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19 June 1985

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

SDP, SOCIALISTIC PEOPLE'S PARTY VIE FOR VOTES, AIR ALLIANCE

Large, Unstable Leftist Segment

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Apr 85 p 15

[Article by Ole Dall and Svend Bie: "S and SF Battle for 200,000 Voters"]

[Text] The Social Democrats have a problem on their left flank, where the party today has Europe's unqualified largest left wing. Included in the proposal for cooperation, S and SF have directed harsh attacks against each other. Tax reforms give Social Democrats tactical problems. There are 200-300,000 unstable voters between S and SF.

"The conflict between S-SF by and large is a surface discussion which involves each of the two parties attempting to entice voters to itself. It is a large and unstable voter group which swings between the two parties." This was the comment of assistant professor Hans Jorgen Nielsen from the Institute for Social Studies in Copenhagen to BERLINGSKE SONDRAG in a commentary on the week's hot political subject: Permanent cooperation between the Social Democrats and the Socialist People's parties.

There is no count on how many of the numerous and particularly unstable voter types there may be between the old and the new socialistic parties, but an analysis of the movements during the most recent years demonstrates that at least 200-300,000 are involved. Or converted to parliamentary seats: 10-15 seats in Christiansborg.

This past week, the two parties have discussed and argued over how they can cooperate.

This is not the first time that the two parties have battled, but it also is not coincidental that sparks are flying when the two "workers' parties"--as they are called on happy occasions--were to clarify their hate-love relationship.

For many years, the Socialistic People's Party has been a little appendage to the left of the Social Democrats. A party of so-called protest size.

But whereas previously there were seven Social Democrats in Parliament for every one representative from SF, today there are only three. And if an election were held tomorrow, there would only be two Social Democrats for each one from SF.

"It is unacceptable to the Social Democrats that SF is becoming so large," states assistant professor Hans Jorgen Nielsen of the University of Copenhagen.

"The Swedish Social Democrats have succeeded in gathering together the group of public employees, but the Danish Social Democrats have not managed this undertaking. After all, Denmark is the country in Europe which has the largest left wing outside of the Social Democratic Party. Even the French communists are not in as strong a position as SF in Denmark," Hans Jorgen Nielsen explains.

And the members of SF have become aware of their size. During the discussion this week, party leader Gert Petersen asserted that SF wants influence according to its size if common trousers are to be made out of the workers' hides.

"The Social Democrats must accept the fact that they do not have the monopoly which they had in olden days. At the moment, we split the voters one-to-two, but it very possibly could be that soon we will stand one-to-one. They must accept that," states Gert Petersen.

But the Social Democrats will not accept that.

Thorkild Simonsen, member of the party board of directors and mayor of Aarhus, characterizes SF as follows:

"SF consists of former Social Democrats or voters with a great sympathy for the Social Democrats, who believe that they can improve things by voting for SF. But they are making a serious mistake."

"So long as the Social Democrats are as far down in vote-getting as at the moment, they cannot be a realistic alternative to Schluter. That requires support from parties which previously have not shown their willingness to stand in solidarity with the Social Democrats. And I am so polite that I am talking only about economic policies. Things look even worse when it comes to security and foreign policies," states the mayor of Aarhus.

It has not been easy for the Social Democrats to reconcile their opposition role with the realities to which the long periods of having power have accustomed them. To the great irritation of the Social Democrats, this has provided SF with good possibilities for promoting itself as the party which stands as a whole-hearted opposition to the non-socialist government. In this connection, it is a tear in the Social Democrats' eye that SF has succeeded in convincing many that by voting for SF, they can ensure that the Social Democrats follow the correct course.

Intervention Produced S-SF Debate

It has surprised many that the S-SF showdown comes so soon after the government's intervention in the labor negotiations, but there is a natural explanation for this, according to Jimmy Stahr (Social Democrat).

"Schluter's intervention has created problems first and foremost in the labor movement, but also in the Social Democratic Party. Quite simply, dissatisfaction over the intervention in the labor negotiations is so great that the fanatics have wind in their sails. In this fashion, Schluter has been the catalyst for a development which I do not believe he himself was interested in," states Jimmy Stahr.

He says that the debate on cooperation between the two parties and the discussions concerning SF's responsibility has come to the surface many times. As editor of the party newspaper, NY POLITIK, he has edited this polemic many times.

"We have tested each other. We certainly can find each other in cultural and legal policies, but it immediately becomes more difficult when we come to weighty economic policies," says Jimmy Stahr.

But there are other grounds for the S-SF power tests now. Aside from the problems with the fanatics--who have a tail wind--the Social Democrats are deeply involved in negotiations on a new tax reform. A large tax agreement with the non-socialists is a strong desire among the Social Democrat's center and right wings, but among the SF group, tax negotiations represent an unbearable foreboding which at the least should have been stopped after the intervention in the labor negotiations.

If things go as the Social Democrats' negotiators hope, a tax compromise will come about very soon, and then it will be an opportune moment, if the Social Democrats have shown in advance that SF is an irresponsible party, on which the Social Democrats cannot base their political influence.

"This can be a means for guarding against the criticism which will come after a broad tax reform. Many groups will have their toes stepped on, even though some also will be surprised. We will have a situation where the government and the Social Democrats will need to defend themselves against the attackers," states assistant professor Hans Jorgen Nielsen.

A Duel With Many Faces

The duel between S and SF has taken many forms. It has been characterized as being that the Social Democrats have not shown a great unity on the surface. There have, however, been continuous offers: every single invitation from the Social Democrats for cooperation have been coupled with strong attacks on SF's reliability.

Even Mogens Camre's question to SF is viewed by Hans Jorgen Nielsen as an attack. If it really involved an invitation for cooperation, it is a little strange that conditions and in-depth questions are raised."

"SF may have a showdown with itself," says Mogens Lykketoft, who otherwise had been the first to talk about cooperation between S and SF. Anker Jorgensen initially said "no thanks" to cooperation with SF, but changed his mind later in the week and said "yes thanks" with so many conditions that for many it sounded like an even stronger rejection of cooperation with SF.

There were so many reports from the Social Democrats that the newspaper INFORMATION wrote in an editorial on Thursday: "Initially we must be allowed to assert that Svend Auken, who on Sunday strongly rejected an S-SF cooperation, /would like/ to see such cooperation, and that Mogens Lykketoft, who seemingly opened the possibility for S-SF cooperation /needs/ to see it, and that Anker Jorgensen, who at first would not cooperate with SF and thereafter would cooperate with SF, does not want either. Thus the course is just as chalked off if one is to analyze the political facts of the last couple of days."

Since then, Gert Petersen in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE complimented Poul Schluter, who he otherwise attacked for pursuing one-sided class politics. Poul Schluter has more solidarity with his voters than Anker Jorgensen, Gert Petersen believed, and he based this on the fact that the non-socialist government endeavored to implement its primary economic policy objective while the Social Democrats endeavor to kick SF around and shove social revival in the background.

"In the short term, it may be a solution for the Social Democrats to make SF out to be irresponsible in the voters eyes. But that is a dangerous policy since at one time or another the Social Democrats will be required to cooperate with SF," states Hans Jorgen Nielsen.

SDP After 'Elusive Goal'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Apr 85 p 18

[Editorial: "Elusive Goal"]

[Text] About 20 years ago, the Social Democrats and popular socialists vowed to form a government together, and in the past week, they were on the verge of reviving the historic red cabinet. Statements from both camps bore the warmth which ties them together and which would awaken the sitting government, but the discussion became muddled by the fact that none of the parties knew exactly what it wanted, and before the end of the week, LO put a stop to it. LO leader Knud Christensen proclaimed that it was completely nonsensical and an utterly wrong time for the discussion to proceed.

That the debate occurred at all is due naturally to frustration which for so long has marked the Social Democrats and which has not become less after the dramatic intervention by the majority of Parliament. That which should have given the party new strength ended with an admission that one would have done the same thing only in another manner. And the government's cold-hearted agreement with the Radical Liberals hit the Social Democrats as an evil warning that it may be a long time before they can return to the coveted governing power. The Socialistic People's Party--which would rather get rusty stealing votes from the Social Democrats than help them strengthen their weak position--did not see any advantage in joining the tired soldiers in the same ranks.

The events of the recent weeks thereby have confirmed anew that there is no real alternative to the four-party coalition government. More or less well-founded rumors that Anker Jorgensen will not be at the head of a new Social Democratic government take nourishment from this fact. The more time which passes, the closer it is that one can imagine that the former prime minister--on his own or others' initiative--will be shown to an honorary box seat from which he can witness others' war games. The daily leadership is no longer able to undertake the daily leadership.

The negotiations on tax reform will show whether the Social Democrats are able at all to move enough that they can free themselves from the false ideas and make an agreement with the government and the radicals. They must gradually have learned that there is no one who will help them up and that they need to get up under their own power.

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POLITICAL.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STABLE FOREIGN POLICY SEEN THREATENED BY GENSCHER-KOHL RIFT

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 17 May 85 pp 5-6

[Article by Gunter Hofmann: "'Too Many Little Kissingers.' Chancellor's Style and Departmental Egoism Relegate Foreign Office to Second Place"]

[Text] Bonn's foreign policy is a hot topic. The unfortunate circumstances surrounding the preparations for the Reagan visit, the disagreement between Bonn and Paris resulting from the international economic summit and the battle over Ostpolitik are having repercussions. Is foreign policy becoming the plaything of domestic policy? Has the FRG lost ground in terms of foreign policy influence?

Hans-Dietrich Genscher adds three additional creases to the thirteen already on his brow when he looks back on the past few difficult weeks. He is heard to say that not everything went as well as was hoped for, and when he says this he is the foreign minister from head to toe. But this "precious china," e.g. German foreign policy, can only be seriously damaged if it exhibits uncertainty, he then adds soothingly.

Twenty-four hours later Heiner Geissler of the CDU chimes in, saying that it is immoral to oppose the strategic plans for space of the Americans and that the United States is being made out to be the "political bad guy."

Inappropriate fronts are forming within the coalition. From Paris, expressions of displeasure with Kohl are reaching Bonn. In Bonn, one side maintains, while the other side denies, that Genscher has sent the embassies a "language guideline" regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the controversial American plan for missile defenses in space. The chancellor was furious in a telephone conversation with the foreign office, because he still thinks that the summit was a great success and that Ronald Reagan's Bitburg visit was a foreign policy blessing. He does not want mincemeat made out of it by the foreign office where the results are regarded rather coolly and where consideration is being given to how to limit the damage.

Perhaps Genscher already suspects that it will not be long before Kohl accuses him, too, of "primitive anti-Americanism" because of his critical reservations. In short, something is not quite right in the FRG's foreign policy.

The result is clear. Despite all of Helmut Kohl's good intentions in his attempts to please everybody, German-American relations have been strained and the price for this will not be insignificant. And the relationship with France has also been affected, despite denials from Paris.

Foreign policy is of course not conducted in a vacuum. Genscher, whose hair stands on end when he listens to those who want to join or interfere in the dispute over "Star Wars," was himself in the past considered the prototype of the politician who looked down on foreign policy as the handmaiden of domestic policy. It looks very much as if the Bitburg spectacle will become a classic example of this kind of lowered estimation. And the situation will get even worse, Genscher is also aware, if the CDU/CSU really hopes to win the 1987 elections by morally proclaiming "yes" to space weapons.

Genscher would not make his criticism as strident as that of Paul Frank, the retired state secretary, who thunders down from his retirement home in the Black Forest highlands, "If both sides, America and we here, allow the fundamentalists and party tacticians to hold the reins of government, then in fact no government apparatus is needed." On the other hand, however, Genscher would not contradict the warning that the primacy of foreign policy is being threatened.

It is not the first time that pressure from below has caused concern regarding foreign policy. It was also present during the missile controversy at the beginning of the 1980's. But what is happening today is new. Without the renaissance of German nationalistic feeling, cloaked by modern historian Hans-Peter Schwarz in complaints of the "forgotten power" of the FRG, the unfortunate debates on the Polish border, the "Auschwitz Lie" Law or the May 8 Bitburg visit would not be conceivable. The things which raise havoc with foreign policy may very well be the same things which appeal to instincts at home.

The question of who is making foreign policy today is closely tied to the question of its substance. As early as the 1970's it was Alfred Dregger, as Paul Frank relates, who wanted to make his own contribution in the foreign affairs committee to the battle over the preamble to the German-Czech agreement: A reference to the expulsion of the Germans had to follow the reference to National Socialist crimes. When Frank objected, saying that for him Auschwitz was unique, Herbert Czaja responded by asking whether the FRG government was aware that Auschwitz was not located in Czechoslovakia.

The point is not to rehash old tales which were unfortunate enough when they happened. Rather, the sad fact is that at the time no one could have imagined that the minority which thinks this way could ever again leave its stamp on foreign policy.

Opportunities Not Taken

The foreign affairs committee has not changed all that much, however, in the just under 15 years gone by. Helmut Kohl has not taken advantage of the opportunity to promote those people who support continuity in foreign policy,

and Dregger certainly did not seek such people. The CDU/CSU members of the committee who determine its direction today have been battling this foreign minister of the former and current coalition for a long time.

Some elements of the CDU/CSU caucus consider the foreign office enemy territory anyway. That the foreign office helped support Ostpolitik has been neither forgotten nor forgiven. And Genscher is considered by many to be the protagonist of these "illusions of detente." The position taken by his office regarding the Bitburg visit has certainly fanned the flames of this animosity.

An old hand like Genscher is not so easily upset, and he also does not take every member of the parliament seriously. But the opposition to him or his policies--the two are frequently not differentiated--comes from many different directions. The CSU and Franz Josef Strauss, the would-be foreign minister, are conducting their own private war against him.

For some time Genscher has nevertheless tried to broaden the scope of foreign policy issues--from Africa to the non-aligned nations, from Nicaragua to the Contadora initiative. He had shouldered the responsibility for a great number of issues. But it is strenuous enough to handle the most difficult current problem areas: arms control, Paris and Washington, Poland and Moscow, Geneva and the Pentagon.

Genscher scarcely finishes planning a Warsaw visit when boos and hisses are heard from the CDU/CSU. When Helmut Schaefer (FDP) criticizes the invitation extended to Stroessner, the Paraguayan dictator, Hans Graf Huyn (CSU) promptly defends the terrible general. As soon as the foreign office urges that the Turks among us be treated with greater consideration, the interior minister immediately botches the attempt.

The results are in: Foreign policy is fading into a diffuse, heterogeneous picture. If at the beginning of the 1970's there was still such a thing as broad agreement on the objectives, all that remains of it today is an ill-defined trace. In order to clarify his position, as well as to rectify errors and reply to the opposition, Genscher is writing by-line articles. He is writing them more and more frequently--and they are often excellent. A text on Franco-German relations penned by Genscher will reportedly soon be published in LE MONDE.

Such difficulties are not a reflection of the quality of the foreign office organization. Naturally this office has superior people. Hans-Dietrich Genscher has a nose for finding them. Not infrequently they are put to the test in the minister's office--like Gerold von Braunmuehl, soon to become political director, or Andreas Meyer-Landrut and Juergen Ruhfus, state secretaries who are experienced pragmatists with professional expertise and native intelligence. And Konrad Seitz, the chief of planning, who is currently dedicating himself to the future of technology, just as he formerly dedicated himself to the Third World. And the list could go on and on.

It would not be complete, however, if one failed to add names from within Genscher's office such as Juergen Moellemanns, more often jeered by the

diplomatic corps, and Alois Mertes, the deputy from Bitburg, who contributed to the unfortunate circumstances surrounding the May 8th visit by saying that the CDU and CSU were "born of the resistance."

A current criticism of the chancellery, which gained new strength with the Bitburg fiasco and summit hoopla, is that it is interfering too much in foreign policy. Insiders look back with nostalgia on the good old days: Oh, how nice it was back then with Klaus Kinkel on the planning staff, with Guenter van Well as the "first" state secretary, with Berndt von Staden as the departmental head at the chancellery, with Genscher and with Chancellor Schmidt, himself well-versed in foreign policy.

Today many people at the foreign office complain specifically about Horst Teltschik, born in 1940, political scientist and former Loewenthal student, who has not budged from Helmut Kohl's side since 1972. If Teltschik is described as the man who not only directs the department in terms of foreign policy but also the man who usurped Genscher's power--can this not mean simply that foreign policy ought to again be placed in the hands of those with long years of experience?

The criticism may be considered relative in so far as jealousy and maintaining the status quo are factors. Not every ritual integrated into diplomacy guarantees error-free policy--not to mention its capacity for imagination.

Moreover, the power relationships in the three-way coalition are extremely complicated. Even in the foreign office there is a certain understanding of the way Teltschik--who is not difficult to work with politically--so "visibly" makes policy. This can be used to demonstrate to Genscher's opponents in the CDU/CSU that the foreign minister is not responsible for policy all by himself. The intention is to show them that Kohl is the stage director. From the southern expansion of the EC to the Franco-German reconnaissance satellites, there are enough additional examples to prove that departmental resistance can only be overcome with the aid of the chancellery. That such egoism can blossom in the ministries is also new. Heinz Riesenhuber does research. Manfred Woerner arms. Gerhard Stoltenberg saves. Hans-Dietrich Genscher pleads for dialogue. And the chancellor cultivates his friendships.

In the final analysis the problem is also not whether Teltschik is less proficient at planning, thinking things out in advance and coming up with great ideas, or is "just" a solid, capable pragmatist. His predecessors always came from the foreign office and that always helped in terms of their connections. But many of those who have entered the foreign office or the chancellery through other doors--Klaus Kinkel, Guenter Gaus, Egon Bahr--have given foreign policy a new face and style. The criticism becomes more interesting when it basically concerns the style of policy making.

The Decline of Classical Diplomacy

Of concern here is whether a typical change in the style of government does not also change or even deform foreign policy. Of concern is Helmut Kohl and his weaknesses, which he considers strengths.

In any case it used to be the great exception when important foreign policy considerations at the government level were not cohesive. The visit of the Shah in 1967 is a prime example. He was involved in direct discussions with the chancellor behind the back of the foreign office. When the foreign office found out about it, it warned that the time was not right--to no avail.

The foreign office, concludes an insider, has just "lost its autonomous position as the conscience of foreign policy." Another insider complains that he has long observed a "decline in classical diplomacy." In Helmut Kohl's Bonn it is really true that "too many little Kissingers" want to get involved. The significance of this comment for Kohl himself can only be estimated based on reports that he considers the Americans "the greatest diplomats of this century."

Serious criticism is thus directed at the new structures. It is demoralizing for the entire organization when, with all its experience, it feels unwanted and that personal connections are paramount to all else. One observer stresses this trend with the analogy that Herbert von Karajan does not say to the Berlin Philharmonic, "I will do this next Beethoven symphony on my own."

"I like this man," were also Helmut Schmidt's words of praise following his first visit with Ronald Reagan. Sometimes it looks as though what for him was a matter of course is for Helmut Kohl the quintessence of policy making--both domestic and foreign. There is almost no European head of state with whom he does not have ties based on feelings ranging from trust to friendship, reports the chancellery with no lack of pride. This is Kohl's advantage. In order to cultivate it, "the telephone is used a great deal."

Where this is so, experiences which might help avoid mistakes play a secondary role. Now Helmut Kohl is surprised when his "friend" Francois Mitterrand is hardly discreet in complaining about how much the process of European unification has been disturbed. And Roland Dumas adds that Helmut Kohl wanted simply to be a "friendly host" to Ronald Reagan at the summit conference. That there is disappointment at Kohl's having therefore set aside many of their common interests cannot be denied.

The differences between the chancellorship of Schmidt and that of Kohl are even more extensive. It appears that within the new political order the chancellor is responsible above all for the "climate." He raises his wine glass with Mitterrand. With Reagan he seeks conciliatory gestures in cemeteries. ~~Perhaps he did mistake the summit for a TV spectacular, but he is terribly~~ indignant when this accusation is made. Although Helmut Kohl may find this accusation unjustified after all the trouble he has gone to, he cannot be surprised at the disappointment which will be evident when practical policies (or the foreign office) cannot deliver what the lovely photographs have promised.

Another new development: Not only is there a direct telex connection ("Amex Charly") between the chancellery and the White House; not only do those bits of information arrive here which are passed on to a limited circle of officials and about which Kohl often informs only Hans-Dietrich Genscher--in per-

son, naturally (the foreign office is then considered to have been informed)--what is of greater significance is that the chancellery in the meantime seems to have also become responsible for German-American relations.

This process has been encouraged ever since the administration in Washington began viewing Foreign Minister Genscher with a certain reserve. He, in particular, with whom the administration has dealt so very well, is serious about a policy of detente, reacts negatively to the announcement made from Bonn itself concerning the American embargo against Nicaragua and refuses (up to now) to give his blessing to the SDI project. And to top it all off he also wants to promote technical cooperation with the East, because he sees an opportunity for stability in such a step. For these reasons, the White House also seems to be relying increasingly on the direct line to the chancellery.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher would like to play all of that down somewhat. Meanwhile, he says, the Americans know that the FDP is surviving. And moreover, experience shows that in the long run the ones who make things uncomfortable are taken seriously.

The impression of rearranged areas of responsibility, with the chancellery having a special responsibility for America and the chancellor for Reagan, is given additional political emphasis for still other reasons. As at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's, the FRG appears to be faced again with the difficult decision of whether to give priority to its relations with France or the United States. As long as the Germans have walked hand in hand with the French everything has gone well, acknowledged Genscher recently before his fellow FDP members in the parliament.

It is not without purpose that Genscher urges greater cooperation with France, but at the same time the chancellery warns that he is overestimating the opportunities there. Regarding the SDI, Genscher certainly wants to avoid disagreements with France. That Paris said "yes" to the Pershing missiles demands consideration for France's stand on the "Star Wars" project which has an impact on their role as a nuclear power in Europe. Here, too, then the question of rearranged roles and responsibilities is inseparable from that of policy content. In the future will the chancellery, for various reasons, follow the transatlantic line while the foreign office follows the Neo-Gaullist line?

Professional observers speak finally of an "Americanization of relations" in Bonn. This, too, would be a novelty. What is meant is the rearrangement of responsibilities between the chancellery/White House and the foreign office/state department. What is meant are the different interests represented by the operatives surrounding the president/chancellor and by those practical men urging continuity, Genscher and Schultz. What is meant is the tendency toward domestic populist politics on the one hand and toward foreign policy pragmatism on the other.

This recent lack of cohesiveness in the decision-making process and the increasing lack of clarity in these matters are gradually resulting in a visible loss of prestige. Of course it is not possible to calculate to the third

decimal place how much weight the FRG, Bonn or the chancellor--three different elements which are nevertheless inseparable--still carries. Genscher also warns against talk of lost influence, but he nevertheless hesitates a moment before answering when asked about it.

In the East, no one really knows any more who in Bonn wants what, and who can accomplish what. Washington does not appear to be proceeding as though its maneuverability, as Helmut Kohl always maintained, had increased following the deployment of the missiles. Bitburg, too, has rather become a hindrance. Paris has already announced that France must become Europe's economic driving force. And while suggesting Franco-German cooperation--Eureca!--France marches on just the same.

In Bonn truly anxious glances are cast forward to the future. What will the SDI discussions accomplish? What will happen if the United States allows the Geneva negotiations to collapse because it refuses to give up "Star Wars," but Bonn has already been too hasty and given its blessing? What if Moscow makes a tempting offer to dismantle nuclear missiles in Europe? What will happen in Europe if the SDI project becomes reality? And have not Heiner Geissler, with his drum beating, and even Helmut Kohl with his imprecise rhetoric, already burned their bridges behind them in terms of saying "no"?

The chancellor certainly does not lack enthusiasm and good will. The "old man," Konrad Adenauer, is lauded by Genscher on occasion as having had the attributes of a high degree of clarity and precision. To put it directly, says Genscher, he learned from municipal politics not to talk about red herrings; foreign policy is an area which requires accuracy. Helmut Schmidt knew this too.

One by-product of the mass of confusion and contradictions in the Bonn of Kohl and Genscher is already apparent by the way: Richard von Weizsaecker has taken on a role which he hardly expected. Much more intensively than former president Walter Scheel, he is busy around the clock mending fences, straightening matters out and explaining wherever government policy has gotten out of balance or where foreign policy damage threatens. Most recently his excellent speech on May 8 confirmed the discretion and resolve which he brings to this task.

Will this period of disorientation perhaps toll the hour for the "old pro" Hans-Dietrich Genscher? Since relinquishing the chairmanship of his party, he has spent hours in internal discussions on the SDI and its consequences. Today Genscher is as greatly enthused about the chances for overall European cultural diversity as he was formerly suspicious of SPD neutrality, for domestic political reasons, as soon as they said the word "Europe." Perhaps the diplomat in him really is gradually overcoming the advocate.

But this does not mean that foreign policy is out of danger. Neither does it mean that the uncertainty has ended or that the degradation of foreign policy for domestic political purposes has been eliminated. Foreign policy has become more susceptible to the ideological attack from below, as well as to external pressures and internal intrigues. As Peter Bender wrote as early as

a year ago, foreign policy must be capable of "squaring the circle": "It must more forcefully protect the national interests, but its latitude is as limited as before." Without its own point of view in terms of arms control and without long-term, insightful objectives, he added, foreign policy will not make it through the 1980's undamaged.

Following the Bitburg debacle and the summit spectacle, William Pfaff pleaded in similar fashion for a "more realistic and more European Germany" which does not refuse to become involved in European cooperation for fear of causing displeasure in Washington. Genscher, who is of a similar opinion, sees a challenge for himself. But what he will have to deal with requires more than one person alone can provide who tends, when in doubt, to use caution and not confrontation.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

RAU INTERVIEWED ON ELECTORAL VICTORY, PROSPECTS FOR 1987

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 20 May 85 pp 24-27

[Interview with North Rhine-Westphalian Minister-President Johannes Rau (SPD) conducted by SPIEGEL editors Klaus Wirtgen, Manfred Mueller, Hans Leyendecker at Hotel Maritim in Bad Salzuflen, date not given: "Geissler Means to Wage Ideological Civil War"]

[Text] [Question] Mr Minister President, you have just won one of the most outstanding SPD election victories of the postwar era and will undoubtedly be the SPD's candidate for chancellor who will lead the party in the next Bundestag campaign against Helmut Kohl in 1987. The idea of postponing the actual announcement until the end of the year—is that just a public relations stunt by the SPD leadership in Bonn to keep it in the news until then? After all, an opposition party does not have such an easy time of it making headlines.

[Answer] That is no stunt. We agreed on that time schedule a long time ago. At the moment, you cannot even be sure that the next CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor will really be Helmut Kohl. At this point, it is an open question whether we would then go into the campaign with a traditional candidate for chancellor and who that candidate would be.

[Question] What would the alternative be to a traditional candidate for chancellor?

[Answer] We might go into the election with a team for a change.

[Question] Do you seriously think that is worth considering? Wouldn't that be viewed as a sign of the SPD's lack of real personalities right away?

[Answer] That could be a sign of strength, too. We fielded successful teams before: Willy Brandt and Karl Schiller, for instance, in the Bundestag election of 1969.

[Question] Now that you have won the absolute majority in North Rhine-Westphalia, there is no way of passing you by. You obviously have what it takes to win elections. You proved it twice in a row.

[Answer] My victory is not only due to my own personal skills—and even if it were, I do believe there are others in my party who possess similar qualifications. During the past 2 years, the SPD also came out on top in Bremen, in Hesse and in the Saarland. And next year, I hope, Gerhard Schroeder will win in Lower Saxony.

[Question] But not every winner of an election is suited to become a candidate for the chancellorship.

[Answer] I think it is wrong to restrict the number of possible candidates to two for the reason that the party itself has two deputy chairmen.

[Question] All right. You have decided to continue playing your role but Willy Brandt, your party chairman, said right after the election that your chances were "very good." And after the SPD losses in Berlin and in Bonn, Hans-Jochen Vogel, the other deputy chairman, let it be known through the grapevine that the SPD could only hope to win with Rau in 1987.

[Answer] He did not tell me that and we have our private conversations, too. It is not as if a political party like the SPD stands and falls with one man. I did not start out as a winner either in the late seventies. On the contrary: people were saying then that Johannes Rau will wreck the SPD.

[Question] Do you feel that the next SPD candidate for chancellor should also hold the party chairmanship or would you like to see Willy Brandt run for that office one more time next year?

[Answer] I think that Brandt would like to run again and that the party is happy about it. So am I. Brandt is a man who is all there and that gives a party strength. As far as combining the two posts of party chairman and party standard bearer is concerned: both Brandt and Schmidt ran for the chancellorship without being party chairman. The two posts do not have to be combined; it depends on how well the people involved work with one another.

[Question] Would you rather stay in North Rhine-Westphalia?

[Answer] Very much so, yes. I really like being minister president.

[Question] Do you think that the chancellorship would be too much for you?

[Answer] No. The question is not whether I think I can do something or I can't but where I can now be of most use to the SPD cause. And as far as that goes, I can hear voices urging me to remain in North Rhine-Westphalia now.

[Question] Do you think you are best suited to be minister president or at least more so than chancellor in Bonn ?

[Answer] I can go you one better. The job I liked most was that of lord mayor [of Wuppertal].

[Question] Mr Rau, as minister president, you did not make much of a showing in Bonn—neither at party headquarters, nor in the Bundesrat or the Bundestag where minister presidents do tend to stand out from time to time. Is it that you do not feel comfortable with the Bonn scene ?

[Answer] I did not miss any points in Bonn. I made speeches in the Bundestag on nuclear energy and in the Bundesrat on economic policy, European policy and on the environment. But like so much which relates to the Bonn scene, your fixation on it has something unreal about it. I must say there are a number of things going on there which seem very, very artificial to me—almost like a hermetic environment.

[Question] How would you define that hermetic environment in Bonn ?

[Answer] It seems to me that Bonn is terribly far from where the action is. There are far too many people who spend the entire week in Bonn and run into each other constantly at all sorts of functions, who play to the gallery in the Bundestag but who have lost touch with real life.

[Question] In your campaign you aimed for victory without the help of a coalition partner. The CDU and the FDP were your stated enemies and as for the Greens who were ready to collaborate with you—you turned them down flat. Would you suggest that the next SPD candidate for chancellor follow the same recipe ?

[Answer] I do not think there is any point in speculating about possible coalition partners. I would rather put it this way: the SPD is back in business; the SPD is being accepted once again. It can take voters away from the CDU and become even stronger so that it can gain a majority everywhere.

[Question] There are those inside your party—including some influential people—who have their doubts as to whether it makes sense for the SPD to try to regain power in Bonn as early as in 1987.

[Answer] If there are such, I have not met them.

[Question] Holger Boerner, your counterpart in Hesse for instance, said at a recent closed-door meeting of the fraction at Poertschach in Austria: "The SPD would do well to dig more deeply into the ideological debate and the one on economic policy and look to 1991 with a new generation of political leaders." And he added: "But if we did succeed unexpectedly in 1987, we still have enough capable people from earlier times." Do you agree with this statement of Boerner's ?

[Answer] What I would say is this: anyone who gives up on 1987 cannot expect to win in 1991 either. A political party's reason for being is its readiness to take over responsibility—at the earliest opportunity.

[Question] Do you believe that this vote of confidence for the SPD in North Rhine-Westphalia also was a vote for the SPD as a whole and that the SPD is moving up once again ?

[Answer] When I look at the outcome in the Saarland, in Hesse and in North Rhine-Westphalia—leaving the special case of Berlin aside for the moment—I believe that the hopes set in the CDU/CSU and the FDP have been disappointed to such an extent that the SPD does have a real chance again as early as 1987.

[Question] In the last Bundestag election, the SPD got 38.6 percent of the vote. Even if it adds substantially to this total, it would not be able to govern without a coalition partner.

[Answer] I think what we are talking about here are political programs which are diametrically opposed to one another. We have the social program of the CDU/CSU which they are constantly revamping and relativizing or which is being toughened by the economic wing of the FDP and then there is only the SPD alternative. It is between these two that the voter must choose.

[Question] One could also say that this is the left alternative and includes the Greens as a possible coalition partner.

[Answer] That goes on the assumption that the Greens are a party of the left. I think that is a delusion. The Greens have not yet jelled into a real political party; they are a mixture of very, very divergent positions all the way to extreme conservatism. There are some cult-like aspects to them and of course leftwing aspects, too. The point is not that we come up with a definition of what the Greens are but that we see to it that they become superfluous.

[Question] In Hesse, Holger Boerner is currently negotiating with the Greens once again because he does not have a majority without them. Would you completely rule out a coalition with the Greens, if the majority-minority ratio in Bonn were about the same in 1987 ?

[Answer] A political party which switched around all of its representatives in 1985 and replaced them with entirely new people and which leaves one with the impression that it is totally self-absorbed—you cannot at this stage pass judgment on such a party with a view to 1987.

[Question] Would you like to see the negative trend of the Greens continue—as evidenced in the Saarland and in North Rhine-Westphalia and to have them remain below five percent nationwide in the future ?

[Answer] That depends on whether the Greens achieve the kind of political identity which they still lack. It may turn out that they performed a kind of alarm clock function. For a time, they nudged the other political parties and woke them up and that was all there was to it. But it is also conceivable that they might develop policies—on the basis of their voter profile and their target groups—that could last. But at present, I do not see any indication of that.

[Question] Looking ahead to the elections at the Land and the national level, can you make out a socialist-liberal coalition or a grand coalition ?

[Answer] That would call for changes in the existing political parties—and I do not see any indication of that. There are no signs pointing to the FDP's rediscovering its liberal ideology in everyday political life. If the CDU continues to practice its anti-social policy, then it runs the risk of losing its reputation as a people's party. The CDU/CSU will not be able to bear up under the strain of policies which primarily satisfy the wishes of its right-wing fringe—the CSU and the FDP—and which condemn their social affairs committees to inactivity. For that matter, that might be a big help for us.

[Question] In view of your election victory, will the North Rhine-Westphalian SPD exert more of an influence on the overall strategy of the party at the national level ?

[Answer] Wherever it makes sense, we will do so. For instance, we did run a pretty good campaign here. Certainly it cannot be used as a model for all future campaigns down to the last detail; but some of the basic considerations could be applied at the national level, if they worked for one-third of the German electorate already.

[Question] One of those who campaigned on your behalf in North Rhine-Westphalia was Oskar Lafontaine, the minister president of the Saarland, who is in favor of quitting the NATO military alliance. Would you still pledge your allegiance to an SPD which announced its desire to leave NATO ?

[Answer] In most instances, Lafontaine and I take exactly the same political position and on some points he has come out with views which I could never share. As far as the FRG's integration into the Western world is concerned I have no doubts whatsoever. An SPD which cast doubt on this would be my party no longer. For that matter, everyone inside the party knows that Oskar Lafontaine holds views different from the majority of the SPD with regard to the alliance issue. Because of his Saarland origins, Oskar's position vis-a-vis NATO is much more clearly defined. It is based more on his observations during the De Gaulle era than a fundamental opposition to the alliance as such.

Anyone who tries to take us out of the Western alliance entirely—which Oskar does not want to do—would be robbing us Germans of an opportunity to play an active role in the urgently needed onward development of détente policy.

[Question] Mr Geissler is likely to have some problems with you, if he tries to run the 1987 campaign by pinning the anti-American label on the SPD.

[Answer] Please do not misunderstand me. We will not enter into a competition with Kohl to decide who bows most deeply to Washington or which party is more American.

[Question] The SPD has flatly rejected the American space research program in its present form and is calling for a European alternative in its stead. Is that something you can live with as a candidate for the chancellorship?

[Answer] Yes, without reservations. Bread for the people is more important than weapons in space. I am all for conducting research in space and on behalf of space—but as a European solution and then to cooperate with the Americans on peaceful projects. I have always considered that to be attractive and technologically necessary. But when I visited America, I already said: why does this have to be for military purposes? What happens to controls once the sun, the moon and the stars get taken over by the military, too?

[Question] If a North Rhine-Westphalian industrialist comes to you and says he thinks it is right for his business to accept orders for this American SDI project, what would you tell him: don't dirty your hands with it?

[Answer] There are no businessmen who come to ask the government whether they ought to turn out certain products or whether they are permitted to collaborate on their production.

[Question] Given the outcome of the election, someone might.

[Answer] If one should come to me and ask for subsidies in order to get it going, I would not give him any financial help.

[Question] Along with the Bundestag fraction, Oskar Lafontaine has come out in favor of the 100-kilometer speed limit and is also calling for a radical shift from personal automobiles to public transportation; nor does he think much of the catalytic converter. Is that how you feel, too?

[Answer] I have always had my doubts about the 100-kilometer limit; I would have been more in favor of 130. I fought for the introduction of the catalytic converter by 1 January 1986. But if we really do not get around to placing the converters in general use until the late nineties, then of course we will simply have to introduce a speed limit.

[Question] Mr Minister President, you waged a campaign with a lot of pretty pictures but with little content. Your posters introduced the voters to your wife and your daughter but they hardly found out anything about your policies. And at your rallies, there were more one-liners than political visions of the future.

[Answer] I know that journalists entertain this view; but it is wrong just the same. In a place like Emsdetten at 3 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon you don't get 1,500 people to turn out merely because they know that a nice fellow is coming to town. That does not work.

[Question] Billy Graham fills the halls here in Germany, too.

[Answer] Exactly; but in his case, the event does not have to be translated into casting ballots and lasting support for a political party.

[Question] Could you tell us what the political aspect of the campaign was.

[Answer] It was a comprehensive program covering all political aspects of which hundreds of thousands of copies were handed out and which was explained to people in hundreds of meetings.

[Question] We noticed the pretty posters most of all.

[Answer] Good posters are a part of an election campaign. Now tell me, when the posters were put up in 1972 which said "Germans, we can be proud of our country" did anybody say then that they acted as a substitute for the politicians? I can still recall DER SPIEGEL praising us at the time for having done such a good job of it. Is there such a big difference between "Germans, we can be proud of our country" and "We in North Rhine-Westphalia and our minister president?"

[Question] It all boils down to mere emotions.

[Answer] I don't think the word "mere" applies. After all, what is emotion ? Human beings, who are both the subjects and the objects of politics, are made up of common sense, feelings, sensibilities and interests. That is what I am dealing with. I am not running a campaign on statistics.

[Question] At many of your campaign rallies, you got your biggest applause when you said "anybody who wants Rau has to vote for Rau" and "talk is Green; action is Red."

[Answer] Do you really think that that is the way to get the Greens down to 4.6 percent ? There is no campaign strategy which can do a successful sales job on an inept candidate or on the wrong policy. The voters are much smarter than you make them out to be even though there are many times when political actions can only be brought home to them with the help of symbolism. And I don't think it is all wrong by any means to have people base their decision on the credibility of individual candidates and not just on their platforms, no matter how well phrased they may be.

[Question] This is the very thing which makes it so difficult to figure out where you stand politically. You are not a classic social democrat—either in terms of your origins or your style.

[Answer] As far as style goes, I am not classic at all.

[Question] You bob and weave like a boxer. What kind of policies are you really for ?

[Answer] You know it much better than I. I am apolitical, hesitant and harmless; but I will stay the way I am.

[Question] Seriously now: what is it specifically that makes Johannes Rau a social democrat ?

[Answer] I believe in the Godesberg Program—no question about that. And I try to turn these political concepts into a reality which can be experienced: into images, into examples based on everyday life and not into the language of the politicians which is a language, as a matter of fact, that I have never learned to speak. And I try to do that by obtaining sympathy for my cause. I do not like to go the route of polarization.

[Question] Many of your positions are purely humanist positions which could be espoused at the head of some other political party just as well. The history of the SPD, on the other hand, has been marked by rather rigid patterns of thought. What is your view of society ?

[Answer] I could not see myself belonging to any other political party. Kurt Schumacher (whom you would probably be prepared to accept as a social democrat) once said: it does not matter where someone came from to the SPD. He may have had his origins in Marxism, in humanism or in the sermon on the mount. In the traditional sense I am certainly not a Marxist.

[Question] Marxists base their thinking on socialist ideology. Do you feel comfortable with that ?

[Answer] There are no prepared recipes; there is no philosopher's stone. I do not trust ideologies because in many instances this involves the imposition of some system at whatever cost. The very word "ideology" is a value judgment after all and a self-protecting limitation on other types of thinking. For a Marxist, the Christian faith is an ideology and for a Christian, Marxism is an ideology.

[Question] That is not precise enough for our taste. Could you clarify what you mean by giving us an example ?

[Answer] Everyone has a different definition of human dignity and everyone also has a different definition of where human dignity starts. For one person, it starts with ovulation and for another, it does not start until birth...

[Question] ...and where does it start, for a social democrat ?

[Answer] A social democrat cannot make a decision on when human dignity begins on the basis of the party program. That is up to each individual as a decision based on his own conscience. But there is agreement on the fact that human dignity is inviolable and that that is why there must not be any exploitation or any arbitrary restrictions on mobility. But as far as the question of what the origins of human dignity are that is a matter for the individual to decide.

[Question] What kind of advice would you give to an SPD candidate for chancellor who would have to campaign against Helmut Kohl in 1987 ?

[Answer] First of all, I would advise the CDU not to use Geissler as a club and turn the foreign policy of our country into an election issue. It is not competition Geissler wants but ideological civil war. It simply will not do to turn a political party into a foreign policy liability and to vilify it as a threat to peace and security which produced men like Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt and which was there when it counted on the Berlin issue and which brought about the treaties with the Eastern countries from which Strauss is now profiting.

[Question] We were asking about Helmut Kohl, your competitor.

[Answer] Of course competence is going to play an important role in the Bundestag election campaign—but so will credibility. Platforms and individuals must not diverge. He who wishes to lead must do what he says and say what he intends to do.

[Question] Mr Minister President, we thank you for this interview.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BONN COALITION'S PROBLEMS MOUNT WITH RAU'S ELECTION

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 17 May 85 p 1

[Commentary by Rolf Zundel: "Warning Signals from the Provinces"]

[Text] It was a landslide. The social democrats came up with their best showing ever in North Rhine-Westphalia and the CDU with its worst ever. It is a typical sign for such a landslide that the voters' preference for a particular party is strong and uniform. That is the way it was in all of the election districts: the SPD did not lose in a single one and even in those districts where the CDU did best, it lost almost four percentage points.

As a rule, there are many factors which operate in bringing about a landslide—and that is exactly what happened in this instance. In one corner, we had Johannes Rau, a popular father figure who embodied the North Rhine-Westphalian "we" feeling in the most pleasant way and all but smothered political controversy on the strength of his all-encompassing friendliness. But being a coolly calculating power politician, he played for extremely high stakes in going for an absolute majority. As compared to other Laender, to be sure, he had a very well qualified cabinet to back him up as well as a stable party virtually untouched by any infighting. "Johannes Rau was an almost perfect symbol for a 'hale' SPD," election pollster Manfred Guellner said. He was the symbol on which widely different types of voters were able to project their expectations—including CDU and Greens sympathizers. All this added up to a strong plus for the SPD throughout the Land.

In the other corner, we had a CDU which was visibly divided and demoralized; which did not have the kind of team that might have given support to their helpless, well-meaning candidate and which based its campaign on a strategy that played into the SPD's hands. The CDU slogan "only we stand for progress" made no sense in the face of the high unemployment rate and the meager rise in pension payments and enabled the SPD to highlight its greatest asset: social competency. The FDP, which presented itself as the party of the would-be millionaires in North Rhine-Westphalia, profited from this. The FDP offered the Land the wrong ideology while the CDU offered the wrong candidate. It must also be noted that the SPD has hardly ever run a better campaign and that the CDU hardly ever looked more clumsy. All this added up to a resounding defeat for the CDU.

The SPD was perfectly right to wage a regional campaign. But one does not get a landslide on the basis of Land politics unless politics at the national level open the door for it. One has to go pretty far back to come up with similar election results, e.g. to the North Rhine-Westphalian election of 1966 when the SPD first came close to reaching the 50 percent mark and Ludwig Erhard was toppled as chancellor soon thereafter. or the Land parliamentary elections of 1974 (where the SPD registered its heaviest loss of more than 10 percent of the Hamburg vote) which were marked by the loss of confidence in the SPD and which preceded the difficult change-over from Brandt to Schmidt.

Midterm elections usually are a problem for the party in power in Bonn. There are two factors which contribute to this. On the one hand, there is the voter's political instinct which rebels against letting the same party run things at the national and regional level and which inclines toward providing the opposition party with a solid base in the Laender (just in case one might need that party again sometime), thereby preventing it from drifting into a kind of sterile fundamentalism. For another thing, there is the criticism of the national government which makes many a voter cast his ballot in opposition to it, even if he cannot really imagine what the alternative might be. The most prevalent way of expressing one's displeasure is to abstain from voting altogether.

All this was made easy for the voters this time around—thanks to an optimal situation in the Land in favor of the SPD and an usually unattractive government in Bonn which evokes a kind of fatalistic disinterest rather than acute anger over its hapless way of handling things. The kind of drive which makes social problems more bearable because they merely seem temporary and the kind of resolve which makes difficult situations understandable, even if they are insoluble—there is very little to be felt of that. We do not have a chancellor able to silence his critics with a scintillating display of self-confidence. The Bonn government was incapable of providing any kind of political options for the election; all it did provide was a lot of annoyance.

Will the picture change at the next Landtag election in Lower Saxony in 1986, which will decide the majority in the Bundesrat? The SPD will have a harder time winning in Lower Saxony. It will have to come up with the issues that might bring down a minister president who may not quite qualify as a father figure but who has certainly been the perfect head of government. And, given the outcome in North Rhine-Westphalia, there is no telling whether challenger Schroeder may or even should count on the support of the Greens.

The myth of a political party capable of vaulting the five-percent barrier no matter what the overall situation or its own internal condition is like has now been shattered. It is not only all-weather types who vote for the Greens; in fact, a large number of their sympathizers can be swayed. And even if their potential stock of voters does exceed five percent, these voters are divided into those willing to join a government and those not willing—where each of the two groups is not strong enough to make it into the legislature on its own. A simple decision on whether to agree to forming a coalition or not will not resolve this dilemma. The Greens will simply have to spell out their position from time to time. It will depend on them whether they have a future and on no one else.

Although this cannot be viewed as a Bundestag election ahead of time, it does amount to a warning signal for the CDU just the same. The 1.6 million voters it has lost since the 1983 Bundestag election (most of whom simply stayed home) will not obediently return to the fold without a word, if and when Helmut Kohl tells them to do so. Abstention is the first step toward keeping one's distance.

How could this unfavorable trend for the CDU be prevented? Most likely, the crucial factor is the SPD. In contrast to the 'hale' SPD in North Rhine-Westphalia, the SPD on the national level is far less popular. On that level, many voters consider the government as being quite unattractive; but at the same time do not view the SPD as capable of taking over the reins of government. For the time being, criticism of the coalition has not yet culminated in a desire for change. Nonetheless, both in the Saarland and in North Rhine-Westphalia the SPD is in surprisingly good shape considering the dire forecasts made in 1983 and even compared with its own expectations. The presumably unstoppable march of Rau to the position of chancellor candidate is likely to consolidate this position. The social democrats can no longer be called also-rans. Just the same, they are still a long way from attaining power in Bonn.

What can the coalition do? For the moment, the chancellor seems to be resolved not to undertake any spectacular moves—in fact, very much resolved. When asked about a possible cabinet reshuffle, he says no—and that is probably just as well. In the FRG, cabinet reshuffles tend to be rather cumbersome operations. As a rule, they provide the chancellor with a drastic realization of the limits of his decision-making powers and the lengthy public debates attendant to the operation tend to contribute precious little to the eventual outcome. Kohl's inclination not to make any changes and his realistic assessment of the difficulties may be subsumed in the axiom "it is best to leave things as they are."

What else is there? There are quite a few things that might be considered, e.g. tax relief to help get the ailing construction industry back on its feet; camouflaged job programs; attempts to keep the farmers from losing

even more money. There will be some discussion of tax reform; but the fact remains that there is no money in the treasury to pay for costly programs and that this **present** coalition neither has the intention, nor the capability to introduce any major new legislation. It has to live with what it has.

There are two conclusions to be drawn from this in the government camp: that government policy is fine but a better sales job must be done on it or that, as Kohl has said, the government may expect to present itself to the voters with "impressive gains" at the end of this legislative session. Pronouncements of this latter sort are part of the standard ritual of all governments which find themselves in dire straits as is the warning to the coalition partner not to establish a profile of **his** own at the government's expense. Reality rarely measures up to prior expectations. Why should it turn out differently in this instance ?

It may be expected that the coalition partner will stay in line. The FDP both needs and gets the votes it needs for survival from the CDU/CSU which **in turn can do nothing about that** because it needs the FDP for the continued functioning of the coalition in Bonn. The CSU, which faces a Landtag election **next fall**, does not fail to point out that things are different (and better) in Bavaria than they are in Bonn. Thus, not much is likely to change in principle as far as this government is concerned.

Impressive gains, however, depend only in part on the achievements of this government. If the economy slows down, even the job program will not do any good. And if, by the time February 1987 rolls around, we will have had as bad a winter of unemployment as we had this year, the CDU/CSU may be in serious danger.

The most likely thing that will happen is that the government will step up its public relations campaign and will steer an ideological confrontation course, perhaps most of all on the foreign policy issue, with a replay of the "freedom or socialism" slogan, laced with accusations of anti-Americanism. We already got a small foretaste of this in the final stages of the campaign in North Rhine-Westphalia. But as yet the voters were not listening. In the future, however, it will be more difficult for them not to do so: Heiner Geissler will make sure of that. There is good reason to believe that the remainder of this legislative session will turn out to be a propaganda battle more than anything else.

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FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE CHIEF, PEACE GROUP LEADER INTERVIEWED

Institute Chief on 'Finlandization'

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 3 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by Per Knudsen: "Norway Has Overtaken Finland's Role as Conflict Area"]

[Text] The West gradually has formed a more realistic picture of Finnish neutrality politics, believes Kari Mottola, director of Finland's Foreign Policy Institute.

Helsinki--Finland's Social Democratic prime minister, Kalevi Sorsa, has not been seen very much in Helsinki during the past couple of weeks. Soon, he will have been in Moscow for talks with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and soon in Washington to meet with the American vice president, George Bush, and rumors have it that it is the upcoming summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev which is being discussed.

In a double role as Finnish prime minister and chairman of the Socialist International's disarmament commission, Sorsa has recommended that the summit meeting appropriately could take place in Helsinki.

The capital of Finland was the meeting place for the beginning SALT negotiations and in 1975, the city also loaned its name to the latest large-scale security and detente agreement between the Super Powers and European countries.

Since then, as is known, East-West relations have worsened significantly, but nonetheless--or maybe precisely therefore--the Finnish president, Mauno Koivisto, as early as last November decided that the ten-year anniversary of the Helsinki agreement on 1 August this year should be "duly" celebrated. And that is to say, "politically," the president added, if there should be anyone who thinks that he only wants to say a toast.

At the moment, it is clear at any rate that the foreign ministers of the 35 countries included under the Helsinki agreement again will meet in the Finnish capital. No promises beyond this can be made officially. But should Sorsa's and Koivisto's hectic diplomatic activity conclude with an

American-Soviet summit meeting in "the boundary land between East and West," it thus would be yet a further national victory for the activist security politics which Finland struggles so hard to pursue--perhaps simply because in many ways it is a requisite for Finland's continued existence as an independent country.

It has been this way ever since 31 December 1917, when Lenin accepted the country's declaration of independence, or in any case, since the two Finnish defeats of the Soviet Union during the winter war of 1939-40 or during the so-called continuation war of 1941-44.

These defeats led in 1948 to the signing of a friendship and assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, and it is this agreement which ever since has played a decisive role, not just for Finland itself, but also for the West's view of Finland's position between East and West.

Based purely on idealistic ideas of small countries' possibilities for being completely independent of the Super Powers' security-policy interests, it has been asserted that Finland's neutrality and national integrity have only a little room to operate.

And without all too much consideration for historic and geographic factors, the concept of "Finlandization" also has been used as a warning for what too much cooperation with the Russians can lead to.

"The Finlandization Debate" had its origin in the first "cold war" and also was prevalent during the '60's and beginning of the '70's, but if one believes Kari Mottola, the director of Finland's Foreign Policy Institute, then this impression of Finland as an unwilling victim of the Soviet Union's pleasure now is about to change--if not previously--in the fortieth year since the end of the Second World War and the sealing of Finland's destiny.

Finnish Autonomy

Mottola believes that the majority of Western countries and governments gradually have formed a "more realistic picture" of what Finnish neutrality constitutes.

He states that "it is known that we have the will to preserve our neutrality policy; that we consistently and actively defend Finnish autonomy, and that our defense has total control over Finnish territory. During peacetime, there is thus no military cooperation with the Soviet Union."

As concerns the friendship pact with the Soviet Union, Kari Mottola emphasizes in a conversation with INFORMATION its positive and confidence-engendering character. This aspect of the friendship pact "is valued to an increasing degree in the West as well," believes Mottola, who notes that on several occasions since signing the agreement, Finland has been in a position "to guard its neutrality" when it was thought to be threatened from the Soviet side.

Mottola cited as perhaps the most noted example, the so-called "note crisis" in 1961, which was a side effect of the Berlin crisis.

During this internationally tense situation, the-then Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, demanded "consultations" with Finland concerning the provision of the friendship pact relating to "arrangements for the defense of the two countries' boundary against threats of armed attack from West Germany and its allies."

It was then an ordinary assumption that the Soviet Union would demand access to military bases on Finnish territory, but at a historic epoch-setting meeting in Novosibirsk, the-then president, "Father of his Country" Urho Kekkonen, succeeded in getting Khrushchev to drop the demand for "consultations." Kekkonen's argument was that such a direct interference in Finland's internal affairs would only lead to "unrest and war-psychosis" in the rest of the Nordic area, and not just in the NATO countries, Denmark and Norway, but in Sweden as well.

Nuclear-Free Zone

"The note crisis" demonstrated, according to Mottola, "in a very concrete manner how risky the strategic development is for Finland," and this was the background for Kekkonen, as early as 1963, recommending that the Nordic area should be made into a nuclear-free zone.

At that time, Kekkonen was viewed in most of the West as "Moscow's messenger," but today, in Mottola's opinion, there is a greater understanding of Finland's /own/ motivation for working actively toward the zone proposal. That occurred based on "a conviction that a nuclear-free zone would be in the security interests of all the Nordic countries," Mottola states.

The issue is being discussed now among the Nordic governments, including as well during last week's Nordic foreign ministers' meeting in Helsinki.

Sweden now supports Finland's desire for "realistic negotiations" concerning the zone proposal, but the NATO countries, Denmark and Norway, are not prepared to go so far. On the other hand, the non-socialist governments in Oslo and Copenhagen also accept that in various ways, "there is life" in the zone-discussion, not the least of which is in consideration for Finland's interests.

The Nordic Balance

In this connection, Mottola emphasizes that Finland's intimate connections with the Nordic area are at least equally as important as a good relationship with the Soviet Union.

This is where the so-called "Nordic balance" enters the picture: to the West, the NATO countries of Denmark and Norway which always have opposed the placement of nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime; in the middle, the neutral Sweden; and to the East, Finland, which also opposes placement of nuclear weapons on its territory.

The clear "no" to nuclear weapons, however, is of more recent origin as respects Finland. Only in March, 1983, following lengthy public debate, did president Koivisto make the following declaration: "We will not allow nuclear weapons in our country. The thought that the Soviet Union would be able to compel such weapons is offensive to our neighbors." Later the same year, Koivisto stated in the United Nations yet more categorically: "Finland will not allow nuclear weapons on its territory."

New Evaluation of Friendship Pact

Kari Mottola says that Koivisto's statements "should be interpreted as being that nuclear weapons will not be allowed on Finnish soil /under any circumstances/--including situations which are covered by the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union." That is to say, during crisis- and war-times.

Mottola does not believe that this constitutes a "new evaluation" of the friendship pact, but he will agree that this involves "an addition to Finland's security-policy doctrine" and a further "confirmation of Finland's neutrality."

With regard to the delicate issue of direct or indirect independence of the Soviet Union, Mottola believes that the friendship pact in reality does not mean anything other than that which would occur anyway in case of a direct confrontation between East and West.

In such a case, as is written in the agreement with the Soviet Union, Finland would defend itself with all available means; not just in the case of an isolated attack against Finland, but also in an attack over Finnish territory against the Soviet Union.

Changing Times

Finland is still bound by this clear agreement, but in Mottola's opinion, both the times and weapons systems have changed so much since 1948, that the agreement is of far less significance now than then.

"The special problems concerning Finland's strategic position have their origins in the '60's when nuclear weapons came to Central Europe and West Germany, just as Denmark and Norway became more directly integrated into NATO's military cooperation," Mottola says.

"Today, the major problem however, is no longer the situation in Central Europe, but the cruise missiles and Euromissiles, both land-based and sea-based. They constitute a very concrete problem, which raises the issue of what Finland should do in this new situation. And here, we have maintained that we, as a neutral country, primarily should have a defense capacity to defend ourselves against these new weapons, irrespective of from where they may originate."

This official Finnish policy apparently has been accepted in Moscow--perhaps just in pretend, some believe, but perhaps also because Finland no longer has the same military-strategic significance as previously.

Norway Has Overtaken Finland's Role

"Today, it is Lapland and the North Cape which are of the greatest military strategic significance for the Super Powers. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have increased their military presence in these northern areas and an arms race is occurring which is the result of new, more offensive military doctrines," Mottola states.

"This arming does not directly affect Finland as much now as Norway, which is in a key position as respects the utilization of a series of new types of weapons. Norway, thus, has inherited Finland's position from the end of the '30's, when with the weapons of that period, it was very important for the Soviet Union to have control over Finnish highways and the like, particularly because of the security of Leningrad.

"Now, the weapons have a much longer range so that one can say that things have become 'easier' for Finland. But the increased tension and strategic speculation in the northerly areas also have a contagious effect which is disquieting not only for Finland, but for the Nordic area as a whole," states the director for Finland's Foreign Policy Institute.

Zone Psychology

Thus, we are back to the proposal for the Nordic area as a nuclear-free zone--an issue which Kari Mottola finds to be "politico-psychologically important to adhere to categorically."

"It fits as a natural link in Finland's very goal-oriented attempt to guard against all strategic speculation concerning northern Europe," Mottola states, but on the other hand, he does not have great hopes respecting a more concrete realization of the proposal.

"One can ask oneself whether it actually is of any great significance for the Super Powers to establish a so-called nuclear /option/ in the north, but as concerns NATO, the greatest problem is likely to be that such a zone could become a type of precedent. It could have a snowball effect in West Germany and it is the same problem as we see in New Zealand. But again: it is more of a political and psychological problem than a military issue since the United States has all possible weapons systems available in the Norwegian Sea and in all other northern sea areas," states Mottola.

On the other side--on the Kola Peninsula and in the Barents Sea--the Soviet Union continues its arming, and thus, when Finland under these grim circumstances maintains the proposal for a nuclear-free Nordic area, this occurs, according to Mottola, "based on Finland's own logic, Finland's own security interests."

Each and every one--and most of all the United States and the Soviet Union--should be able to see that Finland is doing everything which is within the country's power to remain neutral.

But there /is/ a "but," since as Mottola also openly admits, Finland has "a special position concerning the matter which has to do with the Soviet Union's important strategic interests." Therefore, for example, Finland has avoided protesting in the United Nations against the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan.

"But this is something which is understood in the West," believes Mottola, who also views the debate on "Finnish self-censorship" as something which primarily belongs to the '70's. "Today, there is not a great difference between how the pressure operates here in Finland and in the other Western countries," believes the director of Finland's Foreign Policy Institute.

More on this follows in the subsequent article on the concept of "Finlandization."



THE FRIENDSHIP PACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION--most recently renewed for an additional 20 years in March, 1983. Behind the Finnish foreign minister Paavo Vayrynen and his Soviet colleague, Andrey Gromyko, can be seen at the left in the picture, Finland's president, Mauno Koivisto, and to the right, the now-deceased two Soviet leaders, Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko.

Peace Leader on Soviet Actions

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 12 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by Per Knudsen: "'Finlandization' Not Unequivocally in Soviet's Interests"]

[Text] This is the view of the independent faction of Finland's peace movement which is attempting to create a positive view of the concept of "Finlandization." At the same time, it is admitted, however, that for example, on the refugee question, there is an example of the complaints about Finnish sensitivity concerning the Soviet Union.

Helsinki--The largest and dominant organization within the Finnish peace movement is called something as bombastic as /Peace Campaign/, but whether it is first and foremost peace which this organization fights for, however, is an open question.

In any case, in Finland, there is no secret that Peace Campaign first and foremost accomodates the Soviet Union's interests as the Finnish member of the World Peace Council. Perhaps it is not always expressed so directly, but the meaning is the same and everyone knows that Peace Campaign views imperialism as a word which goes together with the United States, while Afghanistan literally is viewed as being a city in Russia.

Nonetheless, Peace Campaign has a nearly half-official status in Finland. Both the non-socialist Center Party and the Peoples' Democrats (which is a cooperative organization between the Communists and Socialist Left parties) are, as organizations, connected with Peace Campaign which also plays a central role concerning Finnish solidarity efforts with the Third World.

But other, more independent peace groups also are found in Finland, such as the feminist group, /Women for Peace/, the pacifist /Finland Peace Association/, together with perhaps the most important organization, /The Committee of 100/, which has taken the name of the British organization of the same name, in which, Bertrand Russell in his day, was the moving force.

The Committee of 100 in Finland, as with the Danish organization, "No to Nuclear Weapons," is a member of the non-aligned European peace groups cooperative organization, IPCC, and the organization also is the forum for the most open and judgment-free discussion concerning Finland as "the country between East and West."

One of those who is most active in this debate is Mikael Book, who is a study leader for the Peoples' Visual Arts Association in Helsinki, where INFORMATION has talked with him.

'Finlandization' as Political Propaganda

As the representative for the Committee of 100 in Finland, Book has been deeply involved in recent years in the international peace movement and in that connection--like so many others in the European peace movement--he often has been confronted with the difficult-to-handle concept of "Finlandization."

"Do you want all of Europe to be Finlandicized?" is the frequent criticism against those who are active in the peace movement, but this question, in Mikael Book's opinion is not posed based on any desire to reach a realistic evaluation either of Finland or of the relationship between East and West.

"Finlandization" normally is used as a concept for /a country which has lost its own foreign policy and its own ability to resist Soviet pressure in its internal affairs./

But is this Finland?

Book has his doubts, and therefore, together with another member of the Committee of 100, Carl-Erik Skarp, has written a debate paper with the title, "Finlandization--Viewed With Finnish Eyes," which is widely discussed in Finland. In this document, Book and Skarp assert laconically that today's Finland naturally is Finlandicized if it is to be understood thereby that the country is a product of its own history and geographic location. And in that connection, the Finnish-Soviet friendship pact obviously has its natural explanation.

"But as a concept, 'Finlandization' is first and foremost an expression for political propaganda," believe Book and Skarp, who write in their debate paper:

"The concept of 'Finlandization' popped up in the media during the period of tension at the end of the '60's when a number of Western politicians and journalists saw a danger in that Finland as well as Western Europe could develop into becoming a positive and attractive model for East-West cooperation. Finland was an example of how a country could have both friendly relations and economic cooperation with both Eastern and Western countries. Thus, the concept of 'Finlandization' was discovered and used by people such as Franz Josef Strauss--as the historic opposite of Willy Brandt's /Ost-politik/, " believe Book and Skarp, who see in this one of the reasons for Finns not readily accepting a concept such as 'Finlandization.'

"Strauss was not referring directly to us Finns. But was he not warning us against ourselves? Was it not like suggesting that our country posed a risk for others? And was there not something to the fact that we felt all that talk about 'Finlandization' as a smear?" asked Mikael Book and Carl-Erik Skarp.

Criticism of Soviets

They are clear that as "part of the problem" they perhaps are not the best to create greater clarity concerning the concept of "Finlandization," but they nonetheless believe that it is time to pose some heretical questions:

Who says, for example, that "Finlandization" in the long run is at all in the /Soviet Union's/ interests?

In any case, Book and Skarp do not believe that the close connection between Finland and the Soviet Union is unproblematic for those in power in Moscow.

Because thanks to the many political, economic and personal ties between the two countries, there are far greater possibilities in Finland to direct outright criticism against the Soviet social system.

From the official Russian side, there often is talk about the Finnish-Soviet relationship as a model for other countries, and therefore, in Book's and Skarp's opinion, it is far more difficult for Moscow, for example, to portray the Finnish peace movement as anti-Soviet.

The two Finnish peace activists predict, therefore, that perhaps particularly in the long run, a conflict can arise between the Soviet Union's domestic policies and foreign policy goals on the one hand, and on the other hand, that which is known under the concept of "Finlandization."

In any case, the two believe that they can see a conflict between the "bloc-confrontational-line"--which dominates Soviet politics respecting other Western countries--and thus, the reciprocal relationship of trust which exists at the governmental level between the Soviet Union and Finland.

Book and Skarp are convinced that it /is/ a mutual relationship of trust and not just a one-sided relationship of Finnish dependency.

"The relations between our two countries are very deep and potentially can be made yet deeper," states Mikael Book, who emphasizes that there is /not/ just one meaning to the fact that Finland has a certain desire to be closer to the Soviet /system/.

But the close Finnish-Russian contact creates unique possibilities for dialog with individual persons and groups in the Soviet society, and this, in Book's opinion, is of great significance, not the least respecting the nuclear arms race.

"There is all too much attention surrounding /the numbers/ of nuclear weapons on both sides," Book and Skarp believe, and who, in their debate paper assert that people in the international peace movement ought to focus much more on how /trust/ between the Super Powers can be created.

"The lack of confidence is both a /result/ of the arms race and a /cause/ of it," the two Finnish peace activists believe, and they emphasize that Finland in this connection has an active and constructive role to play.

In this regard, Book and Skarp are anything but uncritical of the Finnish peace movement, where they see a dangerous tendency to tacitly support the official Finnish foreign policy and for people to close their eyes to the government oppression and censorship which exists in the Soviet Union.

This attitude, however, is not an expression of any direct /Soviet/ pressure, Book and Skarp believe, and they think instead that Finland has very good possibilities for influencing the internal debate within the Soviet Union, "notwithstanding that this perhaps sounds rather idealistic to Western ears."

But some /attempts/ are being made in any case.

Thus, Mikael Book recently was invited to an official peace conference in Moscow, where on his own initiative, he made contact with the unofficial part of the Soviet peace movement which is organized into /The Group for Creation of Trust Between the Soviet Union and the United States/.

Book received a declaration from this group which issues a challenge for "eliminating the respective pictures of enemies on both sides through meetings between ordinary people in both the East and West along side of resumed Geneva negotiations."

The declaration from the unofficial Soviet "trust group" thus, with Finnish support, was adopted by the official peace conference--notwithstanding that from the official Soviet side, this led to nothing other than a marked distancing from this group's activities.

But despite everything, in this instance, there was success in "breaking into" an otherwise closed Soviet system and previously it has happened that on the Soviet side, there has been a compulsion to be more forthcoming in commenting on criticism originating from the Finnish side.

This also applies to Book's and Skarp's debate paper on "Finlandization," which Yuriy Zhukov, the president of the official Soviet peace committee, has found as reason for commenting.

Particularly the challenge to utilize the good relationships between Finland and the Soviet Union as the means for "interfering in the Soviet Union's internal affairs" received some harsh words by Zhukov at a meeting of the World Peace Council, who talked about "an attempt to abandon the common fight against nuclear weapons" instead of "undermining the governmental system in the socialistic countries."

There also was nothing new in Zhukov's answer, but Book's point is that at the least, there was an /attempt/ at creating a dialog with Moscow.

Finland's "Low Profile"

In Mikael Book's and Carl-Erik Skarp's opinion, such a critical dialog is important to continued existence, and they therefore also are critical of the "low profile" which Finnish politicians normally maintain on issues where Soviet interests are involved.

This pertains, for example, to Afghanistan, where in the United Nations, Finland avoided voting for the resolution calling for withdrawal and which condemned the Soviet occupation, and also pertains to the question of Soviet refugees who are seeking political asylum in Finland.

It is a known fact that Finland returns Russian refugees even though they know that upon returning home, they risk being sent to labor camps for having violated section 64 of the Soviet criminal law which treats "flight to a foreign country" as the equivalent of "treason."

Mikael Book and Carl-Erik Skarp find this practice morally reprehensible and they also are up-front about the Soviet attempt to cut off the population from all forms of international communication and that this naturally makes the efforts at having an honest dialog difficult.

Nonetheless, the two Finnish peace activists conclude that it continues to be absolutely critical to work for building up and expanding on a trustful relationship between East and West.

The alternative for Mikael Book and Carl-Erik Skarp is to see a strengthened cold war propaganda and increased armaments on both sides on the part of the Super Powers, things with which Finland so unremittingly attempts not to become a part.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PUBLIC POLLED ON POLITICAL PARTIES' STRENGTH, BELIEFS

Athens ENA in Greek 9 May 85 pp 10-13

/Text/ ENA is today publishing the first part of a major poll taken in view of the elections to be held on 2 June. What do Greek voters believe with regard to party strengths? What is their opinion of K. Karamanlis? In what political faction do they put themselves? The second part of the poll that will deal with the ballot box, revealing to us how the Greeks intend to vote, will be published in the next issue of ENA.

The poll, the first part of which is being published today, provides a broad brushstroke of the political geography of Greece a few weeks prior to the 2 June elections. All parties and the political world of the country consider these elections as the most important since the July 1974 changeover.

Let us therefore see what the voters are thinking and first of all in what political faction they put themselves.

For this topic the conventional terminology of rightist, leftist, centrist, etc. was used.

Three big groups appear from the answers provided by those questioned:

- 39 percent describe themselves as Center Left and tending toward the Left.
- 27 percent mention that they belong to the Center Right and tending to the Right.
- 20 percent see themselves as belonging to the Center.
- 14 percent did not answer the question.

We consequently have 66 percent --almost two out of three Greek voters-- who clearly put themselves in one of the big ideological-political factions, as we have known them for a long time, while 20 percent --about one in five Greeks-- belong to the Center, in other words to a political group that despite its inconstancy and its imperfect and anemic party expression, nevertheless continues to exist, to live and, as it appears, to play an important role in the determination of the results of the next elections.

Of the PASOK followers, 31 percent describe themselves as belonging to the Center, while 41 percent see themselves as belonging to the Center Left and 11 percent to the Left.

The majority of ND's followers describe themselves as belonging to the Right, while 35 percent talk about being in the Center Right. (See Table I)

TABLE I

Political Area Where Voters Put Themselves

	Party that Describes Them					Not Decided	No Answer
	Total	PASOK	ND	KKE	KKE (Int.)		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Extreme Right	2	-	5	-	-	2	1
Right	14	1	49	-	3	13	6
Center Right	11	4	35	-	6	5	6
Center	20	31	7	3	7	17	21
Center Left	21	41	-	9	22	8	6
Left	17	11	-	78	59	8	8
Extreme Left	1	1	-	9	2	1	-
No answer	14	11	4	1	1	46	52

K. Karamanlis

What is public opinion on the Karamanlis issue? That was the second important question we wanted answered.

Of those questioned, 36 percent stated that K. Karamanlis' presence in the political life of the country would have been useful, while 56 percent did not agree with that view. Another 8 percent did not wish to express an opinion.

The overwhelming majority of ND's followers, i.e. 89 percent, believe that Karamanlis' presence in the political arena would have been useful, while 16 percent of PASOK's followers and 15 percent of the KKE (Int.)'s followers expressed the same opinion. (See Table II)

Table II

Public Opinion on K. Karamanlis

What is your opinion? Do you believe that K. Karamanlis' presence in the political life of the country is useful or not?

	Party that Describes Them					Not Decided	No Answer
	Total	PASOK	ND	KKE	KKE (Int.)		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Useful	36	16	89	5	15	51	38
Not useful	56	77	8	92	83	35	38
Do not know. No answer	8	7	3	3	2	14	24

The next question on the same issue was more specific, more to the point: "Would you personally want K. Karamanlis to return to political life?"

Yes, 30 percent answered, while the majority, 62 percent, said no. Another 8 percent did not want to answer. A 78 percent of ND's followers and 11 percent of PASOK's followers supported Karamanlis' active involvement in the political life of the country. So did a significant percentage of the undecided and those who did not express their political affiliation. (See Table III).

Table III

Public Opinion on K. Karamanlis

Would you personally want K. Karamanlis to return to political life or not?

Party that Describes Them

	Total	PASOK	ND	KKE	KKE (Int.)	Not Decided	No Answer
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Want	30	11	78	5	14	35	28
Do not want	62	82	17	94	86	43	43
Do not know. No answer	8	7	5	1	-	22	29

From the answers to these two questions it becomes evident that a significant segment of public opinion, that has linked the presence of K. Karamanlis in the political life of the country to orderliness and the harmonious functioning of the state, has condemned every upheaval in the present situation that would possibly oblige the former president of the republic to revoke his decision and to reenter politics.

It would, nevertheless, be naive for us to believe that an idyllic atmosphere prevails in the political life of the country. Public opinion is attentive, follows events and eavesdrops. There are two important messages that come out of the poll.

- 1. The conviction by the majority that the results of the next elections will bring forward a winner, that is a party that will get over 150 parliamentary seats to form a government all by itself.

- 2. The electorate has begun intense activities on the issue of the formation of a government with the participation of more parties so long as the conditions for such a step are necessary.

With regard to the first question, 67 percent of those polled believe that the next elections will produce a party with a self-sustaining majority.

This view is held by 75 percent of PASOK's followers, 65 percent of ND's, 63 percent of the KKE's and 62 percent of the KKE (Int.)'s. Moreover, this same view is held by those undecided as well as those who did not mention any party affiliation.

We thus ascertain that regardless of party affiliation public opinion "sees" that there will be a "winner" in the next elections. (See Table IV).

Table IV

Number One Party in the Elections

Do you believe that in the forthcoming elections there will be a winner, i.e. a party that will get over 150 deputies to be able to form a government?

	Total	PASOK	ND	KKE	KKE (Int.)	Not Decided	No Answer
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes, there will be	67	75	65	63	62	50	47
No, there will not be	19	14	19	27	27	26	30
Do not know. No answer	14	11	16	10	11	24	23

With regard to the issue of a formation of coalition governments, thinking in public opinion leads to a polarization of opinions. Thus, 41 percent agree with the need to form coalition governments, while 48 percent do not.

The formation of coalition governments is supported primarily by the KKE (70 percent) and the KKE (Int.) (76 percent).

Nevertheless, the concept of a coalition government also has a sizeable percentage of supporters in PASOK (39 percent) while 27 percent in ND favor such a development. (See Table V).

Table V

Coalition Governments

We hear and read that in order for the country to confront its problems it needs coalition government, that is a government to be made up of two to three parties. Do you agree with this idea or not?

	Total	PASOK	ND	KKE	KKE (Int.)	Not Decided	No Answer
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Agree	41	39	27	70	76	39	38
Do not agree	48	49	66	21	24	43	43
No answer	11	12	7	9	-	18	19

How the Poll Was Conducted

The poll was conducted by Metrix Research Center between 18 April and 30 April 1985. The number of persons polled was 2,000, namely those with the right to vote, between 18 and 69 years of age. The poll covered mainland Greece and Crete.

The geographical area is divided, according to the ESYE /National Statistical Service of Greece/ (1981 census), into big urban centers (Athens, the former capital administrative region and Salonica), urban areas with a population of 10,000 inhabitants and over, as well as semi-urban/agricultural area with a population up to 9,999 inhabitants.

Besides Athens and Salonica, those polled came from 13 nomes, 12 urban centers, 12 semi-urban centers and 22 agricultural centers.

Each pollster followed a specific street or block in the big urban centers where he had to conduct a determined number of interviews, namely eight.

As for the semi-urban and agricultural areas, the selection process of sites where polls were taken revolved around well-known places (squares, schools, churches, etc.).

A total of 42 pollsters headed by four auditors were involved in the poll.

The data was subsequently entered on magnetic tapes and processed by Quantam statistical analysis by Quantdata.

The political atmosphere was already seriously charged on 30 April when the poll was completed. The ENA poll began the week after Easter, specifically 18 April.

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POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI SECRETARY PROPOSES RETURN TO RELATIVE MAJORITY

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 4 Apr 85 p 10

[Editorial by Gianfranco Pasquino: "Natta's Proposal"]

[Text] The Secretary of the PCI did the right thing when he vigorously addressed the problem of restoring the principle of majority in this country and [restoring] respect for the wishes of the voters. If the PCI were to register an electoral advance on 12 May and if the five-party coalition were to drop below the 50 percent threshold of votes; if, just because of the electoral defeat, strong internal tensions within the five-party coalition and the resulting renewed political instability and inability to govern were to occur, then it would be advisable to proceed by consulting the whole country through elections. If, in the end, the PCI were still to emerge as the party most voted for, then democratic logic would force the President of the Republic to confer the highest ranking appointment on the candidate designated by the party of the relative majority. Naturally, formation of a government which included the Communist Party would only occur if there existed a capability to form a parliamentary (and political) majority around [the PCI] and together with the PCI.

Neither constitutional nor political objections to such hypotheses, that is, to the scenario outlined by Natta, which certainly has a certain amount of plausibility, are convincing or well-founded. Naturally, many people have unwittingly flaunted the "conventio ad excludendum" scarecrow no matter how often they have denied its existence. Others have said that one cannot have the appointment without a majority having been established in advance. However, many exploratory appointments have been assigned in obvious violation of this principle (often with the one and only objective being a call for early elections). And anyway, the President of the Republic has a certain amount of choice in conferring an appointment, especially in a situation in which considerable confusion and disorientation can be foreseen among the defeated majority, as well as the emergence of a "bandwagon" situation favoring the PCI.

For example, Cesare Merzagora has advanced the political thought that the secretary of the PCI has, so to speak, brought grist to the Christian Democrats' mill. However, it was not a tactical error. To the contrary,

his position is both consistent with his previous statements and with his appreciation of an "alternative choice" between DC and PCI, that is fully shared by the country. Natta has clearly outlined a set of options and has given the Italian voters a choice among two equivalent values. If the electors are mature, as they have amply shown themselves to be in all the elections conducted up to now, they will be able to draw on the facts necessary to decide between the different options. (And the laymen and the socialists as well will also be forced to decide on options among plans and alliances, more accurately than the vague statements of alignment or superficial declarations of strategy which have characterized them up to now.)

This consultation of the electorate and its results will have everything to gain from the following: the transparency in proposals of alliances and programs, the clearness of choice (which could be influenced, as happens to all voters, by fears, hopes, dislikes--those elements which are not rational but which have their importance in politics, and rightfully so), and foresight of the consequences.

It is a pity that the present electoral system, that is, a proportional representation which registers small changes but does not magnify the large ones and which allows the voter to express his identification with a party but not to approve a coalition explicitly, constitutes an obstacle to the actual carrying out of the scenario presented by Natta. Nevertheless, the thoughts of the secretary of the PCI and his requests that the electorate clearly express its preferences in the kind of governments [it wants] constitute a considerable step forward in the nature and procedures of political competition in Italy.

Not only the voters but the political system itself has everything to gain from precisely stated options, the former in terms of political influence, the latter in terms of government management: that is, government management sanctioned by the electorate, for the party of the relative majority, on the basis of a program, in prospect of a change in direction and an alternative fully justified by electoral referendum. It is possible to find institutional means more efficient than the present ones, but the political proposals of the Communist secretary go in the right direction (even if the PCI would have to suffer the consequences of "conventio ad excludendum", if this would really take root in the electorate).

12521

CSO: 3528/57

POLITICAL

NORWAY

LABOR PARTY NEWSPAPER VIEWS WILLOCH, CONSERVATIVES' CONGRESS

Willoch Accused of Arrogance

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 27 Apr 85 p 5

[Commentary by Wiktor Martinsen]

[Text] In the past, practically every difficult issue that arose at Conservative Party Congresses met the same fate. Kare Willoch stepped in and decided that the matter would be referred to the parliamentary group for further evaluation and possible action. That was in the days when Kare Willoch had full and total control over Conservative Party representatives in parliament and managed their activities like a private company. Representatives to these congresses were thankful and more than willing to have the party's great leader take care of everything for them. This was also true of the party's parliamentary representatives when they finally got around to dealing with the issue--if they ever did.

Much has changed since then, but not Willoch.

There was a natural explanation as to why the parliamentary leader could play such a decisive role in the past with respect to the entire party and the political organs of the Conservatives. During the early seventies, when Jo Benkow was deputy chairman, he once stated in an interview with this newspaper that the Conservatives were not a political party, but an organization for election campaigns. Clearly, he was correct in this assessment. The party was an organization that lay dormant between campaigns, but woke up whenever local and national elections were held.

Thus, the center of political power for the Conservatives was the parliamentary group. It was the only political organ of the party that functioned on a permanent basis and the only central location where political activities were conducted and political influence exercised.

This situation characterized the Conservative Party until the late seventies. Even though the party participated in various governments from time to time, this did little to change the power structure within the party. This was simply because the Conservatives never held a dominant position within the

earlier nonsocialist governments--apart from Lyng's month-long caretaker government in 1963.

This distorted power structure made its mark on the Conservatives and, obviously, on the politician Kare Willoch, as well. But while the party organization has gradually achieved a position of parity with the parliamentary group, Willoch has not changed in the least since the days in which the parliamentary group was the dominant force. He still wants to have everything his own way--and this is usually what happens. Perhaps this is not so strange, for it is usually easier to change structures than to change the people within them.

We could perhaps have stopped here and simply stated that Willoch had an underdeveloped sense of democracy and that his lack of knowledge about himself created problems for his own political organization. If the problem had been isolated within the Conservative Party and among his fellow party members who want a certain degree of influence, the matter would have been simple enough.

But the problem is not just an internal matter for the Conservative Party. The present prime minister still has the same arrogance and degrading attitude toward other groups in which he serves an official function. For this reason, Kare Willoch now has a more strained relationship to parliament than any head of state has had during the postwar period.

As an opposition politician, Kare Willoch was a master of stretching the rules of parliament in all directions in order to promote his criticism and attacks against Labor Party governments. The most insignificant phrase contained rights granted to parliament by parliamentary custom or regulation was utilized for lengthy formal procedures designed only to prove that the opposition politician Willoch was right. This same man now faces parliament with totally reversed tactics. Now he is as loose with the rules and regulations governing parliament's relationship toward the government as though they were municipal traffic regulations. While the opposition politician Kare Willoch was a formalist to the core, he has now become a master of expediency. Now he is constantly on the lookout for interpretations and loopholes in the rules and regulations that can be used to his advantage. He now treats the assembly to which he so recently belonged as if it were a group of schoolchildren who need guidance and careful assistance to keep them from doing something wrong.

This chameleon act becomes especially obvious when the politician Willoch changes roles for an instant. If Gro Harlem Brundtland should resort to such tricks in interpreting the significance of parliamentary measures as that recently used by Willoch, she would run into a storm of formal arguments from Willoch. The mere suggestion that certain parliamentary decisions were of a temporary nature because they were made at the end of a parliamentary term would have caused Willoch, as an opposition politician, to drag out both the Constitution and the Rules of Parliament. The same would have been true if a Labor Party government had tried to dictate how parliament was to deal

with a certain issue, such as Willoch did in his letter to the Justice Committee in connection with its treatment of the proposed new law on pornography. With Willoch in his role as an opposition leader, such behavior would have had drastic results--possibly a call for impeachment, for that matter.

Such juggling of arguments according to the position one happens to hold at the time generally leads to a devaluation in the value of one's arguments. This is now happening to Willoch. This is one reason why his relationship to parliament and to the parliamentary groups is one of his main problems today.

Congress Ignored Unemployment Problem

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 30 Apr 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Growth and Jobs"]

[Text] The Conservative Party Congress in Alesund last weekend presented a picture of a self-satisfied governing party. The Conservative Party is satisfied with the present situation and believes there is every reason to celebrate. Anyone who opposes them is a prophet of doom.

Is reality so simple? Of course it is not. We do not doubt that the representatives at the Conservative Party Congress are pleased because their party has implemented so many Conservative policies during their time in power. Before the elections in 1981 hardly anyone believed that the Conservative Party would reach such a position of power in the foreseeable future. This has now happened, primarily because of the weakness of the Center Party and the Christian People's Party. Thus, Kare Willoch and the Conservative Party Congress had every reason to thank the cabinet ministers from the middle parties for their help.

The Conservatives are now prepared to continue, with the help of the two middle parties. The only regret the Conservatives have in the current situation is that they have been unable to implement even more Conservative policies. But this will occur if the government is allowed to continue after this fall's elections.

We do not want to be prophets of doom. On the other hand, however, one would have to be both blind and deaf not to realize that the Willoch government has led our country into serious problems during the almost 4 years that have passed since the change in government. It is not true that everything is so much better now. Large groups of people are now experiencing much greater difficulties than several years ago. The political challenge we are now facing is to solve the problems of these groups. Of course, this does not apply to a majority of Norwegians, but if we ignore this challenge we will have no right to claim that we live in a welfare state. The most important criterion for a welfare state is that it provides welfare and security for everyone.

The Conservative Party is the largest of our governing parties. The

Conservatives also hold the prime minister's post. With this in mind, it is discouraging to see that the Conservative Party Congress was oblivious to the more than 60,000 registered unemployed. The Conservative Party Congress hardly gave a thought to the long-term unemployed. The large numbers of young people who are beginning their adult lives as unemployed also received little encouragement from the celebration in Alesund.

The labor movement, which builds its political foundation on solidarity and people's responsibilities for one another, has little reason to rejoice over Conservative Party policies. Four years of a nonsocialist government have seen the unemployment level more than double in this country. We now have a situation in which there is a crisis in the healthcare system and in which the weakest members of society suffer the most. Sixty thousand people are now awaiting their turn for treatment at hospitals. Many elderly people feel insecure and are not receiving the help and support they deserve. Many municipalities and counties are practically paralyzed and must limit services we previously took for granted.

The main slogan tomorrow will be New Growth for Norway--Work for All. The Labor Party Congress last March, which unlike that of the Conservatives in Alesund was a political workshop, drew up policies for both new growth and new jobs. At the same time, by strengthening the economies of the counties and municipalities, the Labor Party wants to take significant steps to solve the crisis in healthcare and care for the elderly.

The elections this fall can make a change. May Day this year must be a demonstration of our will to change the present situation.

9336

CS0: 3639/115

POLITICAL

NORWAY

NORWEGIAN MPS: CHANGE GOVERNMENT TO SET UP 'ZONE'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "Haarstad (Center Party) Agrees With Liberal Opposition: Change of Government Necessary for Nuclear Free Zone"]

[Text] Norway needs a new government if there is to be any progress in efforts toward a treaty-based nuclear free zone in the Nordic area. This was asserted by the Labor Party's Thorbjorn Berntsen and the Socialist Left's Hanna Kvanmo at a Nordic press conference which was arranged at Holmenkollen yesterday. It was more noteworthy, however, that Member of Parliament Ragnhild Q. Haarstad of the Center Party agreed with the position.

"Treaty Now"--the Nordic movement for a treaty establishing the Nordic area as a nuclear free zone--had gathered together a group of parliamentarians from the Nordic countries yesterday in order to demonstrate its support for the movement. The Finnish Social Democrat Saara-Maria Paakinen was able to state that 160 of the 200 members of the Finnish parliament had signed a petition of support.

The movement has received support from Parliament from among the Labor Party delegation, the Socialist Left and five non-socialist representatives: Hans Hammond Rossbach and Mons Espelid from the Liberal Party, Ragnhild Q. Haarstad and Lars Velsand from the Center Party, and Christian Democrat Johannes Vagsnes. "More undoubtedly would have signed if there had been more time," Ragnhild Q. Haarstad asserted.

"The problem is that, in contrast with the other Nordic national legislatures, there is no outspoken majority in the Norwegian parliament," states a Dane, Pelle Voigt. And from the Norwegian side, all blame was placed on the Conservatives. "It is a fact that the Conservatives are a brake block in this matter as well as on the issue of a freeze," said Thorbjorn Berntsen, who added that without the opposition from the Conservatives, the work would have made progress long ago.

"It is only the Conservatives who are resisting. It is impossible to get Prime Minister Kare Willoch and others to understand that it is not a unilateral agreement with the Soviets which we support," stated Hanna Kvanmo. And Hans Hammond Rossbach instituted a search for the political will within the government.

It was regarding the issue of whether she also agreed that a new government was necessary in order for there to be any progress in the treaty movement that Ragnhild Q. Haarstad made the following statement:

"Yes, unfortunately. I would wish that I would be able to answer 'No' to the question." But she emphasized as well that this applied to this particular issue. A short time ago, this Center Party representative caused further attention by asserting that she preferred cooperating with the Labor Party on cultural politics.

"The treaty effort creates special problems in Norway and Denmark by reason of their membership in NATO. But all Norwegian parties, with the exception of the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, have included in their platforms to strive toward creating the Nordic area as a nuclear free zone. The most serious hindrance is that the largest governing party is so negatively disposed," were among the comments she had to make.

12578

CSO: 5200/2605

POLITICAL

NORWAY

ELECTION EXPERTS GIVE NON-SOCIALISTS LEAD IN CAMPAIGN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 May 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "Election Experts Betting on Non-Socialist Victory--Conservatives Warned Against Dullness but Labor Party's Solutions Lack Appeal"]

[Text] At the moment, 33.6 percent of the voters will vote for the Conservatives. This is shown by the current party barometer from Norway's Market Data, and the institute has not noted such high figures for the party since 1979. At the same time, the Labor Party will receive only 36.7 percent--in fact, less than the election results in 1981. "This confirms that the conservative wave is far from finished," according to the expert panel which AFTENPOSTEN has assembled to comment on the election prospects.

But the Conservatives are warned against becoming too boring and careful such that the party gets out of step with younger voters. The panel asserts the opposition has succeeded in convincing people that the government is doing a poor job in the health and social sector. But on the other hand, there is nothing which suggests that the Labor Party's old-fashioned solutions have appeal.

As appears from the graph showing public opinion developments from last fall up to today, the non-socialists have overtaken the lead following a strong Labor Party period. Does this mean that the government can count on a renewed contract? AFTENPOSTEN has asked a group of election experts to respond to this and other questions: Bjorn Balstad, director of Gallup/NOI (the leader within the public opinion branch), Svein Lovas, social economist and director of Scan-Fact, and political scientist Tor Bjorklund from the Institute for Social Research, who has, among other things, edited the large book on the conservative wave and additionally has cooperated with the Marketing and Media Institute.

Election Campaign Decisive

All three are betting on a non-socialist election victory, but say in a chorus that it is still very even and that the election campaign will be decisive.

Balstad: "The non-socialists lead was larger prior to the election in 1981."

Lovas: "The election campaign is still thought to be more important. In today's informed society, people feel continually bombarded. Many do not manage until just before election day itself to gather impressions, influences and their own feelings together into a viewpoint. This is a development which we also see clearly in surveys of the commercial market."

Bjorklund: "Uncertainty has become greater. Group affiliations are weaker. Previously in election research the saying was: Tell me where you come from and I will tell you how you vote. Now it is more important where one's thoughts have gone."

Enthusiasm Lacking

MMI has a current panel survey which shows that 10-15 percent have changed parties between October of last year and February. Many Labor Party voters lack enthusiasm and are sitting on the fence.

Balstad: "Many who had thought about voting socialist are no longer sure. The economic development in Norway has been very positive in recent months."

Labor Party Old-Young?

AFTENPOSTEN: "Surveys have shown that people have the greatest confidence in the Labor Party on matters on which they themselves place the most weight, that is, health and social policies and employment. Why is the Labor Party not advancing?"

Lovas: "Perhaps the Labor Party would otherwise be even worse off? But there must be other things which influence people. Undoubtedly, many believe that the Labor Party is a old-young party. They likely have confidence in the party's will but not its ability. Feelings and lifestyles still mean more for people's votes in all areas."

Balstad: "Do the voters believe the Labor Party's promises? Perhaps they can see the effects of greater price increases, etcetera, which Willoch warns against?"

Bjorklund: "The Labor Party's answer to problems is to pour in more money. The Left's dilemma is that it no longer has new solutions to offer. In contrast, the Right has fashionable explanations and economic solutions."

Conservatives Visionless?

Lovas: "The party which succeeds in making the election campaign into something other than a quarrel about billions will be the election winner. We have done a series of studies which shows that the voters comprehend very little or nothing of the things which the politicians believe are determinative--national congresses, budget debates and the like."

Bjorklund: "The Conservatives lack visions for tomorrow's society."

Lovas: "I agree completely. There are too many arguments of the type 'We must be cautious now--nothing rash, thank you!' In contrast, the Conservatives attack sharply in other areas where people want to let go, for example, respecting the closing law and information concerning the NRK [Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation] monopoly."

Balstad: "Yes. Astrid Gjertsen has the greatest increase in our popularity tests for members of the government."

AFTENPOSTEN: "Will it be decisive which areas become the main themes of the election campaign?"

Balstad: "In all likelihood. The opposition clearly has succeeded in convincing people that the government is doing poorly in the health and social sector."

Lovas and Bjorklund say that they agree with this.

Bjorklund: "We are confronting a very interesting paradox. Norway's Market Data's polls in AFTENPOSTEN last Saturday show that people think they are well off and believe in future progress. At the same time they complain about bad conditions in the health and social sector. Strangely enough, people are more optimistic now in the middle of the uncertain 1980's than previous polls from typical growth- and advance-periods have shown.

"We have become a wealthy country and the conservative wave is rolling strongest precisely in the most prosperous areas around the Oslo Fjord and Rogaland. Perhaps social policies actually do not matter so much for many who say that they do?"

Progress Party a Wild Card

AFTENPOSTEN: "Henry Valen has called the Progress Party the election's big wild card and counts on the party having a large advance. But is it likely that the success from the last two elections will repeat itself?"

Balstad: "The Progress Party no longer is in the news to the same degree and can hardly count on a similar large jump this year."

Lovas: "Support swings strongly in accord with media notoriety. If the election campaign proceeds as previously, I believe the Progress Party will do considerably better than the current poll figures suggest."

Balstad: "We must remember that Hagen now is in the light more than before-- and also starts from a higher level."

AFTENPOSTEN: "Doesn't the Progress Party risk getting caught in a typical government election?"

Balstad: "I do not think that this counts very much for the voters."


Bjorklund: "The Progress Party likely will benefit from the fact that the Conservatives would prefer to cooperate with those which the party calls prohibition- and cost-parties in the Center. As a protest party, the Progress Party is dependent on taking a beating from all the others."

Moscow-Liners of the 1980's

Lovas: "Hagen and Company benefit from being the only anti-establishment party. They are different, and that has appeal."

Balstad: "Agreed. The other parties suffer from stamping everything which comes from the Progress Party as being dumb. The voters react against this."

Bjorklund: "Liberal ideology is in the wind and that provides 'explanations' for everything which is wrong. Vice chairman Anne Beth Moslet--'Maggie from Karmoy'--operates with a certain logic. And the young idealogues within the party are in a certain way the Moscow-Liners of the 1980's. Faith and teachings give them the answer to all questions: the church should be operated according to the economic principles of the marketplace, etcetera."



- Key: 1. A-Bloc (Labor/Socialist Left/Liberal)
2. B-Bloc with Progress Party
(Conservative/Christian Democratic/Center/Progress)
3. B-Bloc (Conservative/Christian Democratic/Center)

NORWAY'S MARKET DATA -- POLITICAL BAROMETER

	1	2															
	Stor- tings- valg Sept. 1981	Fylkes- tings- valg Sept. 1983	Jan. 1984	Febr./ Mars 1984	April 1984	Mai 1984	Juni 1984	Aug. 1984	Sept. 1984	Okt. 1984	Nov. 1984	Des. 1984	Jan. 1985	Feb. 1985	Mars 1985	April 1985	
RV.....3.....	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Ap.....4.....	37,1	39,2	38,9	38,4	39,2	39,0	40,1	39,6	39,9	39,9	39,6	38,8	38,1	37,7	37,6	36,7	
NKP.....5.....	0,3	0,4	0,4	0,1	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,3	0,4	0,9	0,3	0,2	
SV.....6.....	5,0	5,3	5,9	6,5	5,2	5,5	6,2	6,0	5,4	6,0	5,1	5,6	5,1	5,2	5,1	4,8	
Fr.p.....7.....	43,5	40,1	40,3	45,6	45,7	45,7	47,2	46,7	46,1	46,9	45,7	45,5	44,1	44,8	43,8	42,6	
DLF.....8.....	4,5	6,3	7,0	7,1	6,7	7,5	6,2	7,1	5,7	6,4	5,9	5,4	7,0	6,3	4,4	5,8	
Hayre.....9.....	0,2	0,7	0,3	0,2	0,6	0,2	0,4	0,4	0,2	0,7	0,3	0,4	0,5	0,4	0,6	0,3	
Kr.F.....10.....	31,8	26,3	28,7	28,9	28,6	28,6	28,9	28,0	29,1	28,5	29,4	29,2	30,4	30,9	31,2	33,6	
Sp.....11.....	9,3	8,7	7,9	8,3	8,7	7,6	7,7	8,5	8,9	8,5	8,6	8,2	8,3	8,7	9,3	7,7	
Vestre.....12.....	6,6	7,3	5,7	6,7	6,1	6,3	5,3	5,2	5,6	5,1	6,0	6,6	6,0	4,7	6,5	6,1	
Andre.....13.....	3,9	4,4	4,0	4,0	3,3	3,8	4,0	4,1	4,5	3,4	3,7	4,4	3,7	4,1	3,6	3,5	
Sum.....14.....	0,2	0,3	0,2	0,2	0,4	0,3	0,4	0,1	0,0	0,5	0,4	0,2	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,4	
Svar om partipreferanse.....15.....	100,0	100,0	100,1	100,0	100,1	100,0	100,1	100,1	100,1	100,0	100,0	99,9	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	
Antall interv. falt.....16.....	1141	1177	1029	1041	1001	1039	1056	1023	1065	1094	1007	1020	1046	1016	1037	1037	
	1388	1423	1298	1261	1241	1245	1289	1288	1288	1323	1252	1253	1278	1215	1262	1262	

- Key: 1. Parliamentary Election, Sept. 1981
2. Local Election, Sept. 1983
3. Radical Liberal
4. Labor
5. Norwegian Communist
6. Socialist Left
7. Progress
8. New Liberal
9. Conservative
10. Christian Democratic
11. Center
12. Liberal
13. Others
14. Total
15. Responses re party preference
16. Total number interviewed

The barometer is created by each party being weighed relative to the parliamentary election of 1981. Statistical errors are calculated to be in the range of 3% for voting percentages around 50%, about 2% for voting percentages between 10-20% and near 1% for lower voter percentages.

Interviewing occurred during the period 22 April-20 May, 1985

Norway's Market Data A/S

12578

CSO: 3639/116

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL SHOWS PINTASILGO 'INVINCIBLE ON LEFT'

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 27 Apr 85 p 7

[Article by Antonio Pinto Leite]

[Text] Assuming the hypothesis that the optimism of Mario Soares will take him to the second round of the presidential elections, the socialist leader would be faced with those who, according to the Norma-SEMANARIO poll, would be his most threatening adversaries--Firmino Miguel, Freitas do Amaral, Alberto Joao Jardim and Lourdes Pintasilgo. Public opinion was unfair to Soares--a defeat on all fronts, except the military sector, against Firmino Miguel. Only Firmino withdrew and Soares as a candidate loses to Freitas and Jardim, and is crushed by Pintasilgo. Thus the first round for Soares may be his last.

However, those who think that the prime minister we now have will let himself be beaten down are mistaken. These results will be seen as a tremendous victory! There will be no further need to justify the 3 and 4 percent figures of a few months back on the television. Now, given any of the possible hypotheses, he will not drop below 21 percent, a solid base for the final thrust. He has some credit, is not at a standstill, and two private television channels will do the rest. Soares has no doubts.

The worst thing is the voters. The rich support him (22.7 percent to 32.9 percent), it is true, but the middle class is indifferent (from 18 percent to 20.8 percent) and the lower class treats him badly (from 3.2 percent to 15.6 percent). With the restrictive policy of Ernani Lopes, it cannot be presumed that the poor are going to have any reason to believe in Soares. Which is unfair, now that there is "rice pudding" aplenty for everyone.

The indication in earlier polls that men definitely preferred Soares more than women did stood out clearly. But the women are beginning to have less resistance to his charm. And there is an explanation for this. They are naturally sensitive to persistent men in particular, and the women can watch Soares every evening in their bathrobes on Telejornal.

All of the previous doubts as to the popularity of the socialist secretary general remain within the youngest age groups, which have always been less

attracted by him than the voters on the older age levels (19.8 percent as compared to 24 percent, on an average). It is thus confirmed that Soares is wrong in confusing the third wave with the undertow.

Requiem for Firmino

When this poll was taken General Firmino Miguel was still in the race for Buenos Aires--correction, Belem. Despite the fact that his candidacy was then at its peak, he would be the only one defeated by Soares. A smashing defeat, almost all down the line. Men, however, prefer him, as does the upper class, where he was moreover the only candidate to defeat Soares. Women are tired of wars, and they ruin his chances entirely in the middle class, as well as the lower class, which treats him abominably.

Another important fact is that a second round with Soares opposing Firmino would see a record percentage of abstentions, more than half. Thus Soares would end up elected by a so-called "relative minority."

Silence Is Golden

Withdrawn into total silence and, as of the date of the poll, strictly adhering to his decision not to run as a candidate, Freitas do Amaral achieved a worthy score for someone whose candidacy is said to be impossible.

He succeeded in outdoing Soares, although not by much, by eight-tenths. This was very particularly due to the support given him in the native land of Sa Carneiro, Oporto. There the socialist leader triumphed heavily (24.8 percent as compared to 14.9 percent), and it remains to be seen if the businessmen in the north will react similarly, following the revival of his candidacy (the charts by district have not yet been published).

The difficulties the "professor" faces in agrarian zones, even Evora (17.2 percent), where there is also a university, are obvious. He invariably loses there. In Lisbon as well, not even peripheral Abecasis favors him, although the level of those questioned who would not vote for either of the candidates or who could not say for whom they would vote (52.9 percent) is high. And it is only fair to remember that Freitas do Amaral has not yet waged any campaign, unlike Soares, who has managed his in unsurpassable fashion.

The upper class prefers Soares, without any room for doubt (30.8 percent to 25.8 percent), which suggests that the Portuguese right wing is just what it is termed. However, it is curious to note that the level of those polled in the upper class who had no opinion or would not vote in this case is the lowest in the entire poll. In other words, it is hardly likely that the campaigns of Freitas and Soares will reach bankruptcy.

Alberto Joao Jardim

Totally reversing the image of Jardim, that of a man in whom the disadvantaged people have confidence, this poll achieves a real feat! Of all of those polled in the lowest economic class, none voted for Jardim. None. The overwhelming majority of the humble people polled (85.6 percent) would not vote

either for Jardim or Soares, moreover. In other words, if Jardim offers Soares his support, as he has already suggested, Soares would not gain a single poor vote thereby.

The victory of the regional leader over the prime minister is also close--four-tenths, a half of the difference with Freitas.

His stronghold continues to be Evora and women, particularly women, who cannot resist his manner. Also the younger group prefers him, as does the middle class. He divides the honors in the large cities with Soares, winning in Oporto, losing in Coimbra, and tied in Lisbon. Vila Real, probably jealous of the unsolicited insularity for which he is the spokesman, made him pay dear in terms of an average. Only 12.9 percent would vote for him, as compared to 30.1 percent for the socialist leader.

Pintasilgo, the Candidate of the Left

The worst defeat suffered by Soares would, despite everything, be on the left, in a possible contest with Lourdes Pintasilgo.

In general terms, the triumph of the self-candidate of the Eanist sector would be overwhelming, with our prime minister resisting it with the precious aid of the most prosperous class. It is obvious that almost half of the voters (47.9 percent) would be excluded, a margin which might upset all the calculations now being made by December.

There are, moreover, some typical and impressive situations. For example, among the poorer people, the leader of the Socialist Party in our country would not win more than 3.2 percent of the votes, as compared to 47.8 percent for Pintasilgo. There is a structural reform in the Soarist electorate.

One can choose among various interpretations of the results for the two. Among other things, it could be assumed that the percentage of those polled who voted for neither falls within the sector commonly described as the "left." Thus, imagining the situation on the first round, the left would give its votes to Pintasilgo.

On the other hand, it is certainly curious that the right wing, which showed its preference at about 23 percent in the cases of Jardim and Freitas do Amaral, has not added its votes to those of Soares (who stayed at 21 percent) to defeat Pintasilgo in a possible second round.

Also, the left wing did not endorse him in the battle against the right-wing candidates. Significant point.

One conclusion seems acceptable, and that is that these results confirm that bipolarization is the worst electoral enemy of Soares. Only a splintering of the candidacies, in particular on the right, would allow him to build the "great center."

Second Round of the Presidential Elections

	TOTAL	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic Stratum		
		M	F	18-44	45+	A/B	C	D
If the candidates were the following:								
Al. João Jardim	23.6	23.2	24.0	26.2	21.2	17.8	28.2	—
Mário Soares	23.2	24.0	22.4	21.3	24.9	32.9	19.3	14.4
Would not vote	36.1	40.9	31.7	40.7	31.9	37.1	34.1	55.7
Don't know	11.8	7.1	16.1	7.4	15.9	8.1	12.4	26.9
No answer	5.3	4.8	5.8	4.4	6.2	4.2	6.0	3.0
If the candidates were the following:								
L. Pintasilgo	31.0	32.0	30.0	34.1	28.1	25.6	32.2	47.8
Mário Soares	21.1	21.9	20.5	17.2	24.8	30.8	18.0	3.2
Would not vote	32.8	36.0	30.0	36.1	29.9	31.2	33.4	35.9
Don't know	9.8	5.4	13.7	8.3	11.1	8.3	10.4	10.1
No answer	5.3	4.7	5.8	4.4	6.1	4.2	5.9	3.0
If the candidates were the following:								
Freitas Amaral	23.3	27.6	19.4	24.7	22.0	25.8	22.8	13.9
Mário Soares	22.5	24.3	20.9	21.1	23.8	30.8	19.0	16.9
Would not vote	36.6	38.7	34.7	38.8	34.6	28.5	39.6	48.2
Don't know	12.2	4.6	19.1	11.0	13.4	10.6	12.5	18.0
No answer	5.4	4.8	5.9	4.4	6.3	4.2	6.1	3.0
If the candidates were the following:								
Firmino Miguel	17.8	26.5	9.9	16.0	19.4	31.3	12.7	1.3
Mário Soares	21.2	19.5	22.7	19.8	22.5	22.7	20.9	15.6
Would not vote	39.5	41.3	37.9	45.5	34.0	28.5	43.8	51.2
Don't know	16.1	7.9	23.5	14.2	17.8	13.1	16.5	28.9
No answer	5.4	4.8	6.0	4.5	6.3	4.4	6.1	3.0

Citizens Want Independent President

The citizens of Portugal definitely lack confidence. The slogan "One Majority, One Government, One President" does not impress them. They clearly prefer a nonaligned president with a moderating, arbitrating, perhaps monarchic function. They want him to represent a level of political and psychological recourse to which the inflationary acts of the cabinet can be appealed. This is the viewpoint of 63.3 percent of those polled. Only 23.3 percent have no fear of giving a government to the president or a president to the government.

There is a significant level of mistrust of the executive branch on the part of the poorest class. Only 1.4 percent prefer a president of the same political hue as the cabinet. After 10 years of revolution, this is in no way edifying. Curiously, the so-called middle class is that which reacted most to the slogan launched by Sa Carneiro in 1980: 24.7 percent regard political consistency between the two institutions as good and "only" 62 percent have a negative view of it.

Women feel better protected by a moderating president, and only 18.5 percent of them did not know which they preferred. The men, for their part, were firmly decided, with only 7.7 percent indicating no choice. The majority (64.8 percent) advocated having an arbiter in Belem.

Among those polled, the group 45 years of age and older was most disillusioned with the lack of authority or ill-adjusted to it over a considerable time. The majority still insists on the political independence of the president, but those who urge this were after all the smallest of all the majorities obtained on this matter (54 percent as compared to 26.5 percent).

A final note--only 13.4 percent of those polled failed to answer on this question. In other words, Portuguese citizens seem certain about the kind of political system they like best. From the responses obtained and due to the "success" of the Portuguese political experience in the past 10 years, that generous Roman procurator who passed through here must have been right. "There is a people on the Iberian Peninsula which neither governs itself nor lets itself be governed." He was speaking of us.

Political Hue of the President and the Cabinet

	<u>TOTAL</u>	Sex		Age		Socioeconomic Stratum		
		<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>18-44</u>	<u>45+</u>	<u>A/B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>
Same political hue	23.3	27.5	19.6	19.9	26.5	24.1	24.7	1.4
Independent cabinet	63.3	64.8	61.9	73.5	54.0	68.1	62.0	50.0
No preference given	13.4	7.7	18.5	6.6	19.5	7.8	13.3	48.1

5157

CSO: 3542/168

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLLS SHOW SUPPORT FOR FREITAS DO AMARAL CANDIDACY

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 3 May 85 p 4

[Text] An increase of 3 points for Freitas do Amaral as of the time he announced his candidacy is the most outstanding fact indicated by the Marktest poll taken for O JORNAL for the month of April. In that same period, after Portuguese membership in the EEC had been announced, Mario Soares gained 1 point and Lourdes Pintasilgo, whose major lead was maintained, showed a slight decline.

The candidacy of Freitas do Amaral clearly won over the PSD [Social Democratic Party]. According to this poll, the former centrist leader is currently the candidate in the best position with the social democratic voters, among whom he has 30 percent, followed by Jardim with 16 and Mota Amaral with 15. In the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], Freitas has 44 points, while Lucas Pires obtained a significant 20 percent.

The Oporto region and voters over 55 are two other important sectors in the overall results for Freitas do Amaral, who showed a gain from 11 to 14 percent. Lourdes Pintasilgo, who continues to run well ahead of the other candidates with 26 percent, obtained 82 points with the APU [United People Alliance Voters], 38 with those who supported Eanes and 32 with the socialists.

Pintasilgo is also in a good position in the southern part of the country, with 28 percent, and in the Lisbon region. The voters between 35 and 44 years of age proved most favorable to the candidate, while the young people (18 to 24) support him least. Mario Soares, with 9 percent, is not as strong with the socialist voters as Pintasilgo, who has only 25 percent. The highest percentages for Soares were to be found in the north and in the Oporto region, as well as among the voters between 24 and 35 years of age.

Mota Amaral still has 7 percent, and was outdone by Alberto Jardim, who has 1 percentage point more. This difference remained the same among the social democratic voters as well. Actually, the two leaders of autonomous regions showed very similar percentages.


As to the spontaneous indications, it should be noted that a candidate supported by Eanes, and thus defined, won 9 percent of the intended votes.

Also, a very significant increase was seen here for Freitas do Amaral (7 points), along with a slight increase for Soares. Lourdes Pintasilgo, contrary to what was seen with the "suggested indications," also increased his score, while Alberto Joao Jardim lost 3 points.

Eanes Endorsement May Mean Election

Spontaneous Indications	Vertical percentages				
	Apr	Sep	Dec	Feb	Apr
Lurdes Pintasilgo	8	5	13	10	12
Freitas do Amaral	4	3	5	2	9
Candidate with Eanes' support	9	15	6	7	9
Alberto João Jardim	—	—	2	8	5
Mário Soares	8	5	7	3	4
Firmino Miguel	1	1	1	6	3
Mota Amaral	4	4	3	2	3
Lucas Pires	—	—	1	2	2
Lemos Ferreira	—	—	—	3	2
Mota Pinto	—	—	1	2	1
Pinto Balsemão	—	—	—	1	1
Alvaro Cunhal	1	1	1	—	—
No vote	12	15	14	5	5
No opinion	50	44	41	51	44

Tally Shows Only the Professor Gained



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CANDIDATES REVIEWED FOR SOARES SUCCESSION

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 18 May 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saravia: "The Successor"]

[Text] As the date at which Mario Soares will announce his candidacy to the presidency approaches, the problem of his succession in the Socialist Party comes into actuality.

It is curious to note that the possible successors to Soares today are exactly the same as two years ago, when the last PS Congress occurred: Gama, Constancio and Almeida Santos.

However, the fundamental question today is a bit different.

As is known, the PS has recently subordinated all its interests to the interests of its leader's presidential candidacy.

It could even be said that the PS has practically suspended its workings-- in order to let Soares occupy first place and organize the launching of his candidacy as he likes and without any restrictions.

It remains to be seen whether this pause of the party is temporary or permanent. That is: it remains to be seen whether the socialists are willing to remain forever a structure of support for Mario Soares' political and personal interests or whether, on the contrary, once the elections are over, the PS will want to reactivate the internal debate and acquire, once again, its own voice, whether Soares is elected or not.

It is obvious that the way in which the socialists view the party's future influences the succession problem.

If they view the party as a group of support to Soares, they will naturally let Soares choose his successor without excessive pressure.

However, if they wish the PS to be an independent reality, they ought to demand for themselves the solution of the problem, even if the individual chosen is not to the present leader's liking.

Therefore, the coming months are very important to appraise the Socialist Party's state of mind.

Of the three names likely to succeed Soares, it is not difficult to see that one of them would be very agreeable to him, one would not and the third would be a compromise solution.

Soares would not like Jaime Gama very much, because the latter of the three is the one with the clearest political ambitions; in other words, he is the one whose personal realization situates itself most clearly in the political area, and that is why he would not sacrifice his own interests. Were Gama to succeed Soares, he would attempt to impose his own style and lead the party to forget as soon as possible the figure of his predecessor.

The solution that would most please Soares is Almeida Santos, because he is a man of diverse interests, for whom politics were always a means and not an end. That is why he hitched himself to Soares and has always remained faithful to him, to the point of effacing himself and appearing to serve the plans of the secretary general, and not projecting his own personality. Were Soares to be elected president, Almeida Santos would not be a party leader, but only a link between the presidency and the Socialist Party.

How about Victor Constancio?

In this case as well, Constancio's interests are not to be found exclusively, and perhaps not above all, in the political field.

Increasingly showing an aptitude for technical questions, Vitor Constancio would be, in Soares' view, a compromise solution.

In addition, he would not be a very strong political leader--and to this extent, Soares would not be forgotten.

Moreover, the field would remain open for a freer action on the part of Almeida Santos, who could maintain his influence and continue to play behind the scene the role of grey eminence, something that would be almost unthinkable with Gama at the helm.

CSO: 3542/181

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

SEARCH FOR CHURCH-SUPPORTED PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 14 May 85 p 8

[Text] The fact that Radio Renascenca opened last Sunday's interview with Prof Freitas do Amaral with a statement disclaiming any support of the latter's presidential candidacy gives rise to a brief comment, which may later be developed.

In terms of information pure and simple, the interest--or, if you will, the actuality--of an interview with someone who, like Freitas do Amaral, has just announced his candidacy to the highest office of the land is incontestible. No Radio Renascenca listener, be he a Catholic or not, could interpret the future candidate's presence at its microphones as a demonstration of support.

That Radio Renascenca, by itself or obeying the decisions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, saw the need to make the above statement is something very surprising which could, moreover, give rise to certain doubts among the Catholic electorate.

Indeed, if the Church does not support Freitas do Amaral, who will be the candidate toward whom--directly or indirectly--it would orient the Catholics' vote for president? Mario Soares? It would be absurd to think so. Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo? No way, unless the Church is not averse to giving its approval to a candidate who can nourish any illusions as to the success of her aspirations only because of the--apparently guaranteed--favors of the Communist Party.

Far be it from us to attempt to teach Radio Renascenca. We acknowledge its valiant efforts in defense of those values that, in the end, constitute the most precious heritage of Portuguese society. But in all conscience, we could not hide the surprise that Radio Renascenca's attitude created.

CSO: 3542/181

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

POLL FAVORS FREITAS DO AMARAL--The results of a poll disclosed yesterday substantially favor Freitas do Amaral. Thus, if the PSD [Social Democratic Party] fields its own candidate, Freitas do Amaral would receive 50 percent of the votes of this party, with the PSD retaining 40 percent and Mario Soares 10 percent. If the PSD would not field its own candidate, Freitas do Amaral would get 80 percent of the PSD vote and Mario Soares 20 percent. In the first hypothesis, Freitas do Amaral would get 27.8 percent and the PSD candidate 12 percent. In the second hypothesis, Freitas do Amaral would receive 37.5 percent of the vote, a fact that would allow him to enter the second round. According to the constitution, the first round of the presidential elections will take place on 17 November and the second round on 8 December. [Text] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 17 May 85 p 40]

CS0: 3542/181

POLITICAL

SPAIN

REPORTAGE ON REAGAN VISIT TO SPAIN

'Inconsistency' Over Reagan Visit

PM071138 Madrid YA in Spanish 30 Apr 85 p 7

[Editorial: "Consistency on Reagan's Visit"]

[Text] United States President Ronald Reagan's imminent visit to Spain is being preceded by a commotion which arouses enormous perplexity on the part of any close observer of the Spanish political scene.

It is not the worst thing that marginal groups, suddenly active and equipped with resources, should mobilize against the visit, daub the walls of our cities, cover them with insulting posters, and stage marches against it, nor even that some municipalities in the north and south of the country should solemnly declare Reagan "persona non grata" and "polluting," or that Mr Carrillo should give free rein to his familiar demons.

The most worrying thing in this situation is that news media close to the government or controlled by it, such as Spanish Television, should wish to wash their hands of this affair, and with misleading allusions, distorted reports, or equivocal if not clearly hostile commentaries, should encourage this state of confusion which in no way helps Spain's image and our national interests.

Let it be made perfectly clear that in a sovereign and democratic state citizens and political groups have every right to express their opinions in a civilized manner on the matters concerning them, and, of course, to disagree with Mr Reagan's policy. Let it be made clear that the demands of hospitality and international courtesy--what the classics called the "comitas gentium"--in no way prevent--quite the contrary--people disagreeing considerably or a little with U.S. foreign policy, and, specifically, as far as its relations with Spain are concerned.

But if there is anything that requires stringent and firm state policy criteria and approaches, it is foreign policy. The occasion of this visit is bringing to light certain inconsistencies of socialist foreign policy, ranging from the honeymoon of the prime minister and government ministers with the U.S. Administration on their visits to Washington to the anti-Americanism of a section

of the party membership, identified with concealed neutralism, and the ambiguities and changes of mind about NATO and the U.S. bases in Spain. As regards the United States you can be an ally, a friend, neutral, or even an enemy, but once the choice is made, you must be consistent with it and its consequences. And the fact is, quite simply, that the president of a friendly and allied country is visiting us, and that what really concerns the Spanish people in this context is to know what the visit's aims are, what its purpose is, and what disputes will be raised and discussed in the corresponding talks. However, Spanish citizens, who are almost wholly ignorant of the matter, have scarcely been informed of these topics, which could be crucial. Nor have the interviews recently granted to Spanish journalists--preselected and with discriminatory treatment for some of them, such as this newspaper's correspondent--by President Reagan, which were strictly limited to previously submitted questions, helped to clarify the horizon of the talks.

Last, it must be borne very much in mind that a fundamental debate on the significance and scale of our relations with the United States in all their aspects--not just the political and military aspects--will arise in these talks. Specifically, in the economic aspects--let the considerable U.S. support for Spain's entry into the EC, acting as a real ally, not be forgotten--friendship or otherwise with the United States, whose deep-rooted protectionism could cause a disastrous blockade of our exports, is in no way immaterial to our interests. Let it not be forgotten, either, that the United States is one of the world's intellectual and cultural centers, with enormous opportunities open to science and technology, from which, with an intelligent policy, we could benefit by means of cooperation programs and agreements.

Government Inconsistency Exposed

PM160921 Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 8 May 85 p 5

[Editorial: "The Discrepancies of a Visit"]

[Text] It was strange to watch the faces at the official address. Mr Gonzalez wore what is usually called a ceremonious expression, while Mr Reagan seemed as happy as he could be. Prime Minister Gonzalez delivered vague remarks in an inexpressive tone of voice, without his usual almost didactic desire to communicate. The most specific thing he said was that the Spanish Government will strive to maintain good relations with the United States irrespective of the legitimate differences of assessment that we have on both sides. President Reagan read out in a lively manner a speech in which he expressed gratitude for the Spanish Government's "wonderful hospitality" and praised the contribution to Western security which Spain is making through NATO and our bilateral accord. An observer would have said that Reagan was very pleased to have come and that Gonzalez was wondering whether it was worthwhile.

All this seemed even more disconcerting in view of reports emphasizing the adverse nature of the atmosphere. For the second day running there were reports that students--one day in Zaragoza, the next in Madrid--had awarded the U.S. President a doctorate "horroris causa"--a grotesque episode which seems

to have been considered extremely important. But the discrepancies were not confined to the choice of what news to report. Actually nobody remained indifferent. Those who apparently should have been present were not--and deputy Prime Minister Guerra appeared at an event near Madrid--and those who considered that they had not been granted proper consideration protested. It was revealed that Mayor [of Madrid] Tierno would not be able to present Reagan with the golden key, thus proclaiming an indifference to Reagan on Madrid's part which was disproved by the demonstrations and blackouts. The Spanish employers' federation leaders did not attend the U.S. President's address to the March Foundation as the guest of the Management Progress Organization, and they complained about a meeting with the leading business chiefs not having been included on the official agenda.

The question of protocol proved controversial on all sides, except perhaps for Washington, whose opinion seemed to have been decisive in this respect. The U.S. President did not address parliament, but in view of the displays of indifference or even hostility that occurred within the socialist ranks doubts about the atmosphere of such an encounter could have been raised. Reagan's [word indistinct] in his lecture was one of complete optimism, which presents another discrepancy with the Spanish situation. Governments themselves cannot provide more progress, the U.S. President said; what they can do is provide freedom. For Reagan, as is well known, this means reducing the bureaucracy and taxes which stifle productive capability. This is the platform that won him his reelection. Even the Latin American horizons seemed bright, with the contagious freedom that has caused several dictatorships to disappear over the past 10 years.

It is true that optimism was not absent on the Spanish side either, and the clearest expression of it came in the king's speech. And probably the outlook afforded by the visit is an optimistic one if viewed in the long term, though worrying viewed in the shorter term. Reagan's visit to Spain comes 10 years after Franco's death and encounters a consolidated monarchy and a center-left government that has succeeded in joining the EEC and seems fairly well prepared to remain within the Atlantic alliance. Viewed thus, good Spanish-U.S. relations are no fiction.

But a disconcerting impression results from an examination of shorter-term prospects. It will be said that most of the reactions have been due simply to the fact that in Spain international issues have not been approached with the same realism as domestic matters and that Socialist involvement in the hostility attempted to capitalize on both opportunities--that of the official visit and that of the street demonstrations--but in the final analysis Spain and its government cannot be said to have displayed clarity or consistency. The invitation revived the protests nurtured by the prospect of a referendum on NATO, and Socialist schizophrenia is growing because of the absence of a clear message. If the government considers it better that we stay in NATO it has not taken advantage of the visit to convey this conviction, however subtly; if it wants to distance itself from the Atlantic alliance it is incomprehensible why it invited the U.S. President to visit. Of course, the talks between Moran and Shultz can

open up other paths and the repercussions of a visit to not become apparent until much later. But the discrepancy between President Reagan's political decisiveness and the Spanish Government's doubts and confusion in its delicate task in connection with the Atlantic alliance issue could not fail to prompt unease in the country.

EL PAIS Assesses Visit

PM151503 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 8 May 85 p 10

[Editorial: "Record of a Visit"]

[Text] The repercussions on Spanish domestic policy of the visit by President Reagan, who today continues his tour of Europe, could prove more striking than its implications for Spanish-U.S. relations. Within the strictly diplomatic context Ronald Reagan helped people forget, in all his remarks, the ominous statement made by Haig, while the government and deputies were being held hostage in the Congress of Deputies by Antonio Tejero, about the nature of a merely "internal matter" which the Republican administration attributed to the failed 23 February coup. Having paid rhetorical tribute to the historic and cultural debt to Spain, the U.S. President voiced his admiration for the progress of freedom in our country since General Franco's death and cited our transition process as an example to all nations--especially in Latin America--evolving toward democratic institutions.

The mention of the existence of "a broad range of accords" between the two governments concerning the "kind of world" that both countries wish to achieve did not prevent the U.S. President from referring to the disagreement on other issues. The reference to the need to make "additional efforts to strengthen peace, democracy, and economic progress" in Central and South America was accompanied by the acknowledgement that that region is of "particular concern" both to Spain and to the United States. In this connection we would point out that Nicaragua's independence and sovereignty could be destroyed by the tumult of the present East-West confrontation, but it must not be forgotten that "gunboat" diplomacy and the "big stick" policy were imposed by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean before 1917. Apart from this, Reagan stressed the bilateral accords with the United States and continued membership of the Atlantic alliance as a Spanish contribution to Western security.

In contrast to this, with the exception of a reference to "legitimate differences of assessment on certain foreign policy matters," Prime Minister Gonzalez's statement--apparently off the cuff and in any case very weak--was confined to the realm of generalities and platitudes. The vagueness of this supposed political declaration contrasts with the king's official speech, in which Juan Carlos stressed Spaniards' anxiety about the future of the Latin American nations, pointing out that those peoples' claims to justice are inseparable from the enjoyment of freedoms.

Turning our analysis to another area, the Socialist government seems to have lost control of the domestic policy repercussions of this visit, whose diplomatic significance has been supplanted by the attempt to make it serve other ends. The idea of using Reagan's visit to renegotiate the U.S. presence in Spain is so

far divorced from normal diplomatic usage that it can only be explained in terms of the strategy--if the term can be used for something so faltering--aimed at justifying not only our country's continued membership of the Atlantic alliance but the very invitation extended to the U.S. President. Actually a closer inspection reveals that the Spanish Government has not clarified publicly and reasonably what it expected to secure from this visit or whether it benefited it, and if so, how. So one cannot talk in terms of the success or failure of Spain's stances because these stances have appeared ill prepared, poorly explained and rather unspecific. What is certain is that Sunday's demonstrations in Barcelona and Madrid made the NATO issue not easier but more difficult for Felipe Gonzalez. And also that the Spanish prime minister missed a golden opportunity in his statement after the luncheon with Reagan to be more explicit on matters such as Nicaragua or Spain's contribution to Western security. Neither can the composition of the negotiating board between the two countries, headed by the two top leaders, be said to shine thanks to the members of the Spanish team, despite the presence of a U.S. delegation of the first rank.

Spain gained nothing of substance from this visit, as far as is known, in the bilateral context--military or economic--while as far as foreign policy is concerned it will be necessary to await Daniel Ortega's visit this weekend to verify the truth of the assertion by U.S. observers that Madrid has moved closer to Washington's ideas, though standing by certain logical disagreements. The net result is that Reagan came here to sell a particular policy and that the public response to his proposals has been one of silence or astonishment. We are not sure whether this Madrid stage has been a triumph for the U.S. President on his busy European tour. We are sure, however, that it has demonstrated the lack of preparation, confusion, and ineptitude of the Spanish prime minister's advisers. Because now everyone is wondering: What will happen now as regards the referendum, NATO, the bases, footwear exports, Contadora, Spain's mediation in Nicaragua, and so forth?

Positive Outcome

PM160907 Madrid YA in Spanish 9 May 85 p 9

[Editorial: "Assessment of President Reagan's Visit"]

[Text] An assessment of President Reagan's visit must start from the fact that it took place under a socialist government, which when raising Spain's problems must contend with the trammels of its previous party commitments and with the opposition of a section of its supporters, clinging to attitudes very difficult to eradicate. Some of Felipe Gonzalez' problems in this field stem from the discrepancy between the responsibilities which he has undertaken as leader and some old party oversimplifications, stubbornly present as a disapproving back-cloth behind all his government decisions.

This explains why precedence over the issue which should have really mattered was taken by other, more spectacular, issues. One important issue was economic: the deficit in our relations with the United States, the danger to our exports of protectionist measures, technological exchanges, and so forth. That is what

really affects the Spanish people's well-being in their contact with the most powerful nation on earth. The issues which monopolized attention were the reduction of the U.S. forces in Spain and the case of Nicaragua.

As regards the former, the alarm created by the sudden manner of disclosing that aim, which will now be handled with the guarantee of calm diplomatic talks, has abated. Moreover, it has become clear that the prime minister will use the reduction of the U.S. forces as a trump for seeking a "yes" vote in the referendum on our remaining in NATO. Frankly, it does not seem that the trump can be decisive, when at the same time it is asserted that in any case the bases will be kept and the bilateral relationship with the United States will not be severed. The best way for the government to win the referendum is ... for it not to be held. And we do not rule out the possibility that this will happen or that it will be held after the election; we also take into account the wound in the PSOE's electoral side which the foreseeable formation on its left of a critical front with anti-Americanism as a banner would represent.

As regards the case of Nicaragua, the hopes of those who saw Felipe Gonzalez set up as a mediator were not borne out here, either, but it is clear that he will be able to speak to Commander Daniel Ortega with much greater knowledge of the facts than he had before Reagan's visit. It should give satisfaction that Spain should contribute in this way to the peaceful resolution of the problem, since it is a matter of a country of our blood, however little sympathy its political system may inspire. In that respect, and on a general and lofty level, the king said very fine and true things about the Spanish American world. Nevertheless, the predominance of the Nicaragua issue in the Madrid talks can only be explained in the light of the Socialist government's internal problems; Nicaragua is the "leftist" alibi with which it seeks to offset its friendship with the Western world's leading power.

There were no agreements either on these points or on any other, because it was not a matter of that. However, the outcome of the visit was positive. Contact between leaders is always positive when it is as cordial as in this instance. Prime Minister Gonzalez has reaffirmed his course toward the realistic foreign policy required by Spanish interests, even though he finds himself obliged to use the props of "alibis" and electoral concessions such as those mentioned. President Reagan has been able to reassure himself about the guaranteeing of Western strategic interests, which would have been endangered by the traumatic raising of certain problems and, as an expert politician, has undoubtedly gained a firsthand impression of the Spanish leaders' exact situation. All this is positive. The fact that the visit took place amid protest, posturing, and insults and with a deputy prime minister standing openly aloof from everything that was happening forms part of that situation.

The attempt to turn that protest into the voice of the country is another matter.

Madrid Speech

PM171008 [Editorial Report] Spanish newspapers published 8 May carry editorials praising U.S. President Reagan's speech at the March Foundation in Madrid during his recent visit to Spain.

Madrid ABC asserts on page 19: "In contrast with our politicians' usual babbling and imprecision, Ronald Reagan spoke without fluffing a word, with pleasant fluency, with the style of a great modern orator, with the requisite tone, and in an appropriate and courteous manner. He was masterly, and objectivity requires that this be acknowledged." And it adds: "On few occasions has a defense of economic freedom and its advantageous consequences for the progress of nations and of the world in general, so clear in its exposition and so comprehensible to everybody in its fundamentals, been heard in Spain."

It concludes: "Without any bombast or pompous pretentiousness, President Reagan's speech conveyed the lessons drawn from a political experience crowned with success in the massive creation of jobs--8 million--and of new enterprises through the reduction of inflation and the revaluation of the dollar; all this based on a key of twofold economic and personal freedom."

Madrid YA maintains on page 11 that the speech's importance "lies above all in seeing the U.S. President expound his favorite viewpoints on something with which we must agree: the creative ability which stems from freedom." However, it warns of the "clear danger" of believing, as regards U.S. economic policy, "that that experience can be easily exported." It continues:

"Reagan's message in Madrid contained in this sense which we have just explained, possibly four issues which Spain must ponder for a very long time rather than simply accepting them. In the first place, there is the issue of protectionism. Of course, Spain could secure considerable advantages from a dismantling of tariffs, but it cannot be supposed that free trade is just around the corner--far from it; even if it is feasible in the way the old manchesterists believed. In this respect, not even the United States is setting very much of an example. Right now, in the capitol in Washington, the banners of an economic nationalism which, as is well known, was enshrined by no less than Abraham Lincoln's first followers in a bloody war, are being raised again. Spain, to take an obvious example, has just faced the problems stemming from the Common Agricultural Policy--an obvious protectionist phenomenon created within the EEC. Japan clearly displays more protectionism than might be supposed.

"The second message which goes together with that favorite topic of the president is tax reduction. If anything could be dangerous, it is the belief that a policy to this effect could become a fine model for export. Not even Reagan himself was able to transplant it easily from California to the whole union. Moreover, the examples to which he referred were not exactly very convincing.

"The third message concerns free movement of capital and is connected with the fourth, which the U.S. President calls respect for the rights of ownership. It is well known that the United States contains very strong multinationals, capable of unbalancing--and which indeed have unbalanced more than once--the

economic life of the less developed nations. Free movement of capital and very great respect for ownership can complicate matters considerably.

"So the lecture, splendid in form and with a very interesting substance and four broad opportunities to compare views, finally constituted one of the best contributions afforded to us by the U.S. President's stay in Madrid."

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

SPANISH PAPERS CRITICIZE U.S. EMBARGO ON NICARAGUA

PM201557 [Editorial Report] Spanish newspapers published 2 and 3 May 1985 carry editorials on the U.S. trade embargo on Nicaragua.

Madrid EL PAIS 2 May asserts on page 10 that U.S. President Reagan, having been denied funds to support the Contras, is now using economic measures "in order to accomplish overt interference against a lawful government which is a member of the United Nations and maintains normal diplomatic relations with all states in the world." After comparing current events with what happened in U.S.-Cuban relations at the time of Castro's takeover, and contending that "it seems as if there is complete blindness to the lessons of history in Washington," it continues:

"In order to justify the embargo, the White House spokesman cited a series of arguments already used on various occasions: The United States wishes to end the Managua regime's support for rebel groups in other Central American countries, prevent that regime's excessive rearming, sever its military relations with the USSR or Cuba, and democratize the country. In fact there is no logical connection between a trade embargo, total severance of relations, and the aims summarized above. In all probability, the embargo's consequences will be very different. It is illusory to believe that the Sandinist government will disappear as a result of the CIA's 'dirty war,' or of the recently decreed embargo. And it would be highly desirable for that illusion to disappear from Washington's political speculation. Rather, the outcome of the embargo could be the intensification of a siege mentality in Nicaragua, greater toughness in the leadership team, and greater difficulty for the processes of detente, amnesty, and democratization, in which substantial steps have recently been taken, as is demonstrated by the agreement reached between the Sandinist government and the representatives of the Miskito population.

"The gravity of the U.S. Government's latest decision seems greater if it is placed within a regional framework; if it is recalled that 2 weeks ago the representatives of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama--that is, the Contadora Group--together with those of the Central American countries, made real progress toward setting in motion the plan for making peace in the area drafted over the past 2 years. Within this framework, effective measures, with international supervision, to reduce foreign military presences and assistance to rebel groups and to promote reconciliation and democracy, are possible. When that prospect is moving closer, it is clear that the U.S. policy is not only confronting Sandinism; it is obstructing, in practice, the Contadora peace process.

Spain and the European governments as a whole are, on the contrary, committed to vigorous support for that path of stability and peace. Ronald Reagan's coming visit to Madrid will undoubtedly enable the Spanish Government to explain to him quite clearly our country's stance on that issue, which is today of great importance at the international level."

Madrid YA 3 May maintains on page 7 that "This result of President Daniel Ortega's visit to Moscow could be the bitter prelude to many other dangerous reactions." It asserts:

"When the Somozas' tyranny fell, as when Batista's tyranny in Cuba collapsed, the United States began to go from mistake to mistake. The Soviet Union, which had nothing to do with the original Sandinism--just as it had nothing to do with the Castroism of the Sierra Maestra--took advantage of the mistake and began to place pawns in a place of strategic importance for U.S. life. It is sufficient to look at a map to see that an ally of the Soviet Union in Nicaragua endangers no less than sea communications between the U.S. East and West coasts, and could thereby strike the whole Canal Zone through rapid action against Panama, with tremendous damage to the U.S. economy and defense system. Because of all this, Reagan is telling anybody who will listen to him that the issue of Nicaragua is vital to him.

"An additional factor influences the dispute. For whatever reason, the Pentagon has viewed with visible apprehension a U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua since the invasion of the island of Grenada, which eliminated the colorful center of Castroism which had been set up in the former British colony. The Contras' activities, in addition to the encouragement of the Miskito Indians' separatism and the deployment of forces on maneuvers, seem for the present to mark the limit of U.S. military action. So the Pentagon is becoming a kind of dovecot. The hawks have taken refuge in the State Department, and the two viewpoints are fighting openly in Washington. For the present, this, which is something whose dynamic President Reagan seems to hope will yield him a dividend, has succeeded in confusing the Latin American politicians of the Contadora Group and clarifying matters very little for members of the U.S. Congress.

"The assistance promised by Gorbachev to President Ortega will necessarily be slight, and give Nicaragua very little benefit. But the U.S. blockade, in addition to reawakening old memories and aligning that people's nationalism with the current government, will destroy the rural economy and private industry and commerce, giving an impetus, even more than through the reduction of purchases of sugar, toward forms of economic collectivism. The fact that all this burden is falling on the fraternal Nicaraguan nation must be a cause of deep and sincere sorrow among us."

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

CARRILLO GROUP RESPONDS TO PCE ULTIMATUM

PM031503 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 25 Apr-1 May 85 pp 13-16 (special supplement)

[Letter from former PCE Secretary General Santiago Carrillo and others to PCE Secretariat and Central Committee]

[Excerpts] Comrades:

Your letter of 2 April, giving us a 15-day period to "amend" "explicitly and individually" is reminiscent of the saying: "Surrender, and come out one by one with your hands in the air" and the threat of self-exclusion recalls a kind of political "escape clause" replacing the application of the--also political--death penalty--that is, expulsion pure and simple.

We hereby wish to assert that the party's leadership team is clearly placing itself outside internal legality by adopting repressive measures not envisaged in our rules.

Article 62 specifies the sanctions which can be adopted against party members. In no instance are self-exclusions mentioned. Self-exclusion, as the word itself indicates, is an optional action by an individual, and in no circumstances the outcome of a vote by a party body. Ignacio Gallego, Jaime Ballesteros, and the comrades who decided on their own initiative to leave the PCE and join another party excluded themselves, but that was neither approved nor even discussed in the Central Committee or other leadership bodies.

We are neither leaving the PCE nor resigning from its leadership bodies. We are firmly determined to continue to belong to the PCE.

So the self-exclusion of which you speak is no such thing; in this instance the word is a euphemism to disguise the brutal decision which you intend to apply, which is to expel us.

We Are Not a Faction

You use this euphemism because you know that we are not a faction; we are the legitimately elected leaders of a number of regular party organizations--the Madrid region, Valencia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Valladolid, Granada and Albacete--who are carrying out decisions of the PCE organizations and collective leadership bodies which we represent and which today comprise over 28,000 party members.

We acknowledge that the process which has led us to act jointly in some respects--a process which has a lengthy history--is not an ordinary phenomenon in our party. But it is only a response which has taken shape in the presence of other phenomena caused by the current leadership team, which in our opinion violate the party's rules and fundamentals and have created a situation which distorts the PCE's normal functioning, causing one of the gravest crises in its history, against which all normal methods fail. Proof of this is this new kind of sanction which you have invented--self-expulsion.

This process which has led us to combine our efforts was consolidated when, following the dismantling of the Balearics, Castilla-La Mancha, Cantabria, and Castillo-Leon organizations--helped by the move toward Gallego's ranks of some of the principal leaders of those regions--we saw the leadership group begin a splittist process in the Madrid, Valencia, Galicia, and Basque Country organizations; in the first two by taking in hand the organization of a conference and congress over the heads of the two organizations' regular committees and contrary to their views, democratically expressed at separate conferences held on the eve of the national conference. By effecting this split, the leadership team deliberately violates the party rules, which in Article 31 specify:

"The special conference will be called by the appropriate committee, subject to agreement with the higher bodies, on its own initiative or at the request of a number of organizations representing at least half of the party members."

There is not a single article in the rules authorizing the Central Committee to convene any conference, still less a regional conference or congress directly.

Furthermore, neither the party's rules nor its practices authorize splitting the regular organizations, as the Central Committee majority is now doing.

As legitimate representatives of regular party organizations whose mandate we are carrying out, we deem it our right--even more, our duty--in the midst of the current crisis to uphold principles and rules which you are violating. And we do so without leaving the PCE and its bodies. Our nonattendance at the national conference--explanations for which come later--is not regarded in the rules as an action deserving punishment. It is simply a renunciation of exercising a right, which we have justified politically. Our statements to the press were a response to other statements by the leadership team and to something worse: to the press leaks which officials of the leadership team have been making for a long time and in which the basest accusations have been leveled against us, sometimes using reaction's foulest anticommunist arguments without daring to authorize them using their full names.

If we are not a faction, it is true that over the past few years a faction operated within the PCE which called itself one and which published documents containing the names of its leaders and the decisions which they took--to so-called Leninist Front of Andalusia, headed by Comrade Juan Antonio Romero; a faction which recently finally broke with the PCE. No sanction was ever adopted against that avowed faction. On the contrary, agreement was reached

with it to have its support in order to ensure a majority in the Communist Party of Andalusia bodies for its current leaders, by giving it posts in that organization's various bodies. And the PCE's current leadership team also reached agreement with the Leninist front at the 11th congress in order to ensure a majority in the PCE Central Committee, by giving a post in it to Juan Antonio Romero and, what is more extraordinary, voting at the congress for a resolution envisaging the dropping of Eurocommunism, which was rejected despite the current leadership team's vote in favor, necessitated by the behind-the-scenes agreement reached with that faction. With this action the leadership team scandalously broke the rules of the organization which it now claims to uphold.

Our Political and Ideological Differences

Although we enter later into the formal justification of our stance and into the leadership team's violations of the PCE's rules, we wish to begin by defining the broad outlines of our disagreements in the ideological and political field which are essential in order to understand our stance. We will specify them in the following points and in the chronological order in which they have arisen:

1. The party and the "renewalists"

The party conducted a policy of renewal of cadres and methods well before the political changeover in Spain, promoting young members of its leadership and giving it a collective nature, even when we were still not legal. After we became legal, the policy of renewal of cadres continued to be practiced resolutely and perhaps even excessively in some instance, depriving us of the participation of still fit veteran leaders in order to make way for young people. Following legalization, secret voting for the election of leadership bodies at all levels and the existence of majorities and minorities in the debates and votes of conferences and congresses were introduced. An approach of broad autonomy in the functioning of party organizations in nationalities and regions was established, authorizing the setting up of Central Committees in them.

These measures did not prevent the Right and certain left-wing sectors from continuing to talk about lack of internal democracy in the PCE and to criticize democratic centralism, deliberately disregarding the primary role achieved by the former of the terms of this concept. Nor did they prevent the right-wing tendency called the "eurorenewalists," strongly supported from outside the party, leveling the same accusation against us.

The 10th PCE Congress clearly rejected the "Eurorenewalist" stances, even while in a unitary effort keeping comrades of that tendency in the leadership bodies.

Well then, immediately after the 1982 changeover in the secretary generalship and in the Secretariat, a 180-degree turnabout began to be observed in the new leadership team's attitude toward the "Eurorenewalists," who had already shown their overtly destructive stances on the occasion of the conflict with the "Lertxundi group." The lunches, dinners, and meetings began with the "Eurorenewalists," who were now outside the party, because there was a belief that its recovery depended on readmitting them unconditionally to our ranks.

And those meetings were held directly by the Central Committee Secretariat, disregarding the leadership bodies of regions and provinces. Thus the process of the breaking down of the party organization by the leadership team continued. For a while there was considerable demagoguery about the "successes" of the recovery, until it was found that there was no such thing; on the contrary, Ignacio Gallego's split occurred--the leaving of the party by members who regarded the leadership team's attitude as destructive. In the attempt to attract the "Eurorenewalists" they went so far as to set up in Valladolid an association of "former members," with disregard for all the rules and the Central Committee Secretariat's violation of the organizations' autonomy.

In this context, certain statements by the secretary general were regarded as an expression of destructiveness. The accusation of abandonment of the symbols was not a slanderous invention; it stemmed from an interview granted by the secretary general to the journal DUNIA, in which "heterogeneousness" was contrasted with "doctrine," the anthem the Internationale was described as "history," it was asserted that the hammer and sickle were "not registering," and there was talk of not erecting barriers between "ideological militancy" and society.

An article published in NUESTRA BANDERA on the eve of the 11th congress under the heading "Adjust the Party to Strategy" lapsed into these dubious formulas by not defining clearly any strategy and stressing paragraph after paragraph the need for "a different party model" and for the party's "renewal," hostility toward the "concept of militancy" and "traditional" forms of political action, "necessary changes in the concept of organization of the party structure," "unlimited democratization," the reduction of the importance of "seniority" and "personal charisma," a party with "very plural views," and a party unity transformed into the "consensus of broad influential sectors in society"; in short, a "new party," very remote from the Marxist conception not just of Lenin but also of Gramsci and Togliatti.

In order to achieve this aim, it was not sufficient to attract the "Euro-renewalists"; it was essential to discard and sweep away what was called the "minority" or the "critical" or "Carrilloist" sector, in an attempt to reduce to a personal level and play down the stances of those of us who upheld the need for a genuine PCE, which without renouncing its historical roots had already taken fundamental steps in its renewal and democratization; steps which the new leadership team was attempting to discredit, as all the anti-communists had been doing.

Far from us is the data that all those who align themselves with the majority today are deliberately destructive, but that is where the leadership team's dynamic leads and it represents a grave danger for the PCE's future as a communist party. And the process leading to our expulsion--even if it is called self-expulsion--opens the doors to the self-destruction of the party which has cost several generations of Communists so many efforts, sacrifices and lives and its conversion into a "new left," without ideology or class references.

What we have summarized is the substance of the first--in chronological order--disagreement to arise between us and the leadership group. The consequence of this situation has been that we signatories to this letter have been kept

in a kind of ghetto in the leadership bodies, under the unfortunately correct impression that our heads were being offered to the "Eurorenewalists" in return for their reinstatement and that the aim was to dismantle all our positions in the party at any price in order to be able to make another party.

2. Stance towards PSOE government:

Proceeding in chronological order, the second disagreement with the leadership team occurred in connection with the stance toward the PSOE government.

Very soon after it took power, the Socialist government's pro-Atlanticist stance in international affairs and liberal-conservative stance in economic and social affairs became apparent. Apart from this, the spirit of the organic law on the Coordination of the Autonomy Processes persisted with regard to the autonomous communities, as did the lack of will to carry out a democratic reform of the state apparatus.

In view of what had already become apparent, we, the signatories, asserted the need for a policy of confrontation with the government, which we described as "a shift to the Left" by the party. We viewed this not only as a clash with the PSOE but also as the only means of encouraging left-wing currents within it and within the General Union of Workers, this being the precondition for opening up new prospects of unity and change for the working class and the working class sectors.

For many months the leadership team opposed our proposal. The predominant view was that our interests lay in ensuring "that the PSOE's period in government did not end in failure, which would be a failure of the Left and which would inevitably bring the Right to power." Hence what was called the policy of "critical support."

In implementing this policy the party made at least two serious mistakes--its support for the appropriation of Rumasa and its support for Narcis Serra's military reform.

The former because at the time of its proclamation Boyer clearly told parliament that it was a matter of expropriating the Rumasa enterprises in order to restore them to health with public money and then returning them to private capital. Through our attitude of support we helped create in left-wing opinion the illusion that the PSOE was taking an important anticapitalist measure, whereas what was involved was a continuation of the state's subsidiary role with respect to private enterprise, in the tradition of Francoist policy. In the final analysis the banks and enterprises previously owned by Rumasa, having been revived with over 400 billion pesetas of public money, were returned to the capitalists, many of them foreigners.

The second mistake was to support a military reform which is in fact the outcome of a pact between the PSOE government and the armed forces chiefs which places all military policy in the hands of those chiefs, including, among other aspects, promotions, thus granting them a prominent political role which subsequently had to be protested.

As for our stance on a "shift to the Left," the leadership group tried to capitalize--as if they were its own achievements--on the major mobilizations in connection with Sagunto or shipbuilding in Galicia, Biscay, and Asturias, which were prompted by the government's brutal policy of conversion, forgetting that at least in Valencia, Galicia, and Biscay the party's role--which was indeed an important one--was ensured, without any need for directives from above, by organizations partly headed by the signatories of this letter, who considered this "shift to the left" necessary, and not only in the context of the economic struggle.

Eventually the leadership group accepted the policy of confrontation with the PSOE government, but without a proper analysis, which led in some cases to the use of a terminology reminiscent of the twenties and early thirties and which led others to display obvious hesitations when the negotiations for the Economic and Social Agreement began--hesitations which explain why at the Workers Commissions congress there were two lists of candidates composed of PCE members.

1. "Convergence":

The third disagreement arose in connection with the so-called "convergence." An attempt was made to portray this as a decision of the 11th congress. But however hard they may try, it is clear--and the members of the Central Committee must remember this--that the idea of a "convergence of the left" emerged in a confused manner following the failure in the elections to the Catalanian parliament.

The "renewalist" leadership group was convinced that the party, having deserted the "minority," was well on the way to recovery, and to "prove" that we were the obstacle to a recovery we were totally excluded from the election campaign in Catalonia, in which Comrade Cristina Almeida, a well-known "Eurorenewalist" and non-party member, was involved instead. But the gains expected to result from this did not materialize. And this prompted the leadership group to believe that the PCE as such was unable to bring about its own recovery in electoral terms and to believe in "convergence" as an electoral insurance.

This approach was introduced at a Central Committee plenum at which it seemed as though the majority and minority could come to an agreement on our stance toward the government that would settle the contradictions--a possibility that the "convergence" destroyed.

We asserted the principle that since there were no left-wing political parties with which we would converge, our aim for the 1986 elections was to recover the PCE's electoral space, which was possible if we agreed on this objective and fired communist voters' enthusiasm for this prospect, since the PSOE has disappointed the most left-wing sector of those who voted for it on 28 October.

The approach to the "convergence" was so confused that at a subsequent meeting one member of the majority had to admit that the party could not understand it and that it was necessary to draw up a theoretical policy document explaining it clearly.

In view of this it was attempted to portray "convergence" as a "strategic" plan, analogous to the Popular Front, the Democratic Junta, and the Pact for Freedom and one which could materialize in electoral terms in 1986. An outcome which some circles considered difficult--even if precautions were taken--though it was stubbornly persisted with.

When people asked with whom the "convergence" was to take place the answer was: with social movements and individuals, and that the important thing was to put forward the idea and to see what happened. A number of leaks to the press revealed further details--with the Trotskyist League, the Communist Movement, the Tamames group, the PASOC [expansion unknown], the Basque Left, the Galician Left, the Majorcan Socialist Party. No matter that the secretary general of the party had already denied during a meeting in Madrid that there would be negotiations with Tamames; no matter that the Basque Left refuses electoral pacts with the Basque Communist Party, just as the Galician Left refuses any with the Galician Communist Party; no matter that it is difficult to imagine an accord with the Communist Movement and the League being feasible or of any use to us; no matter that it is very difficult to imagine electoral pacts with social movements which are pluralistic [as published] and do not take part in elections....

If it serves no other purpose the "convergence" serves to keep the minority in the Central Committee isolated and ostracized; it enables the "Eurorenewalists" who do not want to join the party at least to feature on its electoral lists; it serves to continue splitting the party and to destroy all hope of a PCE electoral recovery in 1986.

Furthermore, though it is portrayed as a strategic plan and though it is an absurdity within a serious analysis, it does serve a very important purpose with a view to eliminating those referred to as the "critical sector" or the "minority"; it serves to bury in oblivion the whole of the party's theoretical political formulations in the "manifesto-program," an attempt to ignore which is also being made, it serves to bury the idea of political and social democracy, of the unity of the workers, of the alliance of the forces of labor and culture, of the historical bloc, of the new political education for socialism.

With the magic word "convergence," which, strictly speaking, can refer only to a temporary agreement, a whole responsible and pondered strategy--which undoubtedly requires further work with regard to the implementation of the "Manifesto-Program" but which was conceived not for a temporary situation but for an entire historical period--has been cast aside.

In fact it is impossible to understand the watchword of "convergence" or the aim to expel us other than in relation to a destructive intent, which is a charge that we level not at the members of the majority but at those who are at present guiding it.

It is symptomatic and should be a cause for reflection that until the trial of the minority within the Central Committee began, Tamames rejected a "convergence" with the PCE, whereas later, when our "self-exclusion" or expulsion was announced, he declared himself in favor of the "convergence," albeit not promoted by the PCE but "self-promoted," doubtless with the intention of performing in it the same prominent role as he has performed on the National Committee for the referendum, whereby he fabricated his progressive image.

Apart From This, What Is the Real Substance of the Disagreements?

But apart from these specific facts about the disagreements between the "majority" and "minority" as reflected in the infrequent and limited debates of the Central Committee, there is a fundamental issue:

Is the PCE, with its identifying characteristics and its historical background, still a valid instrument for the emancipation of the workers and oppressed sectors, or has it entered into a period of inevitable decline and does it need to be revised, converted, or replaced by something different?

Because it is one thing for us to consider the new problems posed to the revolutionary workers movement by world developments; for us to examine the paths along which the developed countries can advance toward socialist transformation; for us to succeed in perceiving the emergence of forces and movements which potentially embody revolutionary elements; for us accurately to define the Communist Party's role in complex developed societies with pluralistic traditions; for us to strive to develop Marxism creatively; in other words, for us not to confine ourselves to obsolete scenarios and formulas.

It is another matter if we allow ourselves to be dazed by the tremendous anti-communist campaign which is being stepped up as the general crisis of imperialism intensifies and the threat of war grows; if we allow ourselves to become demoralized by negative phenomena caused in the field of socialism or by our own setbacks; if we feel disarmed by transient events and ultimately question the purpose of our very existence as a party.

It is true that in this controversy nobody dares go as far as this publicly and that most members of the present "majority" do not see things this way and would be shocked at the mere idea of being accused of such thoughts.

But when one forms the analysis that the proletariat is disappearing or diminishing as a result of the new technologies, one is not talking about the Spanish situation, where these technologies occupy only a small place and where workers' conditions are deteriorating as a result of unemployment, the black economy, and the tendency to reduce the state's welfare role; and where in the countryside we still have a proportion of the population--inconsistent with that of highly industrialized countries--working as peasants and day laborers and living in dire straits.

And Spain's future--at least for the next few years--is no more hopeful. Because the technological revolution is allowing a very small minority of major powers to draw away not only from the Third World but also from industrialized countries which are lagging behind and cannot stand the pace. And also because the international division of labor is determined less and less by the free market and more and more by the multinationals, by the IMF, and by the bodies controlled by U.S. imperialism and the strongest countries. Within this context, with governments--such as the present one--supremely obedient to Washington, one can imagine Spain's space becoming increasingly limited and this resulting in a deterioration in the workers' conditions.

Furthermore, as long as the capitalist system survives, the second industrial revolution will not eliminate the proletariat and turn all workers into scientists and specialists. There will be a progressive increase in the numbers of unemployed, of underprivileged, of the proletariat in the Roman sense of the word, of disadvantaged, of people who will not have access to employment. This, specifically in the capitalist countries with the highest level of economic development, which are being very cautious about introducing on a large scale the successes already achieved by new technology, for fear this will exacerbate their domestic class struggle and even lead to the creation of revolutionary situations.

Under such conditions, the anticommunist ideological campaign has a clear objective: to disarm the working class, the workers, the working class sectors and to deprive them of revolutionary Marxist party that is ideologically and politically solid and that it solid also my virtue of its profound ties with the broad masses. [as printed]

It must be admitted that this offensive has scored successes in several countries, including Spain, where it comes after 40 years of anticommunism which left a very deep impression on broad sectors. It must also be admitted that this campaign has made a major impact on our party, whose "Eurorenewalists" were a reflection of it.

Now the problem is whether or not the party will succeed in swimming against the tide and surmounting the present adverse circumstances or whether it will succumb to them.

And, comrades, do not delude yourselves: the split that you are causing in organizations of such fundamental importance to the party as those of Madrid, Valencia, the Basque Country, and Galicia and that will, if you persist, inevitably spread to the party as a whole, and the expulsion of a substantial nucleus of leaders in fact constitute a blow to the PCE, the result of a conscious or unconscious capitulation to the anticommunist campaign.

Despite this, in the belief that a solid and strong PCE is needed now and will be needed even more in the future, we will continue with a battle in which communist ideals, the party, and the revolution are at stake, in the belief that the comrades who now fail to understand us--more for formal than for substantive reasons--will understand us in the future.

We Will Continue in the PCE, Struggling for Unity of Communists

Comrades of the Central Committee!

We decided to send you this lengthy joint letter because the terms of your ultimatum are clear: You are preparing to expel us. We lack sufficient votes in the Central Committee to dissuade you from your intention; we have reasons and arguments which, if they fail to take immediate effect, will enter Communists' minds and perhaps enable the party to recover from this crisis sooner than people may believe, stronger and more united.

Be that as it may, we will never consider ourselves expelled from the PCE and will defend in every way the legitimacy of the organizations which we head as representative bodies of the PCE in our nationalities and regions. We are the PCE of the Madrid region, the Communist Party of the Basque Country, the Communist Party of Valencia, the Basque Communist Party-PCE, the Communist Party of Granada, the Communist Party of Valladolid, and the Communist Party of Albacete, and we grant no legitimacy to Palero's splittist tricks.

We will continue to struggle for our exit from NATO, for the closure of the U.S. bases, against the government's economic and social policy, for pay and jobs, against the government's economic and social policy, for pay and jobs, against the social security reform, for a consistent policy on the autonomy regions and freedoms, and for human observance.

But we will also struggle for the unity of communists within a PCE that will not abandon its identifying characteristics, creative revolutionary Marxist theory, internationalist solidarity, or its characteristics as a new kind of revolutionary party which does not interpret what has been called "Eurocommunism" in an opportunistic and destructive way and which maintains its independence.

A PCE which, apart from the necessary confrontation with the PSOE government's policy, will not abandon the aim of uniting the workers and all progressive forces around a blueprint for social transformation which must be based on the unity of communists and socialists, however, difficult this may be to achieve.

A PCE that will implement the "Manifesto-Program," ratifying the fundamental formulations of the program approved in 1975.

A PCE that will be a mainstay of stability, of an intensification of democracy, and of the maintenance of peace.

We are anxious to preserve the future of communism, which is why we refuse to enter into any kind of petty controversy that will jeopardize the prospects for the unity which we are urging. We are aware that we are not the whole of the PCE--for we do not deny [as published] anyone that status--but we are a very important part of the PCE, of its past, its present, and its future. [passage omitted reproducing statement read out at 1 April press conference]

[Dated] Madrid, 1 April 1985 [as published]

Signed: Santiago Carrillo, Adolfo Pinedo, Juan Villalba, Ignacio Latierro, Julian Ariza, Julio Perez De la Fuente, Juan Ignacio Marin, Tomas Tueros, Norberto Buenache, Rafael Pillado, Anselmo Hoyos, Javier Terriente, Angel Cristobal, Adolfo Pastor, Jose Galan, Gose Fons, Lorenzo Hernandez, Jose Soriano, Vicente Zaragoza, Venancio Cuenca, Ignacio Puertas, Santiago Carrillo Menendez.

CSO: 3548/126

POLITICAL

SPAIN

IGLESIAS WINDS UP PCE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SESSION

PM020915 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 25 Apr-1 May 85 Supplement pp XIII-IVI

[PCE Secretary General Gerardo Iglesias 19 April closing speech to Central Committee session in Madrid: "Gerardo Iglesias: Flag of Unity Still Flies"]

[Text] I am not going to provide a formal summing up of this Central Committee meeting. As I suggested to the Secretariat--which was in agreement--in view of the character of this meeting, it seems appropriate for me to say a few final words.

We have held today a regrettable Central Committee session, but we cannot regret the decisions that we have adopted, because we faced two options: one, to abandon the PCE to a process of disintegration, to make the party useless in the defense of the workers' interests, and to perpetuate it as a permanent factor of instability within the party system itself.

The other option was to make an absolute commitment to a recovery, even at the cost of adopting unpleasant measures, so that the party can again recover its unity of action, its ability to submit proposals, and to struggle--in short, to recover the dignity which the PCE deserves by virtue of its history, its men and women, and its blueprint for transformation. For 2 long years we have remained committed to the most complete amenability and flexibility, refusing to respond to disparagements, refusing to respond to the impassioned obstructionism of the minority. This has been our attitude hitherto. Nobody can fairly gainsay this assertion, though it does not imply that we have done everything right.

I would like to say two things about the leadership's conduct over these 2 long years. First, that it has been worthwhile maintaining it for some time, for as long as possible, as a contribution, comrades, to a future party of synthesis, a profoundly democratic, non-decretory [no consignista] party of debate. Second, in view of the extreme level of radicalization of insubordination reached by the minority, the decisions of this Central Committee session had become indispensable if it was not to shirk its responsibilities in leading the party.

Leadership implies first and foremost, and as a minimum, preserving the enterprise that is to be led, its assets. I believe there is no doubt that the minority had, through its attitude, become a crucial factor in dissipating the party's assets.

This resolution had to be adopted, and we adopted it out of a sense of responsibility and in the most democratic--I stress, the most democratic--possible way, since we allowed the entire party to speak before taking this measure, introducing, as I have said before from this platform and elsewhere, a procedure unusual for this party but which we should use more frequently--the consultation of all the associations.

Having made this point, I would like to proceed to a brief consideration which I hope will be adopted as a collective pledge by this Central Commission session, as a moral pledge by the entire party. As I see it, in this process of division of the PCE, there is one factor that emerges above all others--a cultural attitude that is objectively anti-Marxist, I would say reactionary. The cultural attitude to which I am referring is reflected in the blind rejection of anything that does not conform to one's own preconceptions. This is a stance which engenders self-delusion whereby, when events turn against you, instead of analyzing them in their full complexity, you react by seeking arguments to justify your preconceptions. This is an approach which ultimately creates an unreal world in people's minds. It is mentality which speaks of Marxism but which I believe is not Marxist. In my opinion, it is largely this mentality which has led this party to disaster. So it is this mentality that we must remove once and for all from all of us.

I would like to cite some specific examples, some facts that support what I am saying, so that this does not appear like a meaningless philosophical disquisition. When you are in the majority you defend democratic centralism and implement party rules in the face of any adversity. When this same majority becomes the minority you don't give a dam for democratic centralism and the rules. You act and speak supposedly on behalf of the majority of the party but when the party to the opposite effect, you call it a false majority. Now you say black where once you said white, and we are now starting to be accused--in fact we are already being accused--of extremism with respect to PSOE policy whereas we used to be accused just as blithely of following in the PSOE's wake. One conclusive piece of evidence: The members of the minority within the Workers Commissions, who used to accuse us of being too soft on the government, opposed a 24-hour strike when Marcelino Camacho, together with the other Workers Commissions leaders, proposed one against the brutal attack constituted by the social security reform.

One further example: Two long years after our election defeat that defeat is still being blamed on anything but the party's mistakes. The latest conclusion concerning the causes of our election defeat, expounded by Santiago at a meeting last Sunday, is astonishing. It astonishes me. He distributes the blame for that defeat between the cowardliness of the deputies who threw themselves to the ground on 23 February [1981 storming of congress of deputies] and the cowardliness which spread to the Spanish people. The guilty parties in the final analysis are principally our own deputies of the time, apart from Santiago Carrillo. This is what he means when he says, and I quote: "That is where we were defeated. Oh, comrades, if only the Communist parliamentary group had stayed united in their seats and so set a good example! Unfortunately that did not happen."

Comrades, I mention these examples because they seem to me clear evidence of the mentality I was talking about: Such an attitude precludes a perception of the real situation in all its complexity, its changing complexity. So when this situation clashes with your policy it is always the situation that is wrong. You cannot pursue a revolutionary policy like that. If you refuse to admit any errors, any argument is valid.

Perhaps this mentality is the result of the necessary attitude of resistance during our difficult years--an exemplary period in the PCE's history--but it is an attitude of resistance which has turned into dogmatism. I am not trying in any way to ascribe this to people's malice; but, as Marxists, we must change something that is now becoming a regressive element, since it separates us from real conditions and turns us into a sect.

Therefore, comrades, this Central Committee session must end with a resolute pledge and with a solemn appeal to the entire party. The pledge to devote *ourselves--all of us--above all to the real building of a party that is democratic in both form and substance, a party of integration, synthesis, and debate, which can accommodate all communists, each with his own opinion; in which every leader and every member plays an active role in the formulation of policy. We really must put an end to the sanctification of opinions. We really must put an end to personalism in the party.*

Because if we want to have democratic credibility, if we are in earnest about a new kind of society, a new mentality whereby solidarity and social justice will counter inequalities and hypocrisy, we will have to work to make that mentality penetrate, first and foremost, our attitude, the attitude of the party. So to extirpate any regressive mentality from the party once and for all we must each of us pledge ourselves to an attitude of amenability and flexibility, so that we can at all times facilitate synthesis on all issues. We must pledge ourselves to being always ready to criticize ourselves. But let us not forget something: We are human, and it depends on the system within which we are working whether this intention can be put into practice or diverted and whether we make the same error we have made a hundred times.

Therefore, as I wind up this extraordinary Central Committee session, I would like to say that we must continue thinking about specific innovations, specific democratizing measures that will really guarantee that there will be no paternalism in the party and that any that does exist is eliminated; that the membership need not be composed solely of active members who collect subscriptions or stick bills. And I am not idealizing democracy. But experience shows that democracy can be developed beyond the point it has reached now. That errors and successes are measured not from brilliant speeches but from the party's advances or setbacks. All the rest is hot air, self-indulgence.

Comrades, the mandate entrusted to us at the 11th congress is causing us a great many troubles. I would not be surprised if sometimes we feel tired. The task we took on is frankly a hard one. But I am more and more convinced--and I am sure that I share your own feelings--that it is worth making this effort. It is worth our continuing even more eagerly and committedly, if possible, this exercise in prudence and tenacity that we have conducted hitherto, always on the chosen path to regeneration. A regeneration which means no more and no less than

making this party more open [permeable], more dynamic, and more vigorous, so that it can be more communist. No more, no less.

Comrades, more and more this country needs a strong communist party, and the pressing need for united party action is increasing more and more. A group of EEC socialist parties met in Madrid a few days ago. It is true that there is often a gulf between words and deeds. But this meeting of socialist parties had to acknowledge and to stress, including in the final resolution, something that is part of our analysis of how to advance a project for progress in Spain and Europe. And this something is this: Either there is a fundamental commitment to building an independent Europe, autonomous of the blocs, that will take on a new initiative within the international context, or there will be no progress in this part of the world.

Even Felipe Gonzalez--though he was clearly being demagogic, did not believe in what he was saying on television and was contradicting all that his government does every day--had to advocate a political Europe free from tutelage. Not to mention the report read out by Alfonso Guerra. In connection with the economic problems assailing millions of Spaniards, the final resolution of this meeting of socialist parties explicitly admitted that the U.S. locomotive has lost its driving force, that it is destroying the metaphorical railcars in Europe that are hitched up to it and advocated a different economic policy.

Now, in the economic changes that it has proposed, the government is implicitly admitting the failure of this policy, whose philosophy was partly to wait to be towed by the U.S. locomotive. And it is also gain saying something which it has been saying systematically--that there is no other possible economic policy.

I would like to note, albeit briefly, the correctness of our analyses when they indicate where the parameters lie for opening the way to an economic revival, to resolving the problems of unemployment and to surmounting the crisis. And this fact confirms the need to step up the communist party's representation.

On the subject of the economy, I would like to mention very briefly that it is not enough for them explicitly or implicitly to acknowledge the failure of their economic policy. We still condemn outright the methods they have again chosen to achieve what they call the recovery of consumption. These imply an acceleration of fiscal counterreform and an acceptance of the economic philosophy of the Right and the employers, with the obvious aim, moreover--we must stress this--of appropriating more political space: an electoralist aim. The recovery of consumption now intended by the government is not based on preserving the purchasing power of incomes and pensions but involves--and this is the brutal nature of the social security reform which they have in mind--a new utilization of public sector resources this time by means of reductions in income tax. This marks a further step along the path pursued by the government of financing business profits by means of a progressive and rapid dismantling of the public sector, which was a kind of asset for the entire country. This, together with the plan I have just mentioned for drastic cuts in social security benefits, marks a significant step toward accepting the economic rationale imposed by President Reagan.

Therefore, comrades, I see increasingly clearly the need for a strong communist party, a communist party that will shun any sectarian or dogmatic tendency. This is obvious. Because though I said that there is a gulf between the words and deeds of the socialist parties' conference, I also believe that one should recognize a positive element in the deliberations made at the conference. And we must even recognize it in Felipe Gonzalez' remarks, somewhat demagogic though they are. At least let them serve to confirm our belief that our analysis is correct. I believe that the party must shun any kind of sectarian tendency because, despite certain ideas that we do not share and which are still being asserted, when it comes to aligning oneself, opening the way to a blueprint for progress now means, among other things, helping to ensure that these deliberations made by the social democratic parties advance in a positive direction.

There is a more pressing need than ever for united party action, among other things because the PSOE's electoralism could produce an advance even greater than that already achieved in the general elections.

There can be no question of ignoring what has happened or of believing that nothing has happened at this Central Committee session. But what has happened had worse consequences until yesterday than it can have in the future. I believe we have lost forces and witnessed lamentable events but I also believe that we are enabling ourselves to address society in the future and say that this communist party will act unitedly. And that it is going to deal principally and above all, first and foremost, with society's problems. And first, we are going to deal with the elections, but not with an electoralist ["electorera"] approach. I believe that the best way to prepare for these elections, comrades, is to examine each region, province, and area specifically. The 24-hour strike must be an overwhelming success. The party must go all out. We must concentrate--though I do not want to harp on this because we have just had the National Conference which discussed this at great length--on the subject of the referendum, Reagan's visit, and all the current mobilizations. This is the best way to prepare for the elections. Today we have elected a number of people and a commission who knows about lists of candidates and election coalitions and platforms; I believe we must proceed with this as a matter of urgency.

Comrades, I would like to end by reasserting a number of points. More than ever we must prevent this party from undergoing a stiffening of stances and a closing of ranks; the banner of the unity of all communists can only really continue to fly on one condition--unity of action within the party. Furthermore, we must achieve this unity by means of specific actions, not just abstract appeals. It may seem contradictory, because we have just completed the exclusion of members of the Central Committee, but it is not so. They were members who did not accept even the most fundamental rules; and a party cannot function under such conditions.

Comrades, there is something else I would like to say. Advancing and proceeding with the party's regeneration implies no more and no less than creating a future and a space for it. Last, something that I do not usually say--because it

not in my character to do so and also because it has already been said many times, though I do not know whether with the same sincerity as I am going to say it; and I assure you I say this with absolute sincerity: I believe we can be sure that the process of regeneration within this party is irreversible and that this Communist Party is forging ahead. This, thanks to the resolute determination--which I wish to salute, without bombast but from my heart--of the substantial body of veteran comrades and leaders who have succeeded in imparting stature and doing justice to this party's history, which is a truly laudable history.

Take heart, and onward, comrades.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

FRAGA DISCUSSES ELECTION PLANS, ECONOMY

PM241347 Madrid YA in Spanish 28 Apr 85 ("Panorama" supplement) pp 1-2

[Unattributed interview with Popular Alliance Chairman Manuel Fraga--date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [introductory paragraph omitted] Question: Are you going to win the next election? Because it seems to be noted in the Popular Coalition's ranks that it considers itself defeated in advance.

[Fraga] I am fully convinced that this can be and is within the Spanish people's grasp. Everything that is said--opinion polls, ceilings, and so forth--does not count; and the Spanish people have already given sufficient proof of this. As regards the electoral ceiling, it could be pointed out that the PSOE won 29 percent in 1977 and 1979, and then in 1982 succeeded in breaking through that ceiling. A few months after the 1982 elections, we improved our results in the municipal and autonomy elections in the face of a still uneroded government which called all the shots. Just to hold our ground would have been a success.

Question: And when will the election be?

[Fraga] Some time ago I made a prediction about the date of the holding of the general election. Whenever I am asked about the matter, I always give the same reply: The dissolution of parliament is a power which the constitution grants the prime minister. But, this proviso having been made, I have been asserting that the most likely date for the election is the end of 1985 or the beginning of 1986. We have long been prepared for the prime minister's move. And I have nothing further to add on this matter.

Question: But what could prompt the prime minister to call an election before the natural end of the legislative term?

[Fraga] I suppose that they could attempt to exploit the European success, but our entry into the EEC is a long-term process, whose results will not be seen until in a few years' time. Moreover, people do not allow themselves to be overawed, and it is well known that foreign policy does not stir many people.

As for the external factors which may be considered, it must be said that the situation and the latest election results, both in France and in Portugal, which are those which influence our country most, do not auger major successes for the socialist parties, which are clearly in retreat.

Nor are we now seeing greater effectiveness in the antiterrorist struggle. On the contrary, the government does not even know from where the latest blows come. Its intelligence capability has not improved at all. No measure has been adopted to control the 200,000 Arabs residing in Spain and possible outbreaks of terrorism, such as, for instance, the extremely grave outrage at the El Descanso restaurant.

Last, we are seeing grave social and legal insecurity, which gravely affects the Spanish people, and which, unlike foreign policy, can mobilize many people in one way or another. Issues such as the reform of social security, pensions, the law on the judiciary, and so forth, catch us unawares every day, like another attack.

Question: Will you toughen your opposition in these last months of the legislative term?

[Fraga] The line which we have laid down is the right one, and there are no grounds for changing the pace, although we hold some cards. It is very possible that we will submit a motion of censure before the end and when it will influence public opinion most.

Question: What will be the Popular Group's message in the next campaign?

[Fraga] The specific watchword of the campaign will be the last thing. We are more concerned about the whole of the message of solutions to the grave problems confronting Spain today than the final sentence in which it is embodied and which could have more success and relative influence. There is no doubt that the socialists' message of change was successful, but the Spanish people are increasingly able to judge and distinguish between the truth and promises impossible to keep. Our pledge will be a serious pledge of responses to the Spanish people's anxieties, and not a more or less successful electoral bait. We will not make demagogic promises such as the creation of 800,000 jobs, which have later proved impossible to keep.

Question: What steps will the coalition take to renew its pact?

[Fraga] In fact the formulation of the pacts was necessitated by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo's haste to dissolve Parliament, and they have never been made comprehensive. First, bilateral pacts were concluded with parties such as the Navarrese People's Union and the Aragonese Regionalist Party, and it was only when several people who had put themselves forward as independents on our lists formed the Liberal Union--now the Liberal Party--that the Popular Coalition's Coordinating Committee, which, I believe, has not been unsuccessful, was set up. Now the renewal or finalization of a comprehensive agreement with a view to the next election and the following legislative term will have to be accomplished.

We are now studying the program's contents and preparing a manifesto which will update the election program. The major issues remain alive. The manifesto should be a set of ideas and major proposals which will later be embodied more specifically in an election program. The Popular Coalition's Coordinating Committee is studying the possibility of its being shared by the whole coalition. However, if the coalition does not sign it, the Popular Alliance will do so on its own account.

Each party maintains its identity, and just a few days ago I raised with Lord Duoro the Popular Alliance's entry into the European Democratic Group, coinciding with Javier Ruperez' presence in Brussels for the Popular Democratic Party's entry into the European People's Party. However, I believe that we will remain together in the next election. That is our party's wish, although the others will have to be taken into account.

Question: Are you satisfied with the coalition's functioning?

[Fraga] Basically yes, although some of the machinery creaks occasionally.

Question: Mr Fraga, there are those who believe that in order to defeat the PSOE, it would be more advantageous to put forward two options--one of the Right and another of the Center....

[Fraga] I do not believe in that at all. Name me a country where that works well. Napoleon boasted of defeating coalitions but he suffered his two most important defeats at the hands of coalitions. Of course, I understand why the Reformist Party, which is declining everywhere, because it is failing, should attempt to attract other forces, although, I stress, there is no possibility of winning in that way.

Question: What is your opinion of the latest measures announced by Minister of the Economy Miguel Boyer?

[Fraga], Well, that they are the measures which the Popular Group was proposing months ago. Jose Ramon Lasuen warned some time ago that it was impossible to implement in its entirety the economic program announced by the government, and he said that it would be necessary to effect a change. The only thing about which he was mistaken was the month. Lasuen predicted that it would be effected in March, and it was in April, but he was completely right about the rest. For instance, we proposed a tax reduction and we were asked how a measure of this kind could be implemented when the budget deficit was being combated. Our suggestion was not even taken into consideration, but after a few months the socialist government has approved it. And the same thing applies to the rest. The socialist government is now adopting the measures which we proposed some time ago, but with the drawback that they have allowed several valuable months to elapse, during which these measures might have already worked their beneficial effects.

Question: But does the popular group have any key to extricate the Spanish economy from the current crisis? Because Prof Fuentes Quintana, when he was minister of the economy, coined the phrase that "the Spanish economy's scope for maneuver is very limited," and it has been repeated by his successors in the post, including socialist Miguel Boyer.

[Fraga] Professor Fuentes Quintana has my full respect, but I disagree that the Spanish economy's scope for maneuver is so limited. Witness the case of Japan, which despite limited resources has been able to give its economy a formidable impetus, the key lies in the small and medium enterprises, which must be assisted, because they can contribute decisively to the economy's recovery. The socialist government, which talked so much in opposition and during the 1982 campaign in support of the small and medium enterprises, has placed them in fact at the disposal of the multinationals, which, since you find them overwhelmed by the pressure and all the difficulties which they are suffering, are buying them at bargain prices. This does not mean, of course, that I am opposed to the big multinationals, but attention must be focused on the medium and small enterprises, which currently do not enjoy sufficient support. In fact, what must be done is to formulate an economic policy governed by common sense. There lies the key to economic policy. The time has come to take our health seriously. The point is not to give more tablets to a man who has a pain in the liver through drinking too much brandy; he must be persuaded to stop drinking.

Question: Continuing with the issue of the economy, do you not believe that, as regards the next election, people will not trust greatly the parties' economic promises, after the failure of the 800,000 jobs?

[Fraga] The fact is that it is necessary to have a great deal of common sense and responsibility in this respect, too. Promises which cannot be kept later must not be made. The socialists promised 800,000 jobs, which later became half a million more unemployed. The communists were promising even more jobs. Of course, people do not forget these things, and the promises of those who have broken them will have to be viewed with distrust.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

GERARDO IGLESIAL CITED ON VISIT TO CUBA

PM241005 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 16-22 May 85 pp 36-37

[Unattributed interview with PCE Secretary General Gerardo Iglesias; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] Question: What is the present status of relations between the Communist Party of Cuba [PCC] and the PCE?

Answer: Though traditionally our relations have been good, they must now be classed as being at an unusually high level of mutual understanding and vitality. Through the welcome and treatment they afforded they expressed the most complete sympathy and solidarity. They form a very positive assessment of as much of the PCE's role as is known in Cuba, namely the recovery and revival of the people's movements. This is apparent there. In short, with regard to relations, as far as Cuba and Fidel are concerned, there are no ambiguities in their posture of total solidarity with the PCE, just as there are none on the PCE's part toward the PCC.

With regard to our stance toward Cuba, it must be described in similar terms of fraternity, and I promise to preset in an article for MUNDO OBRERO in the near future my impressions of the evolution of Cuban society and of the present situation by its revolution. This topic cannot be enlarged on in an interview, but the exchange of information was far-reaching and worthwhile, and it is important that Spanish readers realize this.

Question: Apart from this aspect of relations between the two parties, what other topics were discussed?

Answer: Basically we broached three major topics: Central America, the foreign debt of the Latin American and Third World countries, and the problem of peace.

Question: What conclusions were reached concerning Central America?

Answer: Briefly, complete agreement on developing solidarity with Nicaragua, condemning the Reagan administration's aggressive policy, and supporting the Contadora attempts at present blocked by the U.S. stance.

The information given to me there was very useful but our basic analyses coincide completely. There must be solidarity on the peoples' part which exerts pressure on governments for this solidarity to be expressed at the state level, too. Nicaragua's economic situation is very serious. The latest U.S. blockade measures have brought an already bad situation to critical extremes. They already suffered other blockade measures, to which one must add the CIA sabotage, the military expenditure to deal with the armed assault to which it has been subjected since the Sandinista victory, and--before that--Somoza and the long liberation war. In other words, a grave situation which has now been made even more difficult by the latest blockade. Because it must be realized that a stop has been put not only to exports but also to imports of plant and spare parts which they need.

I take this opportunity to appeal to the party and the public, and also to the Spanish Government. To the PCE and the public to develop moral and material solidarity. Advantage must be taken of the revival of the people's mobilization and it is necessary to embark on a new stage of aid and support, having recourse to councils, the autonomous communities, and organizations of all kinds.

This twofold appeal is addressed to the government too--to cooperate to the utmost with Nicaragua, not just as a moral duty to a country defending its sovereignty, because this support is an investment in Spain's future interests. It is impossible to imagine a foreign policy in a progressive Spain that failed to intensify relations of cooperation with Latin America and with the Third World as a whole. Nicaragua is now a symbol of those countries' struggle for their sovereignty and for a new international economic order. A progressive Spain and Europe must be involved in it.

Question: The question of the foreign debt was also discussed. What impressions did you gain?

Answer: We agreed that the problem cannot be resolved if the only solution allowed is repayment of debt. Overall, the size of the debt far exceeds their exporting capacity. In the case of many countries the interest due to the IMF exceeds the earnings deriving from exports. We also agreed on possibility of a moratorium, if not a cancellation, because in fact the problem could only start to be resolved by cutting military spending. In any case there is a pressing need for a moratorium. Repayment as demanded by the IMF is impossible and is bringing the region to a really explosive situation.

Some countries have embarked on a democratic phase following the military juntas' inability to resolve the disastrous economic situation. The only reasonable way to support those democracies and prevent the return of the dictatorships is through a moratorium. Whoever rejects this option is contributing to the development of an untenable situation, to the recourse to desperate solutions, and to attempt by the reactionary forces of the army and the right to resume the initiative. We have already seen the consequences caused in Argentina, Uruguay, and so forth. Basically, despair could prompt those people to adopt desperate and violent situations, which could constitute the breeding ground for the emergence of "saviors" and the return of situations of dictatorship and terror.

Europe cannot remain indifferent to this situation because in practice we are the victims of the same policy and of the same entity pursuing this policy-- Reagan and the IMF. The results in Europe are 19 million unemployed, the absence of a future or prospects for young people, the drugs scourge, and the direct threat of nuclear war. So ties between the democratic forces on both continents must be tightened. It is a necessity. First, we are the victims of the same policy. Second, there will be no new international economic order unless we shift Europe's axis from the United States to the Third World. We are proposing initiatives to the democratic forces of Latin America and Europe-- we have already discussed the topic to some extent--with a view to intensifying relations and further investigating this joint struggle.

Question: Last, what assessment was formed of the peace issue?

Answer: We agreed on the need to stimulate the peace talks in Geneva, to take initiatives in favor of detente, and to encourage all people's and pacifist movements, making the peace struggle a nonpartisan, people's struggle.

Last, we agreed that the future of peace depends on disarmament, so every initiative aimed at curbing the arms race is now a genuinely progressive initiative.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

OPINION POLLS VIEW NATO, OTHER ISSUES

PM231351 [Editorial Report] Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish on 5 May 1985 publishes on pages 17-19 unattributed reports on an opinion poll conducted by EL PAIS among a nationwide sample of 1,290 people over 18 years of age, which contains questions concerning Spanish-U.S. relations and Spain and NATO.

In response to the statement that "President Reagan's economic policy helps the progress of the other, less developed countries, such as Spain," 17 percent of those interviewed expressed agreement and 65 percent disagreement, with "don't knows" and "no replies" totaling 18 percent.

A majority of the interviewees (74 percent) disagreed with the contention that "President Reagan's army policy promotes peace and averts the danger of nuclear war," while 13 percent agreed, and "don't knows" and "no replies" accounted for the remaining 13 percent.

Most of the interviewees (64 percent) also disagreed with the statement that "the United States and its President are loyal and sincere friends of Spain," with 16 percent agreeing and 20 percent in the category of "don't know" or "no reply."

Furthermore, a 66-percent majority agreed that "if our country remains in NATO, the United States should reduce its military presence in Spain," while 15 percent disagreed and "don't knows" and "no replies" numbered 19 percent.

A question on whether or not Spain should remain in NATO produced the following results: "Yes," 19 percent; "no," 54 percent; and "don't know" or "no reply," 19 percent, while 8 percent would not vote in a referendum on the issue.

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13-20 May 1985 publishes on pages 68-71 a Ricardo Herren report on two opinion polls on Spain and NATO and Spain and the EEC conducted for it by Commercial and Opinion studies [ECO].

Asked: "Do you believe that Spain's entry into the Common Market will influence the decision to remain in or leave NATO?" 35 percent of the interviewees replied "yes, clearly"; 17 percent, "a little"; and 17 percent, "has no bearing," while 31 percent expressed no opinion.

Some 54 percent expressed the belief that there will be a referendum on NATO, while 27 percent disagreed and 20 percent had no opinion. In addition, 70 percent want a referendum, 9 percent disagree, 16 percent are indifferent, and 5 percent hold no opinion. If a referendum were held, 65 percent would certainly vote, 14 percent would probably vote, 5 percent would probably not vote, 9 percent would certainly not vote, and 7 percent do not know.

In reply to the question: "How would you vote if the question were: 'That Spain should remain in NATO without joining its military structure, and that the U.S. military presence in Spain should be reduced,'" 39 percent expressed agreement and 38 percent disagreement, with "don't know" and "no replies" accounting for 24 percent, while the corresponding figures for February were 35 percent, 46 percent, and 19 percent.

CSO: 3548/126

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

PALME HAS ABILITY TO TURN MISFORTUNE TO OWN ADVANTAGE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 May 85 p 8

[Commentary by Morten Fyhn: "Palme Now Also in Hero's Role"]

[Text] Olof Palme is a fascinating politician. He is unusually capable and intelligent. He works hard, is a good linguist and fits well within the environments within which he moves. It seems that everyone agrees on this. In addition, the majority add that he also is a crafty tactician and a confrontational politician. He is not careful with his words. He causes division and not reconciliation. There are few, if any, who have contemplated using a term such as a bridge builder concerning Sweden's prime minister and Social Democratic party chairman.

Deep within the party and the labor movement, one also can find people who are fascinated and frightened by his super political power. In a nutshell: they both love and hate, admire and despise this man who is Sweden's most acclaimed, discussed and slandered politician. No one says just "well, yes" about Palme. One is not just neutral about him.

The picture which Palme would like to project of himself is of a sober and responsible politician and statesman who guards Sweden's best and who always stands on the side of the weakest party in international connections. When he has a confrontation, it always is necessary and required to protect the weak against the strong. This is a heavy, but necessary, burden.

A prominent aspect of Palme's political gifts is his ability to turn an uncomfortable situation to his own advantage. This is a talent which can be beneficial when problems arise such as economic ones now do.

The matter of the labor conflict involving civil servants, which is so burdensome and inopportune for the government, and which was concluded this week, is a fresh example of how Palme does not just govern in order to have a safe landing. He also manages the art of being a hero and rescuer.

It is a fact that the government can thank itself that the strike occurred. In the first place, it was unwise to support a separate negotiation clause for civil servants. Additionally, it was unfortunate to be so intractable toward TCO-S [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] when the organization filed a court action for new negotiations. And third, the government's

negotiators--led by Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt--misjudged the total dissatisfaction and will to fight within TCO-S. Today, it seems clear, with the benefit of the negotiations which occurred, that a nearly identical solution could have been reached without conflict.

So what does Palme do in such a hopeless situation? Undoubtedly he can see that the Social Democratic government is on its way on a collision course with important segments of the labor movement, which could be expensive on election day in September. Thus, Palme takes the unique step of participating in a secret meeting with the leadership of TCO-S and succeeds in getting the association to go along with an acceptable solution. This occurred without the government's mediation committee and the state's negotiators having the slightest idea about what was happening. When critical questions later were raised concerning whether it was proper for the prime minister himself to have intervened and resolved the negotiations, he replied that he had not negotiated, but merely probed. And he adds that it is a prime minister's duty to do something to put an end to a socially-damaging conflict.

The tactic was successful. Palme emerges as a powerful negotiator and shares a hero's role in an absurd drama. He is complimented for having ended a conflict which he himself contributed significantly to having caused. But how many Swedes know or think about this? Wasn't it great that labor peace occurred? Today, industry and all others who only had had inconveniences from the strike celebrate, the opposition is only disgrundled as usual. . .

Palme did not just come out of the conflict unscathed; he has an extra feather in his hat. And the strike likely soon will be forgotten. But to the great detriment of Palme and his economic belt-tightening with, among other things, a steep increase in interest rates. This will be felt in people's pocketbooks as well on election day.

The belt-tightening will become a far more difficult political disadvantage for the Social Democrats than the labor conflict was. At the moment, Palme has not emerged unscathed from this crisis of confidence. But he has attempted. First, he asserted that the Swedish economy is so good at the moment that at times it is too strong. Therefore, he was required to put on the brakes a bit. And then, he blamed the dollar exchange rate and the Swedes who prefer to invest their money outside the country. Thereafter, Palme diverted people's dissatisfaction away from the government and toward the banks. They attempted to increase interest rates on loans by up to four percent--two percent more than the increase in the prime rate. The banks conceded quickly and reduced the increase by a half percent. But Palme continues to talk about the banks as if the belt-tightening is their fault.

The opposition does not hide its malicious pleasure, and declares that Palme's economic policies have completely failed. But it is still an open question whether their stringent policies sound more appealing than Palme's.

12578

CSO: 3639/116

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DETAILS OF BATTLEFIELD NBC DETECTION MISSION, EQUIPMENT

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German Mar/Apr 85 pp76-80

[Article by Alfred Wolke: "NBC Detection Equipment, NBC Reconnaissance Group"]

[Text] Armored NBC-Reconnaissance Vehicle FUCHS

The mission of the NBC Defense field forces, to quickly provide information for command and warning through large-area NBC reconnaissance, requires

- great mobility for mobile deployment of NBC reconnaissance personnel and
- specialized, high-performance equipment.

For this purpose, the NBC defense companies of the divisions are each equipped with six armored NBC reconnaissance vehicles FUCHS and the NBD defense battalions of the corps with 15 FUCHS.

NBC reconnaissance vehicles will be assigned to the territorial army in only limited numbers.

The deployment plan calls for NBC reconnaissance support up to operational group level.

The FUCHS vehicle was designed with the tactical operational deployment requirements of the NBC defense forces in mind.

The FUCHS Armored Transport Vehicle (basic model) has been delivered to the Bundeswehr.

The TPz 1, ABC version (armored reconnaissance vehicle FUCHS) differs from the basic model in the special shape of its rear end (the so-called NBC stern).

The Armored Transport Vehicle 1 is high-terrain-passable, fast, amphibious, armored wheeled vehicle.

The vehicle is equipped with an NBC-protective ventilation system.

The high performance of its engine (235 kW or 320 PS) is transmitted to the road surface. The self-supported, welded steel hull is gas and water tight. The portholes are made of bulletproof glass and can additionally be protected

by steel armor flaps. The vehicle's maximum speed is about 105 km/hour. The vehicle is equipped with emergency tires and an image intensifier driving instrument.

The NBC stern, developed specially for NBC reconnaissance, facilitates the detection of radiation and chemical agents, taking of samples and terrain marking without leaving the vehicle and while maintaining NBC collective protection.

The composition of the small combat/deployment unit for NBC reconnaissance consists of -/1/3//4 (squad leader, driver and detection technicians 1 and 2).

The NBC detection equipment is mounted in the vehicle in the form of an installation kit.

The special equipment of the armored reconnaissance vehicle consists essentially of the following:

Radiation Detection Instrument (ASG)

The ASG is a gamma-radiation radiac set³. It is used to detect nuclear radiation within a measuring range of 10^{-2} to 10^3 rad/h (cGy/h).

The instrumentation consists of the following components:

- the probes attached externally to the vehicle, which detect terrain contamination by radiation while at the same time minimizing the contamination of the vehicle itself, which would give false readings. The probes are located on the right and left on the protective flaps of the vehicle's side windows. They are energy-compensating Geiger-Mueller counters which are provided with shielding so as to measure only a specific area angle. The Geiger-Mueller counters sense the low-dose range of 0.02 to 5 rad/h (cGy/h) and the high-dose range of 3 to 1000 rad/h (cGy/h).

- the main instrument located inside the vehicle, consisting of the operating, display and recording units.

The impulses coming from the probes are processed. The operator can read the dose on the analog instrument. A built-in-timer-computer provides continuous conversion of all dose measurements to the relative time period H+1.

However, the analog indicator always shows the actually measured dose, for the information of the operator. The time-corrected dose readings are registered only on the printout.

The printout can be started manually or at preselected time intervals on metallic printout paper. The location coordinates of the detection location are printed out together with the dose data. In addition, data on the location of the vehicle are also entered into the ASG.

The instrument constantly monitors the functional readiness of the probes on a probe condition monitor. Failure of one of the probes is indicated immediately; at the same time, the readings of the still functioning probe are automatically doubled so as to provide a reasonably accurate continuation of the detection mission.

The Vehicle Location Instrument

The vehicle location instrument permits a real-time allocation of reconnaissance data to the coordinates of the reconnaissance location, and thereby great mobility and speed in nuclear radiation reconnaissance. By automatically ascertaining location, the time spent in contaminated areas can be shortened and exposure of the crew minimized.

The FOA is an autonomic dead reckoning instrument for ground vehicles and consists of the following components:

- Map instrument:

an instrument which constantly displays the vehicle's location on a grid on a UTM map, and in addition, the north and east readings in 10 meter or 1 meter resolution. In addition, the map instrument shows the direction of travel on a compass. Further, the direction of travel can be shown in digital form with a resolution of 1.

- Directional Gyro:

determines any directional change of the vehicle during travel and transmits this to the electronic instruments in digital form.

- Electric Distance Transducer:

is mechanically linked with the vehicle's transmission. The revolutions of its input shaft are converted to an electric signal. Four impulses are generated per revolution, corresponding to 1 meter of distance traveled.

Disposition inside the Vehicle

Clean data transmission and data input are provided by the interface of FOA with the ASG and the MML.

Chemical Agent Detection Instrument

Consists of :

- the MML Detection System (mobile mass spectrometer) with probe for detection as well as identification of chemical agents.

All known agents can be identified as to type and quantity in the air, on surfaces and in water. Unknown agents can also be detected after a short interval. Background substances on the battlefield do not interfere with detection.

The MML has the following components:

1. The detection probe with detection head and temperature-controlled probe line.

The ambient air to be tested is used as the carrier gas. It transports the chemical agent which has evaporated on contact with the surface through the probe line, which simultaneously acts as a separation system, to the MML.

2. The sensor portion and the control and evaluation electronics.

The operational elements are arranged in a way that makes them easy to take in at a glance.

The display unit shows all essential measuring processes and results. The readings in processed form are printed out by the printer in conjunction with the location coordinates from the vehicle orientation instrument. Printout is actuated manually or at preselected intervals.

3. Detection Wheel System with Electric controls and Silicontired Detection Wheels

The steerable detection wheels in their working position take up persistent chemical agents while the vehicle is moving.

The detection wheels are steered to the detection probe of the MM1 one at a time; any contamination is then directed via the detection probe into the mass spectrometer for analysis.

If necessary, detection wheels are changed through the work opening in the rear of the reconnaissance vehicle similar to the procedure for taking samples, with NBC collective protection maintained.

Sample Taking Device:

consists of a sample taking container with remote handling arm to collect and transport samples while maintaining NBC collective protection.

A special glove is used for taking samples through the work opening at the NBC stern.

NBC Marking Set:

serves to mark contaminated terrain and other danger zones.

Marker foil, fastening uprights and the self-erecting marker buoy constitute a marking system. These items are set out through the work opening in the NBC stern.

Chemical Agent Warning Instrument

The warning instrument is mounted in the rear part of the vehicle. An air conduit system transports the samples taken externally to the warning instrument, which analyzes them and flushes them back to the outside. The instrument can be used inside as well as outside the vehicle.

Summary

The introduction of the FUCHS Armored NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle provides an considerable increase in efficiency in the area of NBC reconnaissance because of

- a reduction in time necessary for reconnaissance,
- the acquisition of more accurate and conclusive reconnaissance data,
- the availability of additional time for warning the personnel and
- improved safety of reconnaissance personnel in performance of their duties.

In combat involving NBC use, the commander gains greater operational latitude.

Figure 1: Deployment of
NBC recon-
naissance units





Figure 2: Marking System

KEY

1. marking system
2. fastening upright
3. fastening tape
4. foil
5. marker foil
6. nuclear marker
7. chemical marker
8. biological marker
9. all metal parts
laquered chrome
yellow
10. buoy



MILITARY

SPAIN

ABC OUTLINES JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN PROVISIONS

PM201050 Madrid ABC in Spanish 26 Apr 85 p 25

[V.G. report: "Spanish Military Strategy to Be Based on Deterrence"]

[Text] Madrid -- The Joint Strategic Plan (PEC), in line with the guidelines set out in the National Defense Directive, will probably establish that Spain's defense must be based on deterrence -- an objective which requires a proper strengthening of our forces to enable us to demand respect from potential aggressors.

Although the strategic plan is a secret document which theoretically should be known only to the king, the members of the government, and the staffs of the three services, it has recently been emphasized, in line with the defense directive approved by Felipe Gonzalez last summer, that Spain's principal objective must be to strengthen the Balearic Islands-Peninsula (Gibraltar Strait) - Canary Islands axis, in order to be able to monitor the principal sources of hypothetical aggressions, which are situated in the countries of North Africa.

This general approach will require the redployment of the armed forces' main strength toward the southern and eastern parts of the peninsula and a rigorous defense plan for the Canary Islands. The main army units -- the Brunets, Guzman el Bueno, and Maestrazgo Divisions -- will deploy most of their strength in the southeast, according to the Meta modernization plan, though there will be no neglect of the defense of the Pyrenees, where two brigades of each of the mountain divisions will be deployed.

The Navy will deploy the major part of its fleet -- the aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias and the frigates--around the Rota (Cadiz) air and Navy base, with the specific mission of supervising the Gibraltar Strait. At the moment, the possibility is also being considered of creating a new base in the Canary Islands. Our submarines and corvettes will be concentrated around Cartagena (Murcia) base, while El Ferrol will remain as a rearguard, as a repair base.

The Air Force will keep the Mirage F-1 aircraft at the Los Llanos (Albacete) base as the primary strike force designed to repel air incursions from the south. The F-18's, the first of which are to be delivered to Spain this summer, will be deployed initially in Zaragoza and Torrejon, in view of their greater traffic handling capacity. Unofficial sources indicate that the new strategic plan will almost certainly increase the strength of the Air Force, and to a lesser extent that of the Army. The Navy, which, with its aircraft carrier and frigates, seems to have met its requirements for the coming decade, will probably be allocated fewer resources.

The new PEC will also lay down the basic guidelines for the future revision of the Defense Ministry Budgetary Allocations Law, which expires in 1986. The law will have to be revised on the basis of financing the requirement sand programs laid down by the PEC.

CSO: 3548/127

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

MORE TRAINEES FAIL TO FIND STEADY WORK AFTER QUALIFICATION

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 12 Apr 85 pp 16-19

[Unattributed article: "Missing the Boat"]

[Text] More and more people cannot obtain permanent jobs after completion of their training. By and large, the government, the business community and the labor unions have not been able to find an answer to this problem.

For a year now, the press releases put out by the ministry for education and science have borne the legend "young people must have training." But that slogan will probably have to be revised fairly soon to read "young people must have a job after completion of their training." The reason for it is that those young people of the baby boom generation who have been getting training over and above the needs of the economy for the past several years will now be finishing that training and entering a job market where the gap between supply and demand is constantly getting wider.

Barbers and beauticians are a good example. Year after year, some 20,000 young people start training for jobs in this field. Total employment in this branch of the economy amounts to 200,000—which means that the entire labor force could be replaced by younger people in the space of just 10 years; but there are not enough older employees leaving their jobs to make room for all of these. In fact, there are some 20,000 barbers and beauticians without a job today.

The situation is about the same in many occupations which require training. Urged on by the appeals of the politicians and supported by various assistance programs, industry, commerce and the crafts provided training to far more young people than were actually needed. As a consequence, the number of trainees who do not get a job at their training site or anywhere else has been on the rise since 1981. Last year alone, 54,000 of them registered with the employment offices—which was not as many as in 1983 but then the number of trainees had gone down as well.

The number of training contracts began to rise in earnest in 1982. As they complete their 3-year training cycle this summer, the young people will be looking for jobs in their chosen field. But that is exactly the same thing which 582,000 unemployed young people want—one-half of whom have also finished their training. The market will be getting even tighter because there will be 200,000 more young people looking for jobs this year than there will be people retiring, according to the Rhenish-Westphalian Economic Research Institute. "150,000 young people who have completed their job training will probably be unable to get jobs, perhaps even more," says Herlind Gundelach, an education expert who is a member of the CDU parliamentary caucus. But that is just the beginning. The Berlin Government Institute for Occupational Training estimates that the number of training contracts will not dip below 70,000 until 1988.

"Our motto simply seems to be to 'get them off the street'," complains Oliver Luebke, head of the occupational training department at DGB headquarters. "What happens afterwards is of no concern to the government." But this charge cannot only be leveled at the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition. The Schmidt government, too, was initially interested in the number of training contracts being signed. With reference to this strategy, the education ministry feels that "a 19 year-old can bear up under a few months without a job much better than a 15 year-old."

All the political parties, the labor unions and the business community are agreed on this. Young people who have completed their occupational training still stand a better chance of finding a job than young people with no training. "We used to shoulder this burden jointly and we still do; but we should have realized sooner that there were additional problems to be faced," says Eckart Kuhlwein, the SPD education and science expert in the Bundestag. "We have trained more people than were needed particularly in those fields which did not hold much promise for the future."

This applies to the job of gas station attendant for example. Although almost one-half of all the gas stations were forced to close during the past 10 years, the number of those being trained to become attendants did not decline. But there was no proper assessment of the impact of modern technology on occupational training in the opposite sense either. By 1990, the education ministry estimates, 70 percent of all jobholders will be forced to cope with modern technology. Skilled workers in training today will have to be prepared for this. But the government only recently started a crash program on "new technologies in occupational training" and the research findings from that program will not become available until 1987. "More still needs to be done with regard to training programs in the new technologies," says Wolfgang Vogt, the parliamentary state secretary in the ministry of labor. SPD education expert Kuhlwein puts it this way: "The government programs have tried to spread small amounts of money around on a great many applicants without taking account of future needs." This applies in particular to the Länder which provide funds for

non-industrial occupational training. In the case of barbers, florists or home economists a few more trainees can be accommodated much more easily and cost effectively than in occupations where new and expensive machinery or electronic equipment has to be purchased for training purposes. But it is these very occupations, which are cost efficient from a training standpoint, where there are not enough jobs today.

Olaf Sund, the president of the Labor Office for North Rhine-Westphalia, feels there are two sides to the charge of government failure. The charge, he says, is "justified because the facts are there; but also unjustified because the number of jobs in these fields can be increased more easily and secondly, because the traditional job preferences of those young people who want to become beauticians, for example, need to be taken into account."

(1)

Nach der Lehre arbeitslos		
Entwicklung der Ausbildungsverträge und der nicht übernommenen Auszubildenden 1976 bis 1984		
Jahr (2)	Ausbildungsverträge (3)	nach der Ausbildung nicht übernommen (Vertragsbeginn in Klammern) (4)
1976	495 800	(5) keine Angaben
1977	558 400	
1978	601 700	
1979	640 300	7315 (1976)
1980	650 000	9531 (1977)
1981	605 836	20 812 (1978)
1982	631 366	45 914 (1979)
1983	676 734	82 914 (1980)
1984	705 555	54 674 (1981)
Quelle: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit		(6) Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Key:

1. No job upon completion of training. 1976-1984 statistics on training contracts and trainees failing to obtain employment.
2. Year
3. Training contracts
4. Not employed upon completion of training. Starting date of contract in parentheses
5. No figures available
6. Source: Federal Labor Office

Unterschiedliches Berufsrisiko					
Beschäftigte, Auszubildende und Arbeitslose in ausgewählten Berufen 1983					
Berufsgruppe (2)	Beschäftigte insgesamt (3)	davon Auszubildende (4)		Arbeitslose (7)	
		absolut (5)	in Prozent der Beschäftigten	absolut	in Prozent der Erwerbstätigen
(8) Elektriker	330 870	84 494	25,5	34 460	9,43
(9) Bäcker	290 850	30 330	14,4	10 606	4,81
(10) Konditoren	42 840	10 036	23,4	3 226	7,53
(11) Schlosser	116 400	23 560	20,2	61 022	34,39
(12) Friseure	198 055	66 165	33,4	20 144	9,23
(13) Tischler	198 800	41 111	20,9	27 164	12,14
(14) Arzthelfer	252 000	67 411	26,7	27 640	9,88
(15) Bürofach- und Hilfskräfte	3726 000	204 206	5,5	211 120	5,38
(16) Quellen: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Statistisches Bundesamt, Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, eigene Berechnungen					

Key:

1. Variations in Occupational Risks. Jobholders, trainees and unemployed in selected occupations in 1983.
2. Occupation
3. Total employed
4. Number of trainees of total
5. Absolute figures
6. Percentage
7. Unemployed
8. Electricians
9. Bakers
10. Patissiers
11. Locksmiths
12. Barbers
13. Cabinetmakers
14. Doctor's assistants
15. Skilled and unskilled office personnel
16. Source: Federal Labor Office; German Crafts Association; our own calculations

9478

CSO: 3620/363

ECONOMIC

ITALY

TRANSEUROPEAN MOTORWAY: PROGRESS ON UDINE-TARVISIO STRETCH

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 5 May 85 p 8

[Article by Claudio Notari: "One Hundred Miles of Expressway and the East Is Closer."]

[Text] The first stretch of the Udine-Tarvisio expressway is inaugurated. It is part of the Trans-European Motorway plan: a highway network of 10,000 kilometers linking the Mediterranean, the Baltic, and the Middle East.

A new road for Europe. The opening of the Carnia-Chiusaforte stretch to traffic represents a significant step toward the completion, planned for the spring of 1986, of the Udine-Tarvisio expressway which will connect, in the north-east sector, our expressway network with the European one. Present, for the ribbon-cutting ceremony at Carnia, were Nicolazzi, public works minister, Zanfagnini, vice-president of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sutti, president of ITALSTAT, and Carpi de Respini, president of the Expressway Company, numerous mayors, and the honorable Polesello of the public works committee of the Chamber of Deputies, representing the PCI.

Conceived back in the sixties as a highway from and to Central Europe, for reviving the port traffic of Trieste and Venice, including the international level, and to develop the region's industrial, commercial and tourist activity, the expressway is an integral part of the Trans-European Motorway plan, "TEM," the great artery which, with its branches totalling 10,000 kilometers, is intended to connect the Baltic sea with the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Middle East. The Udine-Carnia-Tarvisio stretch follows the international route "E-55" for Stockholm, which reaches Sweden through Austria, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic, going through Prague and Berlin.

And now, here are a few technical characteristics of the Udine-Tarvisio: 100 kilometers long, it was opened yesterday to traffic as far as Chiusaforte. The remaining 42 kilometers, already in an advanced phase of construction, will enter into service within one year, thus permitting a direct connection with the Austrian expressway, already partly operational. The beginning

part, along the first kilometers to Carnia, is 32 to 51 meters wide, while the stretch to the frontier has 27 meters, with each roadway having 2 lanes for moving traffic and one lane for emergency stops. The entire stretch, 5 stations and 10 customs release points, is made up of 19 kilometers of bridges and 17 tunnels, with an overall length of more than 22 kilometers, and reaching 850 meters--the highest level of altitude--in the Spartiacque tunnel. The stretch ends at Coccau, connecting directly with the Austrian expressway coming from Villah.

The honorable Polesello declared that for the Communists this expressway represents only one part of a complex effort, involving the entire highway and rail transport system, aiming at creating new conditions for the development of the Trieste port, and more efficient and modern communications between Europe and Italy. Polesello, former director of the department of urban planning at the University of Venice, claims that the work executed represents the best achievement in the highway construction sector in Europe and from the technical point of view will be judged a great accomplishment of Italian technology. A few major problems remain: the motorway should be included within a single planning framework which should also take into account the viability of ordinary national highways and railroads under construction in the new Udine-Tarvisio project. We are in a tourist area with commercial and productive installations and their infrastructures must be integrated into the whole of the systems installed there. In a high-altitude earthquake area, steps are needed to protect the earth and ensure the security of the inhabitants as well as the infrastructures. Finally, the ecological problems should be confronted and resolved urgently since they are closely intertwined with the economic considerations which alone can ensure halting the depopulation of the mountain area.

The position taken by the PCI Carnia-Upper Friuli Committee on the inauguration should be noted; it brings out the contradiction between the new infrastructural constructions--expressways, railways, and the gas aqueduct from the USSR--and the new fetters and bondages which, if steps are not taken, will aggravate the Friuli mountain area's economic decline; and also the declaration of the Federation of construction workers, affirming the expressway is "an important work of the highest construction technology, but the work of laborers who made it possible to meet the deadlines," and recalling the specter, nevertheless, of dismissals and closings of construction works.

9772

CSO: 3528/70

ENERGY

NORWAY

OIL EXPERTS INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT EKOFISK SUBSIDENCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 May 85 p 32

[Article by Flemming Dahl: "Increasing Worry About Ekofisk Subsidence"]

[Text] The Oil Commission and the oil company, Phillips Petroleum, are increasingly worried that the subsidence of the sea bottom in the Ekofisk field will result in periodic interruptions in oil and gas production, AFTENPOSTEN has learned. There is talk that during such periods there will be a loss of income of tens of millions of kroner per day.

The increasing fears appear in a secret report which the commission recently has sent to the Oil and Energy Ministry and the Ministry of Labor and Local Government.

It should be noted in this regard that Phillips, which has the operating responsibility for Ekofisk, recently had stated that it agreed that the sea bottom under the Ekofisk installation is thought to be sinking at a rate of a half meter per year.

The Oil Commission believes that this has been the situation since the beginning of the year, while Phillips asserts well into the year that the sinking is thought to be of only a few centimeters annually.

For a long time, the Oil Commission has assumed that the sea bottom had sunk by about 2.5 meters up to the end of last year. If the commission evaluates the situation correctly, by mid-summer this year, the total subsidence will be 2.75 meters.

The problem with the subsidence is primarily that the platform decks come so close to the surface of the sea that there is increasing danger of damage from high waves. Both the commission and Phillips previously have said that remedial measures could include raising the platform decks and additionally, pumping large quantities of gas into the reservoir in order to maintain pressure and thereby prevent continued subsidence.

The evaluations of the subsidence by Phillips and the commission are based on wave measurements. Both believe that far more certain conclusions will exist in the summer when the results of additional satellite measurements will be ready for evaluation.

In the secret report, the commission sets forth three or four alternative lists of measures which can be put into effect, dependent upon how great a rate of subsidence is shown by the satellite measurements to exist. The prospects are that the more rapid the subsidence, the more urgent it will be to institute the measures and the more expensive they can be.

According to that which AFTENPOSTEN can learn, one or more interruptions in production of some weeks or months duration can become necessary if it is decided to extend the platform supports--and thereby raise the decks--on the existing installations.

A question with which the authorities, Phillips and the other companies on Ekofisk are increasingly concerned is where the gas should come from if it is decided to pump large quantities into the reservoir: should one use significant portions of the gas which comes up with the oil and thereby risk not maintaining the delivery obligations to customers on the Continent, or should one "borrow" gas from the Statfjord field farther north in the North Sea?

The latter will be more likely if it is confirmed that the customers on the Continent of the companies in Statfjord will not need as much Statfjord gas as previously assumed. Experts believe that gas from Statfjord can be stored temporarily in the Ekofisk reservoir--and thereby make use of it--while also holding some back in the Statfjord reservoir.

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OCEAN/POLAR ISSUES

ICELAND

PAPER SUPPORTS ICELAND'S CLAIMS TO ROCKALL IN LIMITS DISPUTE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 12 May 85 p 34

[Editorial: "Iceland and Rockall"]

[Text] Since Iceland's complete victory in its struggle for recognition by other peoples of an Icelandic 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction and the sailing away of the last British trawler from the Iceland Banks, attention has focused on other possible Icelandic rights in the ocean regions and on the ocean bottom out beyond Iceland. Eyjolfur Konrad Jonsson, MP and chairman of the Althing Foreign Affairs Committee has been our leader most recently in this area and a major proponent for the recognition of Icelandic rights at home and abroad.

Jonsson fought initially for the recognition of Icelandic rights in the Jan Mayer area. That effort led to an agreement with the Norwegians on the region so that the issue of Icelandic rights was resolved successfully in an extraordinarily short time. In recent years Jonsson has come out in favor of the recognition of Icelandic rights in the so-called Hatton-Rockall Region.

Last Thursday the government made a formal statement about Icelandic rights in this area through issuing regulations on the demarcation of the Icelandic territorial shelf to the west, south and east. Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson said the following in this connection at a press conference: "Through this demarcation Iceland will secure for itself those rights allowed by international law. The Hatton-Rockall region is, to be sure, little investigated but it would be irresponsible on our part if we did not reserve for ourselves those rights that international law grants us. The Hatton-Rockall Region is a natural continuation of the Icelandic continental shelf. Iceland's rights in the area are doubtless more than, for example, those of Eire or Scotland, and the rights of those countries is delimited by the so-called 'trough' and likewise the Faroese Sound delimits the rights on Denmark on behalf of the Faroese Islands in this region."

Eyjolfur Konrad Jonsson said at the same press conference that according to the Law of the Sea Treaty peoples have vital interests in the sea bottom of their continental shelves and added that it was his own opinion that sooner or later the administration of such sea bottoms will belong to the countries lying above.

Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson called attention in his Althing report on foreign affairs to the Althing resolutions of March, 1983 on the Icelandic ocean bottom to the south and above the Reykjanes Ridge and summarized what had happened with regard to the issue since then. It is stated in the Foreign Ministers report that: "On last 5 July Denmark/Faroese Islands, Britain and Eire were provided, for their information, with a report concerning the demarcation of the Icelandic continental shelf south of Iceland. In addition, it was made clear that the Icelandic Government considered it natural that the representatives of these states discuss mutual interests and analysis regarding rights in the Hatton-Rockall Region and the proposal was made for an agreement on joint use of the region and a division of any yields from ocean bottom riches. The initial reactions of Eire and Britain last August and during November-December was to deny that basis upon which the Icelandic demand for rights is based and these countries have thereby put a stop to any formal discussions upon the basis of the Icelandic demand for rights. There are in fact disagreements between Britain and Eire on rights in this area and they would prefer to have them adjudicated before but preparations for the adjudication have taken a long time. Special points of view concerning the demarcation of the Faroese continental shelf have emerged from Denmark/Faroese Islands."

Denmark recently formally advanced its demands for rights in this area on behalf of itself and on behalf of the Faroese Islands. The British Government has opposed the demand of Denmark for rights and the British have likewise strongly opposed the Icelandic Government prior to Iceland's issuing of a position on Iceland's rights in the area recently. A spokesman for the British government said in an interview with MORGUNBLADID yesterday that an additional protest from the British government might be expected in the next few days. It is clear from this train of events that disagreements among all of these countries on rights to the Hatton-Rockall region will be vehement for the immediate future and that it will be very important for the issue to be pursued firmly by Iceland.

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